Thinking Strategically, the National Defense, National Military, National Security Strategies, and JOPES/APEX.
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THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
National Security Decision Making Department
THE DYNAMICS OF DOCTRINE:
THE CHANGES IN GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
by
Timothy T. Lupfer
Reprinted from The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During
the First World War, Leavenworth Paper No. 4, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies
Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, July 1981, pp vii-ix; 37-58. Public
domain material
Module 5.01
Introduction
Bullets quickly write new tactics.
-Wilhelm Balck1
Although the immediate events of the summer of 1914 which led to the First World War
surprised Europe, the possibility of a general European conflict had been anticipated by
governments and the military. Despite this anticipation, confusion characterized the conduct of
the war, from beginning to end. No belligerent had prepared adequately for the actual conditions
and demands of this long war. The confusion was particularly apparent in the realm of tactics on
the western front. Prewar tactical doctrine had become inappropriate by December 1914. On all
sides expedient modifications soon competed with the prewar doctrine.
Military doctrine is guidance for conduct of battle approved by the highest military authority.
In the Imperial German Army on the western front, the Army High Command (die Oberste
Heeresleitung, hereafter called OHL) changed tactical doctrine significantly on two occasions.
In the winter of 1916-17 OHL adopted a new defensive doctrine which described an elastic
defense-in-depth in response to the Allied offensive tactics during 1916 (especially those the
British employed at the Somme) and in anticipation of the continuation of similar attacks in the
spring of 1917. This change is the subject of chapter 1. In the winter of 1917-18, OHL
developed a new offensive tactical doctrine in hopes of achieving a decisive victory on the
western front with their offensives planned for the spring of 1918. This change is the subject: of
chapter 2.
As the famous tactician, Wilhelm Balck,* noted, altering tactical procedures in the middle of
such a desperate struggle was a very serious undertaking, especially for the German Army.2 To
alter the deeply ingrained habits in an army famous for its thorough peacetime training was
difficult, especially when the confusion of the war made the accuracy of any change uncertain.
*Wilhelm Balck had written extensively on tactics before the war. During the war he served as a division
commander. His son, Hermann Balck, was a company-grade officer in the First World War, and became
an outstanding field commander in the Second World War.
vii
The Germans did not win the First World War and their strategic conduct of the war was
often flawed. Yet, much value can be derived from their development of tactical doctrine, for the
Germans developed and applied new tactical doctrine impressively in 1917 and 1918. Their
tactical changes were systematic and thorough, for these changes in doctrine directly affected
subsequent battlefield success. The analysis of the doctrinal changes cannot be restricted to
examining changes to regulations because doctrine that influences nothing beyond the printing
press is stillborn.
German successes in World War I demonstrated a thorough process:
Perception of a need for change
Solicitation of ideas, especially from the battlefield units
Definition of the change
Dissemination of the change
Enforcement throughout the army
Modification of organization and equipment to accommodate the change
Thorough training
Evaluation of effectiveness
Subsequent refinement
This outline describes the manner by which the German Army succeeded in changing and
implementing tactical doctrine during war. The process is not rigidly sequential; it is a dynamic
process that requires great intellectual ability and strong character from tacticians who desire to
make successful changes.
Many characteristics ascribed to the German military have too often sufficed for explanations
of German military success. Glib expressions such as “great organization” or “a knack for war”
do little justice to the men who brought success to German arms and, more importantly, offer
little guidance for anyone who desires to achieve similar success.
In the examination of the German process of tactical change, several important personalities
emerge. Their memoirs certainly must be used with caution, but I have quoted extensively from
participants in this paper, in part to convey the essential interest in tactics among the participants.
