stakeholder Analysis
Read the Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress report. Use thestakeholder analysis tool to identify key stakeholders. You can edit the document to add or delete rows. The major objective of this assignment is the identification of stakeholders. You should conduct reasonable background research to identify interests, positions and resources, but you are not expected to have a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of these items, yet. To help in this you may choose to focus on a specific policy issue listed in Table 4 in the reading.
Campaign and Election Security Policy:
Overview and Recent Developments
for Congress
January 2, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R46146
Congressional Research Service
SUMMARY
Campaign and Election Security Policy:
Overview and Recent Developments
for Congress
In the United States, state, territorial, and local governments are responsible for most aspects of
selecting and securing election systems and equipment. Foreign interference during the 2016
election cycleand widely reported to be an ongoing threathas renewed congressional
attention to campaign and election security and raised new questions about the nature and extent
of the federal governments role in this policy area.
This report provides congressional readers with a resource for understanding campaign and
election security policy. This includes discussion of the federal governments roles; state or
territorial responsibilities for election administration and election security; an overview of
potentially relevant federal statutes and agencies; and highlights of recent congressional policy
debates. The report summarizes related legislation that has advanced beyond introduction during
the 116th Congress. It also poses questions for consideration as the House and Senate examine
whether or how to pursue legislation, oversight, or appropriations.
In the 116th Congress, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; S. 1790; P.L. 116-92), enacted in December
2019, contains several provisions related to campaign and election security. Most provisions involve providing Congress or
federal or state agencies with information about election interference. It also requires the Director of National Intelligenc e, in
coordination with several other agencies, to develop a strategy for countering Russian cyberattacks against U.S. elections. In
addition, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93; H.R. 1158), also enacted in December 2019, includes
$425 million for payments to states, territories, and the District of Columbia to make general improvements to the
administration of federal elections, including upgrades to election technology and security.
As of this writing, 116th Congress legislation that has advanced beyond introduction in at least one chamber includes H.R. 1;
H.R. 753; H.R. 1158; H.R. 2500; H.R. 2722; H.R. 3351; H.R. 3494; H.R. 3501; H.R. 4617; H.R. 4782; H.R. 4990; S. 482; S.
1060; S. 1321; S. 1328; S. 1589; S. 1790; S. 1846; S. 2065; and S. 2524. Other bills also could have implications for
campaign and election security even though they do not specifically reference the topic (e.g., those addressing cybersecurity
generally or voter access). Several congressional committees also have held legislative or oversight hearings on the topic.
Federal statutessuch as the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA); and the Voting
Rights Act (VRA)all contain provisions designed to make campaign finance, elections, or voting more secure. Several
federal agencies are directly or indirectly involved in campaign and election security. These include, but are not limited to,
the Department of Defense (DOD); Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Department of Justice (DOJ); Election
Assistance Commission (EAC); and Federal Election Commission (FEC).
Securing federal elections is a complex policy challenge that crosses disciplinary lines. Some of the factors shaping that
complexity include divisions of authority between the federal and state (or territorial or local) governments; coordination
among federal agencies, and communication with state agencies; funding; changing elections technology; and the different
needs of different sectors, such as campaigns, administrators, and vendors.
This report does not attempt to resolve ongoing policy debates about what campaign and election security should entail. The
report cites other CRS products that contain additional discussion of some of the topics discussed herein. The report does not
address constitutional or legal issues.
