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What opportunities do you see as a result of the changes in todays global workforce? How can managers overcome obstacles to diversity such as mistrust and tension, stereotyping, and communication problems? What approaches would you recommend and why?
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Your book review must be written about Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In by Roger Fisher and William Ury.
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No cover page or reference page; no APA citation of the book International Negotiation 7: 235260, 2002.
2002 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands.
235
Lambs Among Lions? The Impact of Ethical Ideology on
Negotiation Behaviors and Outcomes
JOSEPH T. BANAS & JUDI MCLEAN PARKS
Olin School of Business, Washington University at St. Louis, Campus Box 1133, One
Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA
Abstract. Relationships between individuals ethical orientations (classified on dimensions
of idealism and relativism), their negotiation strategies, their views of ethically marginal
tactics, and their outcomes in dyadic negotiation are examined. Results indicate a relation-
ship between ethical orientation and negotiation strategy. Specifically, absolutists (high on
idealism, low on relativism) tended to employ more assertive negotiation strategies than did
those of other ethical orientations. Individuals in no one category of ethical ideology outper-
formed those in any other category in terms of integrativeness of agreements or outcomes.
Absolutists viewed ethically questionable tactics as less acceptable, whereas subjectivists
found them more acceptable. We found that individuals less accepting of questionable tactics
(lambs), who negotiated against those more accepting of such tactics (lions), were able to
achieve better outcomes and a greater percentage of joint outcomes.
Keywords: deceptive bargaining tactics, ethics, ethical ideologies, negotiation
Introduction
We should not check American ideals at the door when we engage in
discussions with other nations.
George J. Mitchell, 1990
To accomplish almost anything worthwhile, it is necessary to
compromise between the ideal and the practical.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1936
Joseph T. Banas is finishing his doctorate in organizational behavior at the John M. Olin
School of Business at Washington University in St. Louis, where he is a visiting assistant
professor in 20022003. He was formerly an analyst in the Department of Defense and worked
subsequently as a lecturer/consultant in southern Africa under the auspices of the Peace Corps.
His research interests include individual and organizational identity, diversity and conflict, and
organizational change.
Judi McLean Parks is the Reuben C. Taylor, Jr. & Anne Carpenter Taylor Professor of
Organizational Behavior at the John M. Olin School of Business at Washington University in
St. Louis. Her research interests include negotiation and conflict resolution, the psychological
contract and its violation, organizational identity, and revenge in the workplace.
236 JOSEPH BANAS AND JUDI MCLEAN PARKS
Numerous adages and quotes, such as those scattered throughout this article,
provide evidence of a general belief that while morals and ethics should
be guidelines to behavior, oftentimes, for the sake of agreement, those
morals and ethics may not be rigidly followed. While Mitchell advocates
following American ideals in discussions (and negotiations) between the
United States and other nations, Roosevelt suggests that those ideals are
subject to compromise in order to reach an agreement. Whether the ends
justify the means is a central question to American business. American busi-
ness is results oriented and, at times, employees stretch ethical or moral
standards to make numbers while managers turn a blind eye. A further
complicating factor is that no single universally recognized moral standard
nor any one universally recognized ethical standard exists. While most, if
not all, large organizations admonish employees to act ethically (e.g., IBM
2002), multiple moral and ethical standards exist. By which specific moral
and ethical standards should behavior be judged?
When individuals interact with one another, different moral and ethical
standards frequently come into play a situation more likely in an era
of workforce diversity and globalization. Negotiations are a particularly
important type of business interaction, where different operating standards
of morality and ethics have great potential to affect processes and outcomes.
What determines whether a negotiator will view a behavior as appropriate or
inappropriate for use in a negotiation? Some negotiators judge the acceptab-
ility of a behavior from a utilitarian perspective (cf. Brady and Wheeler 1996),
simply by the desirability of the outcome that results from its use. Others may
view certain tactics to be inappropriate under any circumstance, emphasizing
the process over the outcome. Further, some negotiators may believe that
when one plays by the rules one can always achieve an optimum or desired
outcome. Such negotiators may be more likely to play by those rules because
they believe so strongly in them. In contrast, others believe that playing by the
rules does not always pay off and that, sometimes, one must bend, twist, or
even break the rules in order to achieve the best outcome. Moreover, when
individuals with different beliefs about the appropriateness of negotiation
tactics sit across from each other at the negotiating table, their belief differ-
ences can result in one side being advantaged and the other disadvantaged. In
other words, will individuals having differing assessments of the acceptability
of negotiating tactics (behaviors) fare equally well in negotiations? Common
wisdom dictates that negotiators holding different ethics are more likely to
select different sets of negotiating tactics, resulting in differential outcomes.