Their interest in tactics is instructive, for not all military leaders possess a continuing interest in
tactics.
viii
I do not intend to portray all German tactical efforts as inherently brilliant. The Germans
usually achieved a relative advantage over the Allies with respect to tactical change. Tentative
generalizations about the reasons for this German success and about the limitations of doctrine
itself in wartime are described in chapter 3. These conclusions can only be tentative, for the
uncertainties of war extend to its analysis. ”
Timothy T. Lupfer
Department of History
United States Military Academy
West Point, New York
The Offensive Tactics of 1918
In the second half of 1917, strategic conditions were developing that would offer the
Germans an opportunity to concentrate their military power on the western front in 1918. Russia,
suffering from internal convulsions as well as the extreme demands of the war, could not sustain
the war effort. As peace negotiations with Russia began, German units traveled from east to
west. The number of German divisions in the west went from 150 in October 1917 to 192 in
March 1918.1 The opportunity for force concentration in the west had to be seized quickly, for
the United States had declared war on Germany in April 1917. The Germans calculated that it
would require one year for the United States to exert any decisive influence on operations in the
west. Therefore, the changing strategic situation and deteriorating economic and political
conditions in Germany (due to the effects of the Allied blockade of Germany) only permitted the
Germans one final attempt at victory in the west.
On 11 November 1917 OHL decided that the great offensive would begin in the spring of
1918. Between this decision and the initiation of the offensive on 21 March 1918, the German
Army developed the appropriate doctrine and prepared as many units as possible for the attack.
In order to destroy the Allied forces, the Germans attempted to solve the tactical dilemma which
had frustrated the Allies for more than three years. The preferred German maneuver in prewar
doctrine, the envelopment, was impossible to achieve in the west. Therefore, a successful
penetration was required, to be followed up by force sufficient to achieve a strategic
breakthrough.
Although in two and one-half years the Germans had conducted only one major offensive on
the western front (Verdun), the German Army still had considerable experience from which to
draw. Units in the east had been participating in several major offensives throughout the war.
More recently, in October 1917, a German field army (Fourteenth Army under General Otto von
Below), having been formed with units from the western, eastern, and Rumanian fronts, was sent
by OHL to northern Italy to cooperate with the Austrians in an offensive against the Italians.
General von Below’s order to his forces before battle stated:
Every column on the heights must move forward without hesitation; by doing
so opportunities will be created for helping neighbors who cannot make progress,
by swinging round in the rear of the enemy opposing him.2
3
38
At the Battle of Caporetto the Germans and Austrians smashed through the Italian forces,
achieving a strategic penetration, and drove the Italians back to the Piave River. The other Allied
powers responded, sending French and British units to Italy to strengthen the front. Italy,
although badly shaken, remained in the war. The Germans and Austrians had not eliminated Italy
from the war, but the Central Powers success had been most impressive. Italy lost 305,000
soldiers, including 275,000 prisoners.3
The offensive successes in the east and in Italy had occurred within the unique conditions of
each theater. OHL, in considering the peculiar nature of the western front, did not blindly adopt
techniques derived outside the west and try to apply them immediately to the western front.
Instead, OHL examined each combat experience with respect to the particular conditions in
which it had occurred.
Also, the German forces on the western front were better prepared for offensive operations
than their record of recent experiences in major offensives indicated. Although Verdun had been
an offensive with a limited objective and the 1918 offensive plan sought a strategic
breakthrough, the Verdun battles had demonstrated several useful points: the value of sudden
concentrated artillery fire in depth before the assault, the need for centralized control of artillery,
the value of surprise, and the need for greater combined arms cooperation. The Germans had
tried several tactical techniques, such as attaching a horse-drawn artillery battery to an infantry
regiment in the attack, in order to provide the infantry better fire support.4
The German Army’s defensive experiences in 1917 provided another very important source
of offensive expertise. The aggressive tenor of the elastic defense-in-depth, especially the
counterattack, nurtured offensive excellence. To train the army for this defense, units acquired
the spirit of the counterattack, and OHL had codified storm trooper techniques to assist this
training. Having accumulated considerable counterattack experience in 1917, the German Army
in the west already had a deceptively solid base of doctrine and experience for offensive
operations.
The Germans had another source of experience on the conduct of the offense. They had
defended against the Allied attacks for three years, and recognized that the Allies had been
showing them what not to do.5 Reliance on massive firepower to destroy the enemy was clearly
not the solution. In any event, the Germans could not match the Allied expenditure of munitions,
so a different offensive technique was required. A French captain inadvertently provided one
important source of inspiration for developing such new techniques.