R46146
January 2, 2020
R. Sam Garrett,
Coordinator
Specialist in American
National Government
Sarah J. Eckman
Analyst in American
National Government
Karen L. Shanton
Analyst in American
National Government
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service
Contents
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
Defining Election Security ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 2
Scope of the Report …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3
Recent Legislative Activity ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4
Development of Federal Role in Campaign and Election Security …………………………………………. 5
Selected Federal Statutes ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 7
Selected Federal Agencies ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 10
Election Assistance Commission (EAC) ……………………………………………………………………… 10
Federal Election Commission (FEC) …………………………………………………………………………… 11
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ……………………………………………………………………. 11
Department of Justice (DOJ) ………………………………………………………………………………………. 11
Intelligence Community (IC) …………………………………………………………………………………….. 12
Selected Other Federal Agencies………………………………………………………………………………… 12
Coordination By and Among Selected Federal Agencies ………………………………………………. 13
Department of Homeland Security Coordination Roles …………………………………………… 14
Election Assistance Commission Coordination Roles ……………………………………………… 15
Intelligence Community Coordination Roles …………………………………………………………. 15
Coordination Roles and Selected Other Federal Agencies ……………………………………….. 16
Federal Agency Roles and Campaign Security …………………………………………………………….. 16
Federal Election Security Guidance …………………………………………………………………………………. 17
Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems ………………………………………………………………… 18
Funding for States After the 2016 Election Cycle …………………………………………………………. 18
Funding for Federal Agencies After the 2016 Election Cycle …………………………………………. 19
State and Local Role in Election Security …………………………………………………………………………. 20
Selected Recent Policy Issues for Congress ………………………………………………………………………. 22
Concluding Observations ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 28
Tables
Table 1. 116th Congress Legislation, Which Has Passed At Least One Chamber, Related
to Campaign and Election Security …………………………………………………………………………………. 4
Table 2. Selected Statutes Potentially Relevant for Campaign and Election Security ……………….. 8
Table 3. Selected Agency Roles in Campaign and Election Security …………………………………….. 13
Table 4. Selected Recent Policy Issues Related to Campaign and Election Security ……………….. 23
Appendixes
Appendix. Legislation Related to Campaign and Election Security That Has Advanced
Beyond Introduction, 116th Congress …………………………………………………………………………….. 30
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service
Contacts
Author Information ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 37
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 1
Introduction
Election security is one of the most prominent policy challenges facing Congress. A November
2019 warning from the heads of several federal agencies illustrates the interdisciplinary and
ongoing nature of the threat to American elections. According to the joint statement, in the 2020
election cycle, Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign malicious actors all will seek to interfere in
the voting process or influence voter perceptions. Adversaries may try to accomplish their goals
through a variety of means, including social media campaigns, directing disinformation
operations or conducting disruptive or destructive cyber-attacks on state and local
infrastructure.1
These are just the latest challenges in securing American elections. Traditionally, election
administration emphasizes policy goals such as ensuring that all eligible voters, and only eligible
voters, may register and cast ballots; that those ballots are counted properly; and that the voting
public views that process as legitimate and transparent. Preserving election continuity is a chief
concern. Election officials therefore have long prepared contingency plans that address various
risks, such as equipment malfunctions, power outages, and natural disasters.
These traditional concerns remain, but have taken on new complexity amid foreign interference in
U.S. elections. In addition to managing traditional security concerns about infrastructure and
administrative processes (e.g., counting ballots), mitigating external threats to the accuracy of
information voters receive, particularly from foreign sources, is a potential challenge for political
campaigns, election administrators, and the public.
Addressing any one of these topics might involve multiple areas of public policy or law. Doing so
also can involve complex practical challenges about which levels of government, or agencies, are
best equipped or most appropriate to respond. How those entities can or should interact with
political campaigns, the private sector, and voters, are also ongoing questions. Technical
complexity in some areas, such as cybersecurity, and the federal structure of shared national, state
or territorial, and local responsibility for administering federal elections make election security
even more challenging.
Election security in general appears to be a shared policy goal, but debate exists in Congress
about which policy issues and options to pursue. Debate over the scope of the federal
governments role in election security shapes much of that debate. State, territorial, and local
governments are responsible for most aspects of election administration, including security.
This report provides congressional readers with an overview that includes
how campaign and election security has developed as a policy field;
recent legislative activity, especially bills that have advanced beyond
introduction;
federal statutes and agencies that appear to be most relevant for campaign and
election security;
state, territorial,2 or local roles in administering elections, and federal support for
those functions; and
1 U.S. Department of Justice et al., Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI, NSA, and CISA on Ensuring
Security of 2020 Elections, press release, November 5, 2019, at https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/
Article/2009338/joint-statement-from-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-on-ensuring-security-of-2/.
2 In general, campaign and election security policy matters are similar in states and territories, although specific statutes
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 2
highlights of recent policy debates, and potential future questions for
congressional consideration.
Defining Election Security
There is no single definition of election security, nor is there necessarily agreement on which
topics should or should not be included in the policy debate. Broadly speaking, election security
involves efforts to ensure fair, accurate, and safe elections. This can include a variety of activities
that happen before, during, and after voters cast their ballots.
