Weekly Assignment Describe a blended family scenario and how the blending of cultures impacts the family system (both positively and negatively). For

Weekly Assignment
Describe a blended family scenario and how the blending of cultures impacts the family system (both positively and negatively). For example, blended marriages are becoming more common in American society. However, issues related to the blending of cultures always exist, particularly around language, religion, and family rituals (especially when it involves raising children). The scenario can be a real one (i.e., a family you actually know) or a hypothetical one (i.e., a family that you create), but it must include both familial perspectives. The situation should involve gender and emotion. Be sure to be objective enough that your opinion is not entirely apparent and that biases are not evident. Also be sure that the impact of these cultural differences is supported by the literature. Although there is no prescribed page limit, the paper will likely be about 5-7 pages.
Also, please use the textbook for a reference as well.

Family Theories

Don't use plagiarized sources. Get Your Custom Assignment on
Weekly Assignment Describe a blended family scenario and how the blending of cultures impacts the family system (both positively and negatively). For
From as Little as $13/Page

An Introduction

Fifth Edition

2

To our families.

3

Family Theories
An Introduction

Fifth Edition

James M. White
The University of British Columbia

Todd F. Martin
Trinity Western University

Kari Adamsons
University of Connecticut

4

SAGE Publications Inc.

2455 Teller Road

Thousand Oaks, California 91320

E-mail: [emailprotected]

SAGE Publications Ltd

1 Olivers Yard

55 City Road

London EC1Y 1SP

United Kingdom

SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd

B 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area

Mathura Road

New Delhi 110 044

India

SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd

18 Cross Street #10-10/11/12

China Square Central

Singapore 048423

Copyright 2019 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

All rights reserved. Except as permitted by U.S. copyright law, no part of this work may be reproduced or
distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publisher.

All third party trademarks referenced or depicted herein are included solely for the purpose of illustration and
are the property of their respective owners. Reference to these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship
with, or endorsement by, the trademark owner.

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 9781506394909

Acquisitions Editor: Joshua Perigo

Editorial Assistant: Alexandra Randall

Production Editor: Kimaya Khashnobish

Copy Editor: Patrice Sutton

Typesetter: C&M Digitals (P) Ltd.

Proofreader: Susan Irwin

Indexer: Kathy Paparchontis

Cover Designer: Dally Verghese

Marketing Manager: Katherine Hepburn

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

5

6

Brief Contents

1. Foreword
2. Preface
3. Acknowledgments
4. Chapter 1 What Is a Theory?
5. Chapter 2 Classical Social Theories and Family Theories
6. Chapter 3 The Rational Choice and Social Exchange Framework
7. Chapter 4 The Symbolic Interaction Framework
8. Chapter 5 The Family Life Course Development Framework
9. Chapter 6 The Systems Framework

10. Chapter 7 The Conflict and Critical Theories Framework
11. Chapter 8 The Feminist Framework
12. Chapter 9 The Ecological Framework
13. Chapter 10 Theory Construction and Emerging Theories
14. Chapter 11 Epilogue
15. References
16. Index
17. About the Authors

7

Detailed Contents

Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgments
Chapter 1 What Is a Theory?

Architecture of a Scientific Theory
Defining Theory
Functions of Theory
Theories About Families
Evaluation of Theory
Frameworks
Study Questions

Chapter 2 Classical Social Theories and Family Theories
Philosophies of Science
Values in Science
What Is an Explanation?
Classical Social Theories
A Brief History of Family Theory
Conclusion
Study Questions

Chapter 3 The Rational Choice and Social Exchange Framework
Intellectual Traditions
Focus and Scope Assumptions
Concepts
Propositions
Variations
Empirical Applications
Critiques and Discussion
Conclusion
Study Questions

Chapter 4 The Symbolic Interaction Framework
Intellectual Traditions
Focus and Scope Assumptions
Concepts
Propositions
Variations
Empirical Applications
Critiques and Discussion

8

Conclusion
Study Questions

Chapter 5 The Family Life Course Development Framework
Intellectual Traditions
Focus and Scope Assumptions
Concepts
Propositions
Variations
Empirical Applications
Critiques and Discussion
Conclusion
Study Questions