On 9 May 1915 Capt. Andre Laffargue led an attack on a German position. Afterwards,
Laffargue reflected upon the problems of the attack and expressed his ideas in a pamphlet, “The
Attack in Trench Warfare.” The French Army published the pamphlet, but distributed it for
information only; it did not
39
become French doctrine. The British did not translate it.6 Early in the summer of 1916 the
Germans captured a copy of the pamphlet, translated it at once, and issued it to units. Ludwig
Renn wrote that Laffargue’s ideas had immediate use as a tactical manual for German infantry. 7
Laffargue personified that resource of talent which exists at the small unit level and develops
in combat; he was a part of the “human canister” of combat who did not want to die, but to
succeed.8 Exclaiming, “Let us prepare our business down to the slightest detail in order to
conquer and live,” he set out to record his experiences and ideas.9
Laffargue advocated a sudden attack to achieve a deep penetration. His attack resembled a
gulp, not a nibble.* The momentum of the in-depth attack would disrupt the enemy, keep him off
balance, and prevent him from organizing an effective response. To capitalize on disruption, the
assault had to advance as far as possible. The first wave would identify, not reduce, defensive
strong points and subsequent attack waves would destroy them. An artillery bombardment
applied suddenly in depth throughout the enemy area would precede the infantry assault.
Disruption of enemy artillery batteries was particularly important to protect the infantry advance.
Laffargue stated that all troops were not assault troops; special training and care were
necessary to develop the aggressiveness and skill for the assault. Ironically, the German storm
units best epitomized this idea of elite assault units. In his pamphlet, Laffargue also expressed
the need for an automatic rifle for firepower in advance positions, a need later met in all armies
during the war by the light machine gun.11
Although they did not adopt all of Laffargue’s ideas (for example, he was very insistent on
some rather cumbersome formations), the Germans derived greater benefit from his ideas and put
more of his ideas into practice than the French did. German units became well acquainted with
his concepts and the operations section of OHL was impressed with the practical combination of
surprise, firepower, and maneuver to break the tactical stalemate.12
While the Allies had not pursued Laffargue’s concept of sudden attack as vigorously as their
enemies, they had pursued a technological solution to the tactical dilemma. During the Somme
battle in September 1916 the British introduced tanks. The initial use of tanks failed to capitalize
on the tactical and strategic potential of the weapon, to the chagrin of the early tank enthusiasts,
whose highly original tactical ideas had been rejected by British High Command. In their first
battle, tanks were dispersed as infantry supporting weapons and followed the characteristically
heavy and long artillery
*The metaphor likening attacks to consumption of food was popular in the First World War. Joffre described
his 1915 strategy of numerous attacks with limited objectives by stating, “I am nibbling at them,”10 The German
attack regulations of 1918 used the same metaphor and described “devouring” the enemy position.
40
preparation. The Germans quickly developed antitank tactics,13 but they did not attempt to
imitate the Allies in the use of the tank.
On 20 November 1917 at Cambrai the British conducted a surprise limited attack. The attack
caught the Germans off-guard, because it had none of the familiar signs that forewarned of
Allied attacks. Instead of the long relentless artillery preparation, there was a very brief but
concentrated artillery barrage, fired without previous registration in order to insure surprise.
Immediately thereafter a large concentration of tanks attacked, followed by infantry.
The results of this attack were as unexpected as the tactical procedures. The attack stunned
the Germans. The British penetrated the German defensive zones, suffering few Allied
casualties. Then, however, supply and reinforcement difficulties stalled further British progress.
Their impressive gains formed a large, inviting salient. The Germans moved reinforcements to
the area and ten days later eleven divisions of Crown Prince Rupprecht’s Army Group launched a
deliberate counterattack.
This large-scale counterattack was the first major German offensive action against the British
since 1915. The attack began with a bombardment that lasted only a few hours but gradually
intensified. German gunners fired large quantities of gas shells along with high explosive rounds.