A narrow definition of election security might address only efforts to protect
traditional election infrastructure, such as voter registration databases, voting
machines, polling places, and election result tabulations.
More expansive definitions might also address issues affecting candidates and
campaigns. This includes, for example, regulating political advertising or
fundraising; providing physical or cybersecurity assistance for campaigns; or
combating disinformation or misinformation in the political debate.
The policy debates discussed herein can affect different kinds of entities uniquely.
Perhaps most notably, security concerns affecting campaigns can differ from
those for safeguarding elections and voting. Campaigns in the United States
are about persuading voters in an effort to win elections. They are private,
not governmental, operations and are subject to relatively little regulation
beyond campaign finance policy.
Elections are more highly regulated, although specific practices can vary, as
their administration is primarily a state- or local-level responsibility.
Provisions in state or local law, and, to a lesser degree, federal law, regulate
how voters cast ballots and who may do so. Some security discussions
include issues related to voter access, while others view access as a separate
elections policy matter. This report briefly notes that access can be a
component of campaign and election security policy debates, but the report
does not otherwise address access issues.3
This report does not attempt definitively to resolve ongoing policy debates about what campaign
and election security entails or should entail, nor does it fully address all aspects of the policy
issues discussed. Instead, it provides congressional readers with background information to
consider that debate and decide whether or how to pursue legislation (including appropriations) or
distinguish between states and territories in some cases. A discussion of how federal election law applies to territories
versus states is beyond the scope of this report. Unless otherwise noted, campaign and election security concerns
discussed in the text of this report are relevant for territories.
3 Because voter access is primarily a state-level responsibility, this report does not address the topic in detail, although
it does address some Voting Rights Act provisions. For 116th Congress discussion of access issues, see, for example,
U.S. Congress, House Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, Report on Voting Rights and
Election Administration in the United States of America, prepared by Chairperson Marcia L. Fudge, 116th Cong., 1st
sess., at https://cha.house.gov/report-voting-rights-and-election-administration-united-states-america, which includes
discussion of misinformation issues that are potentially relevant for election security; and U.S. Congress, House
Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections Voting Rights Act Findings: Minority Views, 116th
Cong., 1st sess., at https://republicans-cha.house.gov/voting-rights-act-minority-views. Both documents are undated and
were released in 2019. See also, for example, House debate on H.R. 4, Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2019,
House debate, Congressional Record, daily edition, December 6, 2019, pp. H9308-H9334. Most issues related to H.R.
4 do not specifically address campaign and election security and are thus beyond the scope of this report.
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
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oversight. Because all the topics noted aboveand others discussed throughout the reporthave
been components of the recent congressional debate over how to safeguard American campaigns,
elections, and voting, this report uses the general term campaign and election security.
Scope of the Report
This report discusses federal agencies, statutes, and policies designed to prevent or respond to
deliberate domestic or foreign security threats to campaigns, elections, or voting. Concepts
discussed in the report also have implications for some unintentional threats, such as natural
disasters or other emergencies that could affect campaigns, elections, or voting. Legislation cited
in the report contains specific references to campaign and election security. This includes bill text
that uses variations of terms such as campaign, election, or vote near variations of the terms
interference or security. Some readers might view areas addressed herein as more or less directly
related to campaign or election security, and alternative methodologies could yield other bills or
policy topics for consideration.
The report does not include detailed attention to more traditional aspects of campaign finance,
election administration, or voting, particularly voter mobilization. For example, the report
discusses Help America Vote Act provisions that authorize funding states may use to help secure
elections, but not provisions that authorize funding for the Election Assistance Commission
generally.4 Similarly, the report briefly discusses Voting Rights Act provisions that prohibit voter
intimidation, but it does not discuss other federal statutes enacted to make registration and voting
easier.5 In addition, the report briefly notes lobbying statutes that might be relevant for regulating
certain corporate or foreign activity related to U.S. election interference, but it does not
substantially address lobbying as a policy area.