Chapter 6 The Systems Framework
Intellectual Traditions
Focus and Scope Assumptions
Concepts
Propositions
Variations
Empirical Applications
Critiques and Discussion
Conclusion
Study Questions

Chapter 7 The Conflict and Critical Theories Framework
Intellectual Traditions
Focus and Scope Assumptions
Concepts
Propositions
Variations
Empirical Applications
Critiques and Discussion
Conclusion
Study Questions

Chapter 8 The Feminist Framework
Intellectual Traditions
Focus and Scope Assumptions
Concepts
Propositions
Variations
Empirical Applications
Critiques and Discussion

9

Conclusion
Study Questions

Chapter 9 The Ecological Framework
Intellectual Traditions
Focus and Scope Assumptions
Concepts
Propositions
Variations
Empirical Applications
Critiques and Discussion
Conclusion
Study Questions

Chapter 10 Theory Construction and Emerging Theories
Stages of Theory Construction
Methods of Theory Construction
Strategies of Theory Construction
Emerging Theories
Conclusion
Study Questions

Chapter 11 Epilogue
Metatheory and Theory Development
The Future of Family Theory
Conclusion

References
Index
About the Authors

10

11

Foreword

In 1973, a fellow graduate student at the University of Minnesota, Peter Torsiello, and I prepared a lengthy
manuscript on theory construction and its application to families. These ideas remained dormant until 1990,
when I teamed up with Dr. James White, who provided the necessary intellectual breadth and energy to
attempt a textbook project. To the earlier theory construction ideas, we added coverage of the fields then
existing major theoretical frameworks. The result was the first edition of this book, published in 1996.

It always has been important to have stories about families, ways to understand, explain, and predict what
happens in them. But scientific interest in family theories didnt really develop until after World War II ended
in 1945.

Research became more important for academic scholarship, and resources increasingly became available to
develop and apply sophisticated methods of research. The problem was how to integrate rapidly expanding
research findings to create a coherent body of knowledge. At first, conceptual frameworks and then theories
provided a useful structure for the integration.

This book has preserved several useful themes across editions. One is the dual meaning of framework, both as
a pre-theoretical set of concepts and assumptions, and as a set of similar theories. All editions also have
attended to intellectual traditions, to major variations within theories, to specific topic applications, and to the
personal lives of readers, as well as to each perspectives limitations.

Along the way, the authors have taken on the difficult task of trying to effectively reach the needs of both
beginning and advanced students. This remains a challenge.

Other themes have been constant across editions. Where families appear in a theory is important. Do we want
to explain how families work or use something about families to explain how individuals or societies work?
Families as groups relate to their members and to societies in various ways. Some theories about families are
limited in their usefulness to relatively narrow topics, while other theories have broader application.

Changes across editions of this book also have been important. Four kinds of changes stand out. First,
feedback from students and instructors has led to changes in emphasis and detail. Second, changing the mix
of coauthors has added new voices and perspectives.

A third change across editions reflects changes in families themselves. While the last quarter century has
witnessed fairly subtle family life changes in most respects, any shift in the central tendency or variability of
family life raises new questions for theorists to address. While some theories are better able than others to
explain changes in families, periods of rapid social change always pique interest in how to understand and
explain them.

The fourth major contributor to changes across editions of this book has been innovations in theories and in
theorizing. The picture here is mixed. Some theoretical frameworks have been elaborated and refined. Some

12

have become marginalized, whether being empirically attacked or just ignored. One positive newer trend may
be combining similar or even very different theories into a coherent whole.

Unfortunately, two aspects of family theorizing have not been particularly productive across the life span of
this book.

First, a theory should be rejected if it fails to be logically and empirically supported in comparison with a rival
theory. Family scientists have not designed and executed such critical tests. So the appeal of any specific
theory has remained mostly a matter of subjective personal preference. We need more rigorous research on
how popular each theory has been and why some have been more popular than others.

Second, applying and combining existing theories has been considerably more popular than creating new
theories. While both combining and creating certainly can be desirable, there is no broadly acceptable
standard for doing either well. Theorizing, and communication about methods of theorizing, eventually needs
to be governed by acceptable scientific standards and routinely communicated in published reports.

The authors of this book care deeply about the future of family scholarship. Hopefully, readers will care as
much.