The German infantry quickly advanced, following the rolling barrage. The British Official
History provided a description of this infantry assault, which clearly showed storm unit methods,
integration of different arms, and methods of bypassing resistance:
Proceeded by patrols, the Germans had advanced at 7 a.m. in small columns
bearing many light machineguns, and, in some cases, flamethrowers. From
overhead low flying airplanes, in greater numbers than had hitherto been seen,
bombed and machine-gunned the British defenders, causing further casualties
and, especially, distraction at the critical moment. Nevertheless few posts appear
to have been attacked from the front, the assault sweeping in between to envelop
them from flanks and rear.14
The Germans pushed deeply into the British positions, so quickly that the British general
commanding the 29th Division barely avoided capture, escaping in his pajamas.15 In time,
confusion abated and British resistance intensified. The campaign ended with lines drawn almost
where they had been before the initial tank assault of 20 November.
Ludendorff had expected greater success, but he was still pleased with the results of the
counterattack because it had been achieved by troops who had not been specially trained for an
offensive.16 Analyzing the recent experiences almost immediately, Crown Prince Rupprecht’s
Army Group staff quickly circulated to its units a memorandum that stressed the importance of
surprise as demonstrated at Cambrai.17 This analysis of recent tactical experience was a
characteristic German Army method. British General Headquarters also circulated to its units a
pamphlet describing a successful action of three British
41
divisions in the defense against the German counterattack. The British Official History noted that
this effort by British GHQ was “unusual.”18
The Offensive Doctrine
On 1 January 1918 OHL published The Attack in Position Warfare (hereafter referred to as
Attack), which became the basic document for the German offensives of 1918. Just as Principles
had described a defense that incorporated the entire battlefield in depth instead of emphasizing
only the front line, Attack described an attack-in-depth, a devouring* of the entire enemy
position instead of nibbling away at the enemy front line. Once again that “mere captain,”
Hermann Geyer, was instrumental in writing the text.19
The objective of the major German offensive was to achieve a breakthrough after penetrating
the Allied line. In their efforts to penetrate the German defenses, the Allies had relied upon
massive artillery fire. The tank was another possible solution, but appropriate tank tactics did not
emerge until Cambrai. The Germans could not rely on a long destructive artillery bombardment
to give them their penetration, for they lacked the huge quantities of ammunition (their industrial
production did not match that of the Allies), and more importantly, they knew such tactics had
not worked. The Germans did not seek a solution through technological innovation. For example,
they did not attempt to develop the tank on a large scale, but chose to accomplish the attack-in-
depth with existing combat means in a carefully coordinated attack relying on surprise.
The doctrine in Attack was as applicable to the deliberate counterattacks of the defense as it
was to the main attack of an offense to achieve a breakthrough. The introduction to Attack
clearly stated this and it demonstrated the close tactical connection between the counterattack
and the offensive. Attack noted that the strategic breakthrough was the ultimate goal of the
penetration. In order to achieve that goal the attack had to strike deeply into the enemy position.
Acknowledging the impossibility of destroying all enemy forces in such a deep penetration, the
German tactical doctrine did not require complete destruction. Instead, disruption of enemy units
and communications was essential. Throughout the doctrine, keeping the enemy off balance,
pressing the attack continuously, and retaining the initiative received great emphasis.
The authors of Attack described all artillery missions (preparatory fire, creeping barrage,
isolating the objective) with the acknowledgment that total destruction of enemy forces could not
be achieved. For instance, artillery would neutralize, not necessarily destroy, enemy artillery
batteries; the Attack strongly recommended gas shells because of their disruptive characteristics.
The Attack clearly identified the need to move artillery and ammunition forward to
*The German text of this regulation, Der Angriff im Stellungskrieg, used the word fressen, meaning to
devour or to consume.
42
maintain the attack. Also, the authors devoted 21 of the 113 paragraphs of Attack to air forces,
which received an increased role in strafing enemy positions.
Attack stressed infantry-artillery cooperation and recommended pyrotechnics to control
creeping barrages. Special horse-drawn artillery batteries provided mobile artillery to infantry
regiments, a technique used at Verdun and in some storm battalion organizations. The doctrine
encouraged any techniques that could assist the artillery in keeping up with the infantry, for in
the German attack the infantry, not the artillery, determined the speed of the attack:
The momentum of the infantry must not be dependent on the barrage, but vice
versa, otherwise the dash of the infantry will be checked in the rigid curtain of
fire.20
While the Attack urged German infantrymen to exploit the effects of artillery, it also
reminded them that success depended on their own skill. No amount of munitions could relieve
the infantryman from his responsibility to close with the enemy.21
To conduct the attack, the German infantry organized in depth. Speed and depth were the
means of securing their flanks and rear: speed to keep the enemy from reacting in time to the
attack, and depth to provide the follow-up units which would isolate the bypassed pockets of
resistance and prevent these remnants from interfering with the continuation of the attack.22
There has been some confusion about the name of these new German offensive tactics.