When lambs sit across from lions at the negotiating table, are the results
a bloodbath or a fair negotiation? These are among the questions we seek to
examine in this article. Due to the dearth of research examining links between
LAMBS AMONG LIONS? 237
ethical orientations and negotiating behaviors, this research is best considered
exploratory in nature.
Negotiation and Negotiation Behaviors
Negotiations involve serial communication between parties to exchange
information and attempt to influence or persuade ones counterpart. Fisher
and Ury (1981: ix) present negotiation as a basic means of getting what
you want from others and a back-and-forth communication designed to
help parties arrive at an agreement when they have some shared and some
opposing interests. Lax and Sebenius (1986: 11) define negotiation as a
process of potentially opportunistic interaction by which two or more parties,
with some apparent conflict, seek to do better through jointly-decided action
than they could otherwise. Choi and Kelemen (1995: 23) view negotiation as
the ability to accomplish long-term outcomes that both parties have mutually
agreed to reach.
Parties in a negotiation may expect, at least to some extent, that their
interests are diametrically opposed (e.g., Thompson and Hastie 1990). They
may believe also (1) that the other party recognizes this fact, and (2) that the
other party therefore will act opportunistically. Accordingly, the parties may
conclude that they will be disadvantaged in the negotiation unless they too act
opportunistically. Once the negotiation begins, parties engage in behaviors
selected to influence or persuade one another. A wide range of behaviors
is available in both verbal and non-verbal varieties. Moreover, these beha-
viors may be categorized according to social acceptability or appropriateness.
Some actions may be considered appropriate under all circumstances, some
may be considered appropriate only in certain specific contexts, and some
may be viewed as inappropriate in all situations (e.g., physically attacking
your negotiating counterpart).
Ethics and Morality
In common usage, the words ethics and morality are often employed inter-
changeably (Boatright 1997: 22), yet there are important differences. Rahim
(2001) mentions that morality applies to rules and standards of conduct in
a society at a certain point in time, focusing on defining practices as either
right or wrong. In contrast, ethics is often restricted in reference to rules and
norms pertaining to behaviors and practices of members of more specialized,
professional groups.
While the historic professions are law, medicine, divinity, and the military,
over time other groups have gained professional status. McDowell (1991) lists
management as a borderline profession, as it lacks the professional character-
238 JOSEPH BANAS AND JUDI MCLEAN PARKS
istics of state licensing and a code of ethics. In business, the predominant code
of ethics arises from the repeated practices of managers. What managers do,
and what others come to accept, may define what is considered as ethical in
the practice of management and management negotiations.
Nothing is illegal if 100 businessmen decide to do it.
Andrew Young, 1978
McDowell (1991) notes that current society in the West values the charac-
teristics of ambition, competitiveness, desire for material gain, and high social
status. Society also values fair play. Balancing these potentially conflicting
values is left to the individual. Moreover, society allows that alls fair in love
and war. Interestingly, many business organizations adopt military meta-
phors, so employees in the trenches may come to view business as being
equivalent to war or combat. In such circumstances, to achieve victory,
employees may be asked or required to adopt the organizations ethics in
place of their own (cf. Choi and Kelemen 1995: 149).
Characterizing Ethics
Forsyth and his colleagues (e.g., Forsyth 1980, 1981, 1985; Forsyth and
Pope 1984) posit four ideologies characterizing ethical positions based on
relativism and idealism. Relativism refers to the extent to which universal
moral rules are used to evaluate actions or decisions. Idealism refers to
the extent to which one believes that desirable consequences always can
be obtained without violating moral guidelines. At one extreme, the relat-
ivist questions the value of universal moral principles, while others believe
that there is an ultimate right or wrong (Forsyth 1980). In other words, the
relativist may see things in shades of gray, while others see moral issues as
black or white. The extreme idealist believes that desirable consequences are
always obtainable, provided that the right steps are taken. A less ideal-
istic person believes that, even given best efforts, at least some undesirable
consequences are inevitable, making it necessary to accept the bad with the
good (Forsyth 1980).