David Klein

July 2018

13

Preface

Successive editions of a popular book are more difficult undertakings than they may appear. While researching
chapter topics on the web, we encountered wonderful PowerPoint slide shows and a variety of other teaching
materials that instructors had produced. While we were impressed and heartened by this material, we were
also cautioned that any new edition should have considerable continuity with past editions. At the same time,
we realized how important it is, especially to students, that the material seems up to date. This too provided
difficulties because there were many major theoretical contributions in the 1990s and earlier that were before
our current cohort of undergraduates were born!

14

Theoretical Frameworks Versus Applications

We have tried to first and foremost be guided by providing an accurate and coherent view of the theories in
this book. We continue with the frameworks approach as what we regard as the best pedagogical tool for
achieving this end. This point is worthy of some elaboration. Fine and Fincham (2013) have edited an
excellent volume of issue-oriented applications of theory. They believe that students will be best served by
learning theory as it is applied to these empirical topic areas such as work and family or acquiring gender. We
would argue, however, that the framework approach that we use in this volume is more strongly
recommended for several reasons:

1.The framework approach ties the current theory to the intellectual traditions and history that inform this
particular theoretical avenue of thought. For example, there is little dispute that rational choice theory is tied
to the intellectual wellsprings of utilitarianism in the 1800s and also to the hedonists (300 BCE) and the pre-
Socratic sophists. This intellectual tradition is alive and well in economics, sociology, history, and many other
disciplines. The arguments launched by these schools of rationalism also appear in jurisprudence, criminology,
and political discussions. We think that students using Family Theories deserve an entre to this world of ideas
as both future scholars and researchers as well as future citizens trying to understand a very complex world.

2.Another reason we believe that the framework approach used in this book is superior to topic applications
is that the student is exposed to the broad, general, and abstract concepts and propositions of the theories.
The topics approach might expose students to only those propositions that are useful in understanding the
particular phenomenon under consideration. The problem is that this may only give the student an
incomplete picture of the theory. It may neglect the important assumptions of the theory and how the theory
deals with different levels of analysis. For example, if we applied life course theory to individuals in a particular
role (perhaps mothers), we would not have need to explain how this theory functions for cohorts or becomes
institutionalized or deals with social change. Indeed, it is our hope that by introducing the more general
propositions of the theory, we give the student a chance to see the internal logic and coherence of the theory.
Applications of a theory are not applications of the entire theory to a phenomenon (since that would seldom
be required) but only a limited slice of the theoretical pie.

3.The last argument we make in this regard is based on a much bigger difference between our pedagogical
goals and those favoring an applied approach. One of the pedagogical goals we have for this book is to invite
our students and readers into the world of ideas. Ideas have a life of their own. Certainly they can be applied
to research, but they can also help you read the New York Times or assist you in thinking through arguments in
a courtroom where you are a juror. Complex ideas such as the nature and origin of social norms, the limits of
individual motivation, and even the nature of an explanation are beyond any applications approach. As we say
in the last sentence of this book, we believe that entering the world of ideas has intrinsic benefits to the
individual. We feel compelled to say that there are also extrinsic benefits to a society in producing a truly
intellectual and educated group of young adults.

15

16

Major Changes to This Edition

The two biggest changes to this edition are the retirement of David Klein as a coauthor and the addition of
Kari Adamsons as one of the coauthors of this work. Dr. Adamsons has a marvelous background in many
areas relevant to this book. She brings a wealth of teaching experience and academic research to our team.

It is of course a loss to have David Klein retire as an active participant in this enterprise. His years of
involvement have left an indelible legacy to this book and family scholarship in general. He will be missed.

There have been several other major changes to this edition. The introductory Chapter 1 has become more
focused, and students are briefly introduced to the notion of scientific facts. Chapter 2 has been radically
changed to deal with classical social theories such as Weber and Durkheim as well as the themes from classical
social theory that constantly emerge in the frameworks discussed in subsequent chapters. In addition, Chapter
2 deals with theoretical assumptions tied to philosophies of science and a brief history of the ways family
theory has changed over the last 70 years.

We also added a newly revised Chapter 10 on theory construction and emerging theories. For a long time, we
have wanted to capture more of the process dimension of theories to complement the product orientation that
such books as this necessarily assume. This new chapter addresses this grievance, and we anticipate that
students and instructors will welcome this change.