After the German offensive of 1918, the French called the tactics “Hutier tactics,” attributing
them to General Oskar von Hutier. Mer serving on the eastern front, von Hutier was transferred
to the west for the 1918 offensives, during which his Eighteenth Army achieved the greatest
successes against the enemy. The French credited him with the invention of the offensive tactics,
and perhaps this erroneous conjecture provides another example of the personality-dominant
thinking of the Allies. The first Allied reaction to the new German tactics was to attempt to
identify an individual inventor. The Germans themselves never used the term “Hutier tactics,”
and recent research has established clearly that von Hutier did not invent these tactics.23 The
tactics were the product of an effective corporate effort.
A better term is “infiltration tactics.” While the German text does not use the equivalent
German word, “infiltration” is a satisfactory description of the infantry technique of bypassing
resistance and pushing forward as far as possible. However, “infiltration” connotes individual
movement, whereas the German movement was in small units, and the word is too exclusively
infantry oriented. The German effort emphasized the coordination (das Zusammenwirken) of all
arms, especially infantry and artillery: just as no one personality was the source of tactical
wisdom, there was no one weapon or technique that exclusively carried the German attacks. Like
the efforts of the officers in
43
developing doctrine, the efforts of the various arms blended in a complementary fashion.
The Attack Organization
In Attack as in Principles, the Germans considered the division the basic unit capable of
conducting independent battlefield operations. The offensive doctrine, however, established one
relationship that differed greatly from the elastic defense-in-depth. Whereas in the defense the
forward division commander had the authority to order counterattack units outside his own
division organization to deliver an immediate counterattack, in the offensive the higher
headquarters retained control of the follow-up units.24 The reinforcements were kept well
forward, but under the direction of higher headquarters they would reinforce success.25
To maintain the momentum of an attack, the belligerents had tried several different
methods for relieving the leading units in the attack during the war. The French had tried
successive waves (the first wave taking one objective, the second wave passing through to take
the next one) and the British had used a similar leapfrog technique in 1917.26 But in Attack lead
units were instructed to continue without relief, for the doctrine considered it preferable to
maintain the attack and exhaust the lead unit, rather than attempt a succession which would lose
time and impetus.27 Unfortunately, this method resulted in severe losses for the lead units, which
would have an adverse effect on the 1918 German offensive.
Maintaining the initiative in the offense demanded the same high standard of small unit
leadership which the elastic defense-in-depth required. The fluid tactics required independent
action by the assault detachments and groups (Stosstrupps and Gruppen).28
The group (Gruppe) or section of the light machine gun and riflemen was the basic
infantry small unit, as it had been in executing the elastic defense-in-depth. This tactical
organization represented a significant change from the prewar technique of an advancing line of
similarly equipped infantrymen. Ludendorff remarked that the new role of the light machine gun
as the dominant weapon and the subordinate role of the riflemen (to protect the machine gun), as
shown during the defensive battles, was a difficult change for many German soldiers, previously
trained in infantry units where the rifleman had the dominant role, to understand.29
An important aspect of the application of the new offensive doctrine was the role of the
storm battalions in teaching the new small unit techniques to the other German infantry units.
Each German field army had a storm battalion that acted as a teaching cadre during periods of
training. This instruction was so highly regarded that German units on the eastern front began
sending officers and noncommissioned officers to the western front to
44
attend storm unit training courses in late 1916. Field armies on the eastern front then imitated
their counterparts in the west by establishing their own storm battalions, based on Rohr’s unit.30
The composition of storm units varied within these possibilities:
1 to 5 storm companies (infantry assault units)
1 to 2 machine gun companies (heavy machine guns)
1 flamethrower section
1 infantry gun battery (light mountain howitzers
or captured Russian guns)
1 Minenwerfer company (trench mortars)31
Besides the established storm battalions for each field army, ad hoc storm units were often
formed within infantry divisions and were usually led by a cadre trained by the field army’s
organized storm battalion.