The report emphasizes domestic implications of campaign and election security. This includes
attention to protections for U.S. campaigns and elections from the effects of foreign
disinformation and misinformation efforts. The Appendix at the end of this report includes
sanctions or immigration legislation that specifically references interference in U.S. elections, and
which has advanced beyond introduction during the 116th Congress. However, foreign policy
implications of such interference, or a discussion of offensive operations and tactics that the
United States might or might not use against foreign adversaries, are otherwise beyond the scope
of this report.6
Because of the still-developing and complex policy challenges surrounding campaign and
election security, other areas of law, policy, or practice might also be relevant but are not
addressed here. The report references other CRS products that contain additional discussion of
4 Similarly, the report does not address funds for aspects of election security other than securing election systems, such
as Intelligence Community efforts to identify sources of election disinformation.
5 Other CRS products contain additional discussion. See, for example, CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S.
Campaigns and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett; CRS Report RS20764, The Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act: Overview and Issues, by R. Sam Garrett (originally authored by Kevin J. Coleman); and
CRS Report R45030, Federal Role in Voter Registration: The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and Subsequent
Developments, by Sarah J. Eckman.
6 For additional discussion of foreign policy implications and key concepts, see CRS Report R45142, Information
Warfare: Issues for Congress, by Catherine A. Theohary; and CRS In Focus IF10771, Defense Primer: Information
Operations, by Catherine A. Theohary; CRS In Focus IF10694, Countering Americas Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act, by Dianne E. Rennack, Kenneth Katzman, and Cory Welt; CRS In Focus IF10779, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An
Overview, by Dianne E. Rennack and Cory Welt; CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory
Welt; and CRS In Focus IF10694, Countering Americas Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, by Dianne E. Rennack,
Kenneth Katzman, and Cory Welt.
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 4
several such topics. The report does not provide legal or constitutional analysis. It also does not
attempt to catalog all alleged or established instances of campaign and election interference or
security concerns, or to independently evaluate allegations.
Recent Legislative Activity
Highlights of recent legislative activity include the following. Additional discussion appears
throughout the report.
The 115th Congress (2017-2019) appropriated $380 million for FY2018 for
improvements to the administration of federal elections, including upgrades to
election technology and security.
The 116th Congress (2019-2021) appropriated $425 million for FY2020 in the
consolidated appropriations bill (H.R. 1158; P.L. 116-93) enacted in December
2019. The Funding for States After the 2016 Election Cycle section of this
report contains additional detail.
The 116th Congress enacted S. 1790 (P.L. 116-92), the FY2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), in December 2019. The legislation contains several
provisions related to campaign and election security.
Table 1 below lists bills that have passed at least one chamber. The Appendix in this report
briefly summarizes 116th Congress legislation containing campaign and election security
provisions that has advanced beyond introduction.
Table 1. 116th Congress Legislation, Which Has Passed At Least One Chamber,
Related to Campaign and Election Security
See the Scope of the Report section and the Appendix of this report for additional detail.
Bill Number Short Title Latest Major Action
H.R. 1 For the People Act of 2019
Passed House (234-193),
03/08/2019
H.R. 753 Global Electoral Exchange Act of 2019 Passed House (voice
vote), 05/20/2019
H.R. 1158 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 Became P.L. 116-93,
12/20/2019
H.R. 2500 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2020
Passed House (220-197),
07/12/2019
H.R. 2722 Securing Americas Federal Elections (SAFE) Act Passed House (225-184),
06/27/2019
H.R. 3351 Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations Act, 2020
Passed House (224-196),
06/26/2019; see also H.R.
1158
H.R. 3494 Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019, and 2020
Passed House (397-31),
07/17/2019
H.R. 4617 Stopping Harmful Interference in Elections for a
Lasting Democracy Act (SHIELD Act)
Passed House (227-181),
10/23/2019
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 5
Bill Number Short Title Latest Major Action
S. 1321 Defending the Integrity of Voting Systems Act Passed Senate (unanimous
consent), 07/17/2019
S. 1328 Defending Elections against Trolls from Enemy
Regimes (DETER) Act
Passed Senate (unanimous
consent), 06/03/2019
S. 1790 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2020
Became P.L. 116-92,
12/20/2019
S. 1846 State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act
of 2019
Passed Senate (unanimous
consent), 11/21/2019
Source: CRS analysis of bill texts.
Notes: Bills in the table specifically reference campaign and election and security. Other legislation not included
in the table could be relevant for campaign or election security once implemented or in practice. See the Scope
of the Report section of this report and the Appendix for additional detail. The table excludes resolutions
(e.g., proposed constitutional amendments) and routine appropriations bills that propose funding for agencies
such as the Election Assistance Commission or Federal Election Commission, unless the appropriations bill also
contains additional provisions specifically addressing campaign and election security.
In addition, during the 116th Congress, committees in both chambers have held
hearings on these and related campaign and election security topics.7 The
Committee on House Administration and Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration exercise primary jurisdiction over federal elections. Several other
committees oversee related areas, such as intelligence or voting rights issues.
Another CRS product contains additional discussion of committee roles in
federal campaigns and elections generally.8
Development of Federal Role in Campaign and
Election Security
Foreign interference is only the highest-profile and latest campaign and election security policy
challenge.9 Physical security, to protect voters, ballots, and vote counts, has been an ongoing
7 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 1: Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure with Additional
Views, 116th Cong., 1st sess., July 25, 2019, at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Report_Volume1.pdf; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns
and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 2: Russias Use of Social Media with Additional Views, 116th
Cong., 1st sess., October 8, 2019, at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Report_Volume2.pdf; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Oversight of the U.S. Election
Assistance Commission, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 2019, S. Hrg. 116-74 (Washington: GPO, 2019); U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Homeland Security, Defending Our Democracy: Building Partnerships to Protect Americas
Elections, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, Serial No. 116-1 (Washington: GPO, 2019); and U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Securing U.S. Election Infrastructure
and Protecting Political Discourse, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, Serial no. 116-28 (Washington: GPO,
2019). See also, for example, discussion and witness testimony presented during an October 22, 2019, House Judiciary
Committee oversight hearing, Securing Americas Elections Part II: Oversight of Government Agencies. As of this
writing, the hearing record does not appear to have been published. Video and written materials are available on the
committee website, https://judiciary.house.gov/legislation/hearings/securing-america-s-elections-part-ii-oversight-
government-agencies.
8 See CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett.
9 According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), foreign interference with U.S. elections falls
into five distinct categories. Collectively, these include cyber or covert operations. Cyber operations target
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 6
concern. Specifically, in modern history, the federal governments first role in securing elections
was primarily about access and voting rights.10 In 1965, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act
(VRA), which protects voters against race- or color-based discrimination in registration,
redistricting, and voting.11 More explicitly related to security, the VRA prohibits intimidation,
threats, or coercion in voting.12 Congress primarily tasked the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
with enforcing the statute and related criminal provisions. Federal law enforcement agencies,
especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), also support states and localitieswhich
retain primary responsibility for election administration in the United Statesin investigating
election crimes and providing physical security at the polls.
The federal role in election administration expanded after the disputed 2000 presidential election.
In response, Congress authorized federal funding for the states, the District of Columbia, and
territories13 to make improvements to the administration of federal elections. It also created the
Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to administer those funds. Congress charged the agency
with overseeing a voluntary voting system testing and certification program, and providing states
and localities with voluntary election administration guidance, research, and best practices. These
developments notwithstanding, securing campaigns and elections historically was not a major
policy topic at the federal level, as most security matters were reserved for state- or local-level
policy.
The policy environment changed dramatically during the 2016 election cycle, when media reports
and subsequent congressional14 and federal-agency15 investigations documented Russian
election infrastructure, campaigns, parties, or public officials. Covert operations include efforts to assist or harm
groups such as campaigns, to influence public opinion or sow social or political division, or covertly influence
policymakers or the public. See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and
Security Center, Foreign Threats to U.S. Elections: Election Security Information Needs, at https://www.dni.gov/files/
ODNI/documents/DNI_NCSC_Elections_Brochure_Final.pdf. The publication is not dated or paginated. The quoted
material appears on the first full page of text. For additional discussion on influence operations generally, see CRS
Report RL31787, Information Operations, Cyberwarfare, and Cybersecurity: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues,
by Catherine A. Theohary.
10 For an overview of the issues discussed in this paragraph, see CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns
and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett.
11 52 U.S.C. 10101-10702. For additional discussion, see, for example, CRS Testimony TE10033, History and
Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, by L. Paige Whitaker.
12 52 U.S.C. 30107.
13 The Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which contains many of the provisions noted in this section, does not include
coverage for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). When Congress enacted the statute in 2002,
there were no federal elections in the territory.
14 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and
Interference in the 2016 U.