Certainly, there are a myriad of changes such as the updating of empirical applications and theoretical
progress. One major change is the reintroduction of study questions. We have tried to keep a truly intellectual
flavor to these questions while making them relevant to the current context of world affairs. There are other
small changes too numerous to cite here. The overall structure of the chapters remains the same as in previous
editions. We hope that students and instructors will continue to find this book simultaneously stimulating and
approachable.

17

Organization of the Book

The first chapter of this book provides a general introduction to the topic of family theory and theory in
general. The second chapter deals more with philosophy of science issues and a brief history of family theory.
The next seven chapters covering the theoretical frameworks are organized using the same headings. We now
briefly examine the headings used to organize these chapters. Each theoretical framework is introduced by a
brief fictional account or vignette about some aspect of family life. These accounts serve to focus the reader on
the particular form of behavior and interaction that the theoretical framework is intended to explain.

The first subheading the reader encounters in these seven chapters is Intellectual Traditions. This section
introduces the reader to a brief and nonexhaustive historical perspective on the ideas in the theoretical
framework. This section should be especially valuable for assisting students to integrate this material with
material they encounter in other courses in the social sciences and humanities.

The second subheading to be encountered is Focus and Scope Assumptions. All theories contain basic
assumptions, but most important among these are the assumptions that set the boundaries for the theory.
Each theoretical framework sets boundaries on explanations and, just as important, focuses on some particular
elements or processes in families. Understanding the focus and scope of a theoretical framework assists in
understanding the explanatory power of a theory.

The third subheading is Concepts. Concepts are the building blocks of any theory. In theories, concepts are
used to provide meaning and to help classify phenomena. Meanings are provided by formal definitions.
Classification is achieved by placing a particular act or event in the broader category of a concept. Concepts
also assist explanation when they are used in propositions.

The fourth subheading is Propositions. In this section, a modest and nonexhaustive list of theoretical
propositions gives the reader a simple idea of how explanation might proceed. The propositions are best
understood as the way that a particular theory relates its concepts to each other. Explanation then is when an
observation is covered by one of these propositions. This is the most abstract area of each chapter.

The fifth section is Variations. In this section, a small set of theoretical variations is discussed. These variations
are selected to capture the range of differences that the theoretical framework may accommodate. We have
attempted to include what we regard as the major variants, but there is certainly some room for debate.
Instructors and students may, of course, add variants to their class discussions, and this would further enrich
the understanding of the framework.

The sixth subheading is Empirical Applications. One or two examples are discussed, and the more general
theoretical framework or one of its variations is used to explain and interpret an empirical research finding or
small set of findings in a topical area. The principal goal here is to demonstrate how the theory interacts with
research.

The seventh subheading is Critiques and Discussion. This section covers the major flaws or weaknesses of the

18

framework. Our treatment is aimed at enhancing the students depth of understanding of the theory rather
than to encourage rejection of the theory. A Conclusion section provides a brief synopsis of the major thrusts of
the theory and our perspective on the theory. The Study Questions we have added can be used for study and
class discussions.

The penultimate chapter of the book is an expansion of some of the ideas about theory as process that were
suggested in the first chapter. The final chapter of the book, the Epilogue, presents a typology for analyzing
and comparing the seven theoretical frameworks. This chapter also takes stock of where we are in the field
and the directions we see for the future.

We hope that all of our readersstudents, faculty, and researchersare as profoundly influenced by the ideas
in this book as we have been. We believe that your life will be enriched by these ideas and that good research
and thinking about families requires good ideas.

James White, Todd Martin, and Kari Adamsons

19

Acknowledgements

We express our gratitude to our students and numerous colleagues for their support and encouragement. We
acknowledge the many people who have provided support, criticism, and encouragement for previous editions
of this project.

We would like to express our deepest gratitude to the folks at Sage starting with Josh Perigo for his
unwavering support for this project. Finally, we would like to thank our spouses and families for their
continuing support over the years.

We would also like to thank the following reviewers for this fifth edition:

Diann Moorman, University of Georgia
Mark A. Fine, University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Katie Heiden-Rootes, Saint Louis University
Michelle Sherwood, Eastern Illinois University
Duane Alan Dowd, PhD, Central Washington University
Ruth Miressi, Park University
Richard N. Pitt, Vanderbilt University
Lauren Dick, MS, Carthage College
Dr. Stephanie Irby Coard, University of North Carolina at Greensboro

20

Chapter 1 What Is a Theory?