Established storm battalions assaulted with additional infantry from an accompanying
division. The first wave was an infantry probe (from the accompanying division) whose purpose
was to identify enemy positions for the next wave, about 250 meters behind. The second wave
consisted of the elite storm companies and the flamethrower section, with additional infantry
support from the division. This second wave attempted to penetrate the enemy zones by pushing
through weak areas to envelop enemy positions. Supporting these efforts was the third wave,
about 150 meters behind, which contained the storm battalion’s heavy weapons and similar
additional support from the division. This third wave provided fire to support the forward
movement of the storm companies and to protect the flanks of the penetrations. Behind these
three waves followed the remainder of the accompanying division, which reduced pockets of
resistance bypassed by the storm units, provided reinforcements, and maintained the momentum
of the attack.32 In sectors where established storm units were not available, infantry divisions
used their own ad hoc storm units and imitated storm unit techniques.
The storm unit techniques and the new offensive doctrine emphasized a constant drive
forward. Speed and timing were essential for rapid advance, and small unit initiative was crucial
to seize the unpredictable and fleeting opportunities of the battlefield. There was no “secret
formula” in these techniques. Enemy positions were reduced in a practical fashion: the physical
and psychological effects of the advance reinforced each other.
Artillery support was carefully integrated into the assault plan. Although the infantry
missions necessitated decentralization of control, the artillery missions in support of the attack
required greater centralization of control over artillery. The Germans wanted to avoid any
prolonged artillery fire, for surprise would be lost and an artillery duel would develop in which
the Allies, with greater amounts of munitions would eventually prevail.33 Therefore. German fire
had to be fast and accurate, and its mission was neutralization rather than elusive and costly
destruction.
45
The techniques used to deliver fast and accurate neutralization fire in 1918 were greatly
influenced by one very remarkable man, Georg Bruchmuller, the most significant “import” from
the eastern front to the western front. He had been on the retired list at the outbreak of the war
because of a riding accident.34 Recalled to active duty during the war, he served on the eastern
front. Bruchmuller developed techniques to support attacks with a sudden concentration of
accurate fire instead of prolonged preparatory bombardments. In the spring of 1916 he convinced
the chief of staff of the Tenth Army to adopt this method of concentration for a major attack at
Tarnopol, and the effect in supporting the rapid advance of the infantry was impressive.
Bruchmuller’s technique emphasized fire in depth throughout the enemy positions.35 His
support included an accurate creeping barrage, the Feuerwalze, for the advancing infantry.
Bruchmuller knew how to derive the greatest benefits from limited means. Attacks
received support based upon the estimated minimum number of batteries needed to achieve
success. Bruchmuller did not attempt to flatten every enemy position, for this was unnecessary:
In a fire action of a few hours only, the complete destruction of enemy
trenches, a complete harassing of rear areas, etc., could naturally not be achieved.
This was not at all contemplated. We desired only to break the morale of the
enemy, pin him to his position, and then overcome him with an overwhelming
assault.36
Bruchmuller developed several techniques to achieve this disruption, which required
strict control of all artillery assets. Each battery of each type of weapon received specific fire
missions with specific timetables. He organized the stages of delivery of fire in this way:
First Stage: Surprise concentration, hitting headquarters, phone links, command posts,
enemy batteries, and infantry positions. Fire is sudden, concentrated, and makes
extensive use of gas.
Second Stage: Most batteries reinforce those batteries already firing on enemy batteries.
Third Stage: Fire for effect on designated targets according to range. Some batteries
continue to shell infantry positions, and heavy pieces engage long range targets.37
Surprise was essential to achieve maximum disruptive effect on the enemy. Therefore,
the Germans had to conceal their attack preparations very carefully and their initial target data
had to be very accurate.
The relationship between infantry and artillery in all armies often became strained during
the war. In 1915, for example, French infantry in one sector wore conspicuous linen cloth on
their backs in a vain attempt to avoid being
46
shelled by their own artillery.38 To develop mutual co