Juxtaposing these two dimensions results in four ethical ideologies (see
Table 1). Situationists and subjectivists are both relativists, believing that
each event should be examined individually to determine the appropriate
action. In other words, the event must be taken in context. The situationists
idealism is tempered by pragmatism, recognizing the need to occasionally
sacrifice idealism and find a middle-ground solution. The subjectivist recog-
nizes his/her own personal values and needs, perhaps ignoring the need to
find a middle ground. In contrast, absolutists and exceptionists rely primarily
LAMBS AMONG LIONS? 239
Table 1. Taxonomy of ethical ideologies
Relativism
High Low
sees things in shades of gray sees things in terms of black & white
Idealism High Situationist Absolutist
Advocates individualistic ana-
lysis of each act in each situation;
what is right or wrong depends
on act in context
Assumes the best possible outcome
can always be achieved by following
universal moral principles to the
letter
Low Subjectivist Exceptionist
Makes appraisals based on per-
sonal values and perspectives
rather than universal moral rules
Allows moral absolutes to guide
judgments, but is willing to make
exceptions when necessary
Note. Adapted from Forsyth (1980).
on universally-accepted, moral rules in determining appropriate and inap-
propriate actions or policies. The absolutist is idealistic and simultaneously
rule-bound, meaning that only if the rules are followed will the ideal be
obtained. The ends do not count if the means used to achieve those ends
are compromised. In contrast, the exceptionist, while believing in universal
moral rules, recognizes the need for deviations from those rules at times. Both
idealistic, situationists and absolutists believe that the best consequences can
be obtained without violating moral guidelines. Subjectivists and exception-
ists are much less likely to believe this possible (low idealism). Similarly,
on the relativism dimension, individuals vary in the degree to which they
question the existence of universal moral rules or principles.
Forsyth and Pope (1984) found that of the four categories, only the
exceptionists expressed concern over the practice of lying (in the context of
rationales given to human subjects) and the use of manipulative procedures.
Their moral judgments were most closely related to concern over perceived
harm to test subjects. Forsyth (1985) found that situationists and absolut-
ists, both groups high on idealism, discount conformity to social norms
when consequences are extremely positive or extremely negative. We believe
that ethical ideology is likely to affect employee motivation to think about
complex issues and to impact employee decisions concerning behavior, in
this case, in a negotiation. Based on Forsyths (1985) findings, we expect
situationists and exceptionists to recognize the idiosyncratic needs of other
parties, while subjectivists will recognize the idiosyncratic needs of the situ-
ation. In contrast, absolutists will be less likely to recognize others personal
240 JOSEPH BANAS AND JUDI MCLEAN PARKS
needs or situational needs and, hence, may be particularly uncomprom-
ising. Similarly, since subjectivists are sensitive both to the needs of others
and to the situation, we would expect that subjectivists would demonstrate
greater concern for their negotiating partners, and thereby achieve desirable
outcomes through their choice of more cooperative negotiation strategies.
Hypothesis 1: Absolutists will use more assertive negotiation strategies
than will subjectivists, situationists and exceptionists.
Hypothesis 2: Subjectivists will use more cooperative negotiating
strategies than will absolutists, situationists and exceptionists.
Forsyth (1980) draws a connection between absolutism and deontology, a
philosophy of duty-based ethics espoused by Immanuel Kant (ref. Cavalier
2002). In such a philosophical system, the ends never justify the means, and
an action is viewed as being right if it is motivated by rational principled
reasons. This suggests that absolutists tend to be: (a) convinced that their
moral principles are correct and that they know the correct way to proceed;
(b) convinced that their best outcome is achievable; and (c) somewhat rigid
in their beliefs and behavior, with a strong sense of duty to do what they view
as being right. These tendencies suggest the use of more assertive and less
compromising negotiation styles. It follows that absolutists may be less likely
to promote a problem-solving orientation, a critical factor in achieving
integrative agreements (Pruitt 1983: 35) which are able to expand the pie.
Further, given their uncompromising nature, absolutists are likely to be hard
bargainers and hence may receive relatively more in the way of outcomes
than their colleagues. Based on this logic, we predict:
Hypothesis 3: Absolutists will negotiate less integrative agreements.
Hypothesis 4: Absolutists will achieve better individual outcomes.
Lewicki and Litterer (1985) note three major dimensions of ethical
conduct that account for most of the questions arising in negotiation. The first
dimension concerns the debate on the relationship between means (behaviors)
and ends (outcomes). Some individuals hold the view that means justify the
ends while others take the position that some behaviors are inappropriate
regardless of the outcome. This latter alternative implies the existence of
some type of guideline or rule concerning the appropriateness of a behavior,
yet does not indicate the source of that rule, be it an individual, organizational,
or even societal belief or value. The second dimension concerns the ethical
views of the negotiators themselves: whether they see a certain universal set
of ethics as being applicable in all negotiation situations or whether they feel
that ethics are basically situationally-determined. This dimension appears to
be the negotiation-specific case of Forsyths relativism dimension. The third
dimension addresses truth telling, such as what is truth and whether truth
should be told in all situations regardless of the consequences. Again, this
LAMBS AMONG LIONS? 241
Table 2. Scale descriptive statistics
Scale Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Coefficient
deviation
Ethical Ideology
Relativism 4.27 1.24 1.00 7.00 0.56
Idealism 3.77 1.25 1.00 7.00 0.67
SINS
Traditional competitive bargaining 5.88 1.03 2.33 7.00 0.63
Attacking opponent networks 2.41 1.21 1.00 6.00 0.65
Information misuse 3.60 1.59 1.00 7.00 0.66
False promises 2.32 1.27 1.00 7.00 0.78
Misrepresentation 3.65 1.34 1.00 7.00 0.73
Note. N = 136. Means were calculated on a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 = not at all appro-
priate, and 7 = very appropriate. SINS data adapted from Robinson, Lewicki and Donahue
(2000).
dimension seems to be a very specific case of Forsyths relativism dimension
concerning the maxim, never tell a lie, always tell the truth. Lewicki (1982)
sees deception and disguise, in the forms of bluffing, misrepresentation, and
falsification, as playing important roles in negotiation.
Robinson, Lewicki, and Donahue (2000) developed and validated a 16-
item, five-factor scale, the Self-Reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies
(SINS) scale, of bargaining tactics that are considered marginally appro-
priate. The five categories concern the control and manipulation of infor-
mation for purposes of deception. The categories, with exemplar tactics,
are: (1) traditional competitive bargaining (e.g., making an unreasonably
large or small opening offer); (2) attacking your opponents network (e.g.,
attempting to get ones counterpart fired); (3) making false promises to your
opponent (e.g., promise that which you know will never be delivered); (4)
misrepresenting information to both your opponent and your constituency
(e.g., denying the validity of information you know to be valid); and (5)
inappropriate information gathering (e.g., recruiting one of your opponents
subordinates to provide inside information). The sixteen tactics comprising
this scale appear in the Appendix. In a study of 762 students, Robinson et al.
(2000) found that tactics associated with traditional competitive bargaining
were considered generally to be acceptable for use in negotiation (mean =
5.88 on a 7-point response scale), while those related to the other categories
were found to be generally unacceptable (see Table 2).
242 JOSEPH BANAS AND JUDI MCLEAN PARKS
Arranging the scores obtained by Robinson, et al. (2000) in order of
appropriateness suggests, at least intuitively, that traditional competitive
bargaining is the least questionable tactic, while misrepresentation is among
the most questionable. We believe that ones personal ethical ideology (as
just discussed) is likely to predict the acceptability of marginal negotiation
tactics, suggesting a relationship between ethical ideology and SINS scores:
Hypothesis 5: Ethical ideology and acceptability of SINS tactics will be
correlated.
More specifically, the focus of the absolutist is on achieving good (in the
current context, achieving a favorable negotiated agreement) by conforming
to universal moral principles. Absolutists, high in idealism and believing in
universal moral rights, represent one extreme in terms of the ethical ideo-
logies. At the opposite extreme are subjectivists, who believe neither in
universal moral principles nor that good results can always be obtained. We
expect that absolutists would be the least comfortable with using even a
hint of a questionable tactic and, therefore, troubled with the more question-
able tactics. Similarly, subjectivists are likely to be more comfortable with
questionable tactics overall. Based on these two extremes, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 6: Absolutists will find the five SINS tactics less acceptable
than those who subscribe to one of the other ethical ideologies; subject-
ivists will find the five SINS more acceptable than those who subscribe
to one of the other ethical ideologies.
Finally, we consider the two individuals composing the negotiation dyad.
If both participants view the propriety of negotiating tactics similarly, one
would expect them to employ similar tactics in their quest to negotiate an
agreement. However, if one party views a limited number of questionable
tactics as acceptable, and the other party views a broader range of tactics
as acceptable, we might expect one party perhaps the one who accepted a
larger range of tactics to have an advantage. Restated in the SINS context,
will those with low SINS (i.e., having a low acceptance of questionable
tactics) be disadvantaged?
The metaphor we introduce is that of the lamb and the lion. When the
lamb and the lion meet, the common wisdom is that the lamb is devoured.
Similarly, a negotiator willing to employ a broad range of questionable tactics
(the lion) may be expected to best a negotiator restricted to taking the high
road and employing only a limited set of socially acceptable tactics (the
lamb). Moreover, lambs may be more likely to believe that both parties can
benefit from a negotiation. Hence, they may be more likely to compromise
and less willing to use questionable, or potentially divisive (assertive), tactics.
Lions may be more inclined to see negotiations in distributive terms (dinner
or not), believing that one negotiator may triumph at the expense of the other,
LAMBS AMONG LIONS? 243
and, if this is the case, then it is better to profit at the others expense (eat
dinner).
An alternative view of the meeting between the lamb and the lion is one
in which both sides prevail or even one in which the lamb triumphs over
the lion. Stated more commonly, it may be possible that nice people finish
first. The lamb may stubbornly persist in the face of challenge, following
high moral principles to achieve the best possible and fair outcomes for both
sides, refusing to fall prey to negotiators dirty tricks. What comes to mind
is the motto attributed to Captain William McDonald of the Texas Rangers
law enforcement organization: No man in the wrong can stand up against a
fellow thats in the right and keeps on a-comin.1 These two views lead to
two final, competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 7: Lions will take advantage of lambs, and, hence, will
do relatively better than their counterparts in terms of their negotiated
outcomes.
Conversely,
Hypothesis 8: Lambs outcomes will equal or surpass those of lions.
Methods
Sample and Procedures
Data were collected from 136 MBA students as part of their classroom assign-
ments in a negotiation class. Most of these students were full-time managers
enrolled in a part-time MBA program; the remaining students had full-time
work experience and were enrolled in a full-time MBA program. As part
of the experimental procedures, students participated in a scoreable negoti-
ation exercise, New Recruit (Neale 1997), and were randomly assigned either
to the role of the recruiter or the job candidate. The New Recruit exercise
includes two purely distributive issues, two completely compatible issues (in
which each side has exactly the same preference), and four issues that are
weighed differently by the various players, providing the potential for integ-
rative agreements. All responses were collected as part of classroom exercises
or simulation scores throughout the term.
Measurement of Key Variables
Ethical Ideology was assessed using modified and shortened versions
of Forsyths (1980) relativism and idealism scales.2 Each modified scale
included four items, to which respondents indicated how strongly they
disagreed or agreed (high numbers indicated high agreement). The scores,
244 JOSEPH BANAS AND JUDI MCLEAN PARKS
Table 3. Mean idealism and relativism scores, by ethical-ideology
category
Category Mean I-score Mean R-Score
Exceptionist 2.68 3.45
(N = 33)
Subjectivist 2.88 5.15
(N = 36)
Absolutist 5.01 3.18
(N = 34)
Situationist 4.58 5.24
(N = 33)
Total 3.77 4.27
(N = 136)
Note. Means represent responses made on a 7-point Likert scale;
1 = low idealism/relativism, and 7 = high idealism/relativism. Scale
items adapted from Forsyth (1980).
ranging from 1 to 7, position the issues on the idealism and relativism scales.
Means were 3.77 and 4.27, while medians were 3.75 and 4.50 for the idealism
and relativism scales, respectively. Each participant was classified as an
exceptionist, a subjectivist, an absolutist or a situationist based on a median
split of the two scales. This resulted in 33, 36, 34, and 33 respondents in each
ethical classification, respectively.3 Descriptive statistics for the idealism and
realism scales are provided in Table 2. Mean idealism and relativism scores
for each ethical ideology category appear in Table 3.
Acceptability of Questionable Tactics was measured with the SINS scale
(Robinson, et al. 2000), resulting in five questionable negotiation categories:
traditional competitive bargaining, opponent network attacks, false prom-
ises, misrepresentation, and misuse of information. Participants were asked
to indicate how inappropriate or appropriate it was to use each of sixteen
tactics, responding to a point scale ranging from 1 (not at all appropriate) to 7
(very appropriate). Descriptive statistics for these measures also are displayed
in Table 2. A list of tactics comprising the SINS categories appears in the
Appendix.
Negotiator Outcomes were computed by totaling the scores attained by
each negotiator from the scoreable negotiation, New Recruit (Neale 1997).
In New Recruit, possible scores for each of the roles range from 8,400 to
13,200 points. Scores in our sample ranged from 600 to 10,200 points, with
an average of 5,481 points and a median of 5,600 points. Negotiators unable
to reach agreement (impasse) received 0 points. A less skillful negotiator
LAMBS AMONG LIONS? 245
might also receive 0 points based on the agreement negotiated. The negative
value resulted from the only individual who lost points in the New Recruit
negotiation exercise.
We operationalized Integrativeness of a negotiated agreement as the
agreements efficiency. Integrative agreements are win-win agreements, the
result of integrative bargaining activity where both parties share information
and collaborate in an effort to maximize both of their individual outcomes
(i.e., their joint outcome). During the course of integrative bargaining, all
possible means of maximizing outcomes may be explored. When such a
thorough process occurs, little, if any, money is left on the table. In the
context of a dyadic negotiation exercise, an integrative agreement is one
in which all possible points are distributed between the two parties. A less
integrative agreement is one in which the joint outcome is less than the
maximum possible points. We view integrative agreements by definition as
being more efficient, where the efficiency of an agreement is the extent
to which all possible points have been allocated between the two parties
(in the case of a dyadic negotiation). Integrativeness of an agreement was
computed by dividing the actual joint outcome from the negotiation exer-
cise by the maximum possible joint outcome (13,200 points). Integrativeness
values ranged from 50% to 100%, with a mean of 82% and a median of 86%.
Perceived Preferred negotiation strategies were measured using
Kindlers (1981) Management of Differences Inventory (MODITM).4 These
data were collected by having each participants negotiating counterpart
assess the participant following the New Recruit negotiation in terms of the
strategies they believed the participant was using. The MODITM captures
the perceived relative preference given to each of nine different negoti-
ation strategies, which can be characterized through behaviors representing
emphasis on ones own outcomes versus the other partys outcomes (see
Table 4). Counterparts were asked to respond to 36 pairs of statements and
divide three points between the statements, each representing a different
strategy, indicating the extent to which they observed the behaviors in the
other negotiator. In theory, scores could range from 0 to 24 on a given strategy.
Descriptive statistics for each of the different strategies are given in Table 4.
From the scores generated by the counterparts on the MODITM, we deter-
mined which strategies were most and least enacted by the participants (in
the eyes of their negotiating counterparts). If the participants highest score
was duplicated, the participant was counted twice.
The four corners of the MODITM represent the most extreme strategic
behaviors (see Table 4). Specifically, the most assertive and least cooperative
behavior is Dominate/Compete. Collaborate is assertive and cooperative,
Avoid is unassertive and uncooperative, while Accommodate is unassertive
246 JOSEPH BANAS AND JUDI MCLEAN PARKS
Table 4. Preferred negotiation strategies with exemplar behaviors (with ranges followed by
means in parentheses)
Concern for others outcomes
low high
(uncooperative) (cooperative)
Concern high Dominate/Compete Bargain Coll