Bill, why do you think Rod and Michelle are getting divorced? There was no infidelity, and they have always seemed to be so good
together.

Actually, Jill, I would have predicted it. Rod and Michelle were perfect together when they first got married, but over the past 2
years, they have gone in very different directions. Rod is totally absorbed with his job and all the travel that is required, but Michelle
has become more bored with her job and has talked more about having kids. I think their goals as a couple are very far apart. Rod
just wants a companion when he comes home tired from work and travels, and Michelle wants a family.

Jill thought for a moment and then asked Bill, So you think that a couple should share some common goals?

Bill immediately responded, Yes, and that way they can see the future of their relationship and where it is going.

Jill faced Bill squarely and said, Thats an interesting theory. What would it say about us?

Bill has a theory about couple dynamics and longevity. Indeed, as we watch TV shows, read the paper, and
attend classes, we are confronted with informal and partially formulated theories and theoretical propositions
every day. Bills theory is that couples should have common goals. He believes that not having such goals is
associated with couple dissolution. Certainly, marital and couple dissolution involve many other factors such
as social support, economic well-being, intimacy, and so on. A fully developed theory of marital dissolution
would have to include a wider set of concepts and processes than just the couple sharing goals. This example,
however, shows how much of our everyday life and concerns actually involve theoretical propositions.

There are similarities in the way in which we develop and articulate theories in our everyday life and the way
we do so in our professional life. Likewise, scientific theory bears similarities to our everyday theories, but
seldom could these two be equated because the differences are distinct and important. In articulating our
everyday theories, we often assume our definitions are shared by others rather than to consider beginning by
defining our terms. For example, when Jill says There was no infidelity does she mean sexual infidelity or
emotional infidelity? If it were sexual infidelity, does that mean only sexual intercourse or other forms of
physical intimacy as well, such as kissing and holding hands? The foundation of Bills theory rests on the idea
that couples who do not share goals will drift apart emotionally and physically. Since scientific theories are not
on a case by case basis (scientific theories are nomothetic and general instead of individual case and
idiographic), we would need some precision regarding such terms as infidelity, shared goals, and drifting apart.
In our everyday theories, we seldom frame them so that they would include most couple relationships rather
than the particular one we might be discussing.

Another important difference is that our everyday theories are often sloppy in regard to the logic of what we
are saying. For example, Bills argument about sharing common goals so that a couple can envision their
future may seem intuitively obvious for some people. The problem is that Bills propositions about sharing
common goals and envisioning a future may need further specification. Certainly, children may represent a
common longer term goal, but couple agreement on which wine to have with a meal may not be of the same
degree. It would probably help if Bill added some proposition about the long-term and short-term goals,
couple versus individual goals, and the overall salience or importance of goals to both rather than one

21

individual. Scientific theories usually demand a more precise and structured logic so that propositions are
linked into a coherent argument.

Yet another difference between our everyday theories and those of science is in the area of prediction. Bill says
he could have predicted the breakup of Rod and Michelle, but this is clearly after the breakup has happened.
This kind of explanation is called after the fact, or in Latin, ex post facto, explanation. The problem with
such after the fact explanations is that they lack the defining ingredient of prediction in which the explanatory
propositions yield a prediction that has not yet come to pass but will in a specified time come to pass. In other
words, we expect scientific theories to yield before the fact, or a priori, explanations for an event. The
weakness of explaining something after it has occurred is that there are an infinite number of other
explanations that might also be true. Scientific methods are often designed to eliminate these other possible
theories by using experimental designs and predicting from the theory before the event has occurred.

Now that we have seen how different our everyday theoretical musings are from scientific theories, we should
also recall the similarities. We want all of our theories to be credible and plausible. We expect that our
theories should make sense not just to ourselves but also to others. Since humans emerged from medieval
times into the Renaissance and Enlightenment, the nature of facts and data changed dramatically. Before the
Renaissance, facts were established by religious or political fiat. Gods and goblins were invoked to explain
facts, and facts were construed so that these explanations could seem possible. Such explanations as the gods
are angry or superstitions such as garlic will keep demons away were seen as equal to Copernican views of
celestial mechanics. What slowly changed and brought us into the Enlightenment is the view that facts are
methodological in design. This view suggest that when two persons have a disagreement about a fact such as
does Earth orbit the Sun or does the Sun orbit Earth, the way to resolve this is not to imprison the
nonbeliever or have them beheaded. Such resolutions to facts were quite common before the Enlightenment.
There are many societies today that still revert to such tactics such as what the emperor or president says is a
fact. But it was the emergence of facts as methodologically resolvable that was the hallmark of science and
reason in the Enlightenment. Returning to the two views about Earth-Sun orbits, a methodology can be
developed that will resolve one view as superior to another because it predicts and it explains other
phenomena. Modernity has pursued this way of resolving disputes, and those that respect facts do so because
any alternative claim can be subjected to the same methodological tests. Certainly, every discipline and science
has more particular methods of argumentation, logic, and proof, but all facts rest on this methodological view.
There is also no doubt that all of these methods become more refined over time, but such evolution and
change is reason for celebrating human progress in regard to knowledge.

As we have already argued in the discussion of Bills theory about Rod and Michelles divorce, science and
scientific theory would favor a more universal and methodological approach. It is probably the case that in
areas such as love, relationships, marriage, and family where we all have experience and some biases, a
methodological approach to our theories about such areas is of paramount importance. Universality keeps us
from being too idiosyncratic, and logic, definitions, and well-specified relations ensure that there are ways of
testing which theories might be more predictive and explain more. To understand how this is possible, we
now turn to the way in which scientific theory is assembled.

22

23

Architecture of a Scientific Theory

Attitudes that scientists have about theory depend on the philosophy of science that they endorse. We will
deal with philosophical differences in the next chapter. Here, we assume the most conventional and probably
the most popular perspective.

Box 1.1 What Is a Theory?

A scientific theory might be likened to a complex spatial network: Its terms are represented by the knots, while the threads
connecting the latter correspond, in part, to the definitions and, in part, to the fundamental and derivative hypotheses included in
the theory. The whole system floats, as it were, above the plane of observation and is anchored to it by rules of interpretation. These
might be viewed as strings, which are not part of the network but link certain points of the latter with specific places in the plane of
observation. By virtue of those interpretive connections, the network can function as a scientific theory: From certain observational
data, we may ascend, via an interpretive string, to some point in the theoretical network, thence proceed, via definitions and
hypotheses, to other points, from which another interpretive string permits a descent to the plane of observation (Hempel, 1952, p.
36).

A theory is nothingit is not a theoryunless it is an explanation. One may define properties and categories, and one still has no
theory. One may state that there are relations between the properties, and one still has no theory. One may state that a change in one
property will produce a definite change in another property, and one still has no theory. Not until one has properties, and
propositions stating the relations between them, and the propositions form a deductive systemnot until one has all three does one
have a theory. Most of our arguments about theory would fall to the ground, if we first asked whether we had a theory to argue
about (Homans, 1964, p. 812).

Deductive theory can be described briefly as an attempt to increase human understanding by providing explanations of why certain
things occur. It provides this explanation by having a set of propositions and then deducing that, if these propositions are true, and if
certain other conditions are met, certain specific and observable events occur. The more specific events are then explained by the
more general propositions that have been used as premises in deducing that the specific events occur. The explanation is only as valid
as the propositions and logic that are used in the deduction, but one of the goals of science is to gradually eliminate invalid
propositions and increase the number of useful, valid ones (Burr, 1973, p. 3).

Theorizing is the process of systematically formulating and organizing ideas to understand a particular phenomenon. A theory is the
set of interconnected ideas that emerge from this process (Doherty, Boss, LaRossa, Schumm, & Steinmetz, 1993, p. 20).

One useful way to understand theoretical arguments is to examine their basic components. We start with the
idea that a theory is a systematic collection of concepts and relations. This is consistent with all four of the
quotes in Box 1.1. Because there is an endless variety of ways to organize ideas, we will limit ourselves to the
requirements for a scientific theory. Such theories contain systematically related propositions that are
empirically testable (Rudner, 1966). Thus, there are several components that we need to discuss in further
detail: (a) concepts, (b) relations between concepts, (c) propositions, (d) relations between propositio

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *