POL101-2
lneed two paragraphs the meet the following :
Read the articles by Lee (2017)(Links to an external site.) and Gueorguiev (2017)(Links to an external site.) which are required reading for this week, as well as current news articles about Chinese president Xi Jinping. What appears to motivate Xi’s increasing power? What is he trying to accomplish? What are the implications of Xi’s ambitions for U.S. foreign policy? If you were a foreign policy advisor to the President of the United States, what recommendations would you make regarding the United States’ relations with China?
One-man rule is cited as a common source of regime break-downwhat Milan Svolik (2012) refers to as failures inpower-sharing. The reason why power-sharing under author-
itarian rule is so hard is self-evident: in the absence of democratic com-
petition there is little to deter incumbent leaders from abusing their
office at the expense of other elites. Against this backdrop, Chinas post-
Mao period stands out as an example of relatively effective power-shar-
ing, or what the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) refers to as
collective leadership. During this 40-year period, we have observed
between three and six peaceful transitions of power, from one incum-
bent to another. (1)
Rapid concentration of power in President Xi Jinping has raised serious
questions about the efficacy and durability of Chinese power sharing in-
stitutions, leading some observers to conclude that collective leadership
[in China] is dead. (2) In this article, I push back on such claims by re-
viewing Chinas leadership norms and institutions as well as how they
are being challenged. Building on the work of Slater (2003), I start from
the premise that personalisation and institutionalisation under autocracy
are not a zero-sum game. In the case of China, ambiguous leadership in-
stitutions, coupled with elite complicity, have in fact facilitated Xis
power grab.
Instead, I argue that the dangers of personalisation are more likely to con-
cern future governance challenges. First, departure from collective decision-
making procedures, coupled with increasing censorship, is likely to
discourage critical voices from participating in the political discourse. This
chilling effect will make it harder for the regime to anticipate future chal-
lenges and avoid unnecessary policy blunders. Second, anti-corruption
purges, combined with an apparent desire to seed loyalists, has either dis-
couraged or prevented younger contenders from moving up through the
ranks, effectively thinning out the pipeline of future leaders. This potential
shortage of qualified contenders will affect the Party irrespective of whether
Xi remains in office.
Chinese elite politics under Xi Jinping
In explaining the CCPs durability, scholars point to China-specific leader-
ship institutions, norms, and procedures, which in theory facilitate stable
power sharing. In particular, prior research points to: organisational frag-
mentation that prevents incumbents from monopolising power (Lampton
and Lieberthal 1992; Xu 2011), age and term limits that prevent incumbents
from entrenching themselves in office (Ma 2016; Nathan 2003; Shirk 2002;
Manion 1993), along with procedures for collective decision-making that
incorporate lower levels through reciprocal accountability (Shirk 1993; Hu
2014).
Recent consolidation and personalisation of power around Xi Jinping raises
serious questions about each of the above. Over the last five years, Xi has
resurrected the titles of Core Leader (Miller 2016), immortalised his ide-
ological thought into the CCP constitution (Miller 2017), (3) and revised
the national constitution to remove term limits for the office of the presi-
dency. (4) How did Xi Jinping accumulate such an unprecedented amount of
personal power and what does it mean for the future of elite politics in
China?
I begin by outlining the boundaries of collective leadership and examine
just how far Xi has pushed them. Like Slater, who examined packing, rigging,
and circumventing of Malaysias leadership institutions under Mohamad
Mahathir, I focus on challenges posed by Xi Jinping towards the separation
N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2 c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s p e e r – r e v i e w e d a r t i c l e 17
1. Hua Guofeng briefly succeeded Mao Zedong before relinquishing control to Deng Xiaoping. Deng
initially designated two successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. After helping bring both down,
Deng fully handed the reigns to Jiang Zemin. Jiang relinquished power to Hu Jintao in 2002, who
then handed it to Xi Jinping in 2012.
2. For example, see: Jeremy Page and Chun Han Wong. Xi Jinping Is Alone at the Top and Collective
Leadership Is Dead, The Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2017, www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-
xi-elevated-to-mao-status-1508825969 (accessed on 15 November 2017).
3. The CCP added Dengs name and thought to the constitution after he died in 1997.
4. Chinas National Legislature Adopts Constitutional Amendment, Xinhua, 13 March 2018,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/11/c_137031606.htm (accessed on 15 March 2018).
China p e r s p e c t i v e sSpecial feature
Dictators Shadow
Chinese Elite Politics Under Xi Jinping
DIMITAR D. GUEORGUIEV
ABSTRACT: President Xi Jinping is arguably the most powerful Chinese leader since Chairman Mao. Recent constitutional revisions and a mid-
term leadership reshuffle has only substantiated the fear that Xi, like Mao, has no intention of handing over power to a future successor. Does
Xis rise signal an end to collective leadership and does a stronger president translate into a weaker party? In this article, I review the methods
by which Xi has come to consolidate power as well as the implications for Chinese elite politics in the future. Drawing insights from the compa-
rative literature, I question the zero-sum relationship between executive and institutional strength. Although Xi has certainly amassed unpre-
cedented personal power, it has not necessarily come at the expense of the Party. Instead, the dangers of Xi Jinpings power grab are more likely
to result from a chilling effect on dissenting opinions and thinning out of the leadership pipeline, each of which is likely to undermine gover-
ning capacity over the medium to long-term.
KEYWORDS: China, Authoritarian Regimes, Elite Politics, Power Sharing, Collective Leadership, Institutions, Succession.
of powers, norms surrounding succession, and procedures for collective de-
cision-making in China. Although each of these features are aimed at con-
straining despotic rule, each is also subordinate to the primary goal of
political domination by the CCP. As such, we should allow for the possibility
that personalisation of power can occur even if a ruling partys key institu-
tions are still intact (Slater 2003).
Circumventing the separation of powers
The 17th Party Congress Communique from 2007 defines collective lead-
ership as a system with a division of responsibilities among individual lead-
ers to prevent arbitrary decision-making by a single top leader. (5) In stark
contrast, the first PB meeting of the 19th Congress in October 2017 con-
cluded that centralised and unified leadership by the Party is the highest
principle of the leadership. Most recently, Xi Jinpings outgoing anti-cor-
ruption czar, Wang Qishan, penned an essay in Peoples Daily outlining
problems with separating party and state, and explaining why future chal-
lenges would require doing away with this division. (6)
Anticipating Wangs thesis, Xi Jinping is actively blurring the divisions between
politics, economics, and military affairs since stepping into office in 2012. This
distortion of boundaries is clearly visible in the number and span of leadership
positions currently held by Xi Jinping, referred to by some as the chairman of
everything. (7) By Cheng Lis (2016) count, Xi now holds a total of 12 top posts
in the countrys most powerful leadership bodies (see Table 1).
With the exception of the core titles of General Party Secretary, Presi-
dent, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the remaining
positions fall into the category of leading groups, which are informal
bodies of extreme poweroften having more influence than respective
ministries. The mere presence of so many leading groups seems itself a
contradiction to collective leadership, separation of power, and constitu-
tional authority more broadly. Yet, this is precisely what they are designed
to do, i.e., overcome bureaucratic or organisational barriers, pool resources,
and push through policy agendas (Miller 2008). Whether intended or not,
CCP leaders, beginning with Mao, (8) have routinely taken advantage of the
leading groups to bypass opposition and assert control; Xi Jinping is just
the latest.
What is perhaps different, however, is how Xis leading groups cross-cut
and overlap multiple policy arenas, some of which have traditionally fallen
under the purview of other Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) members
and State Council ministers. For instance, the vaguely named Central Lead-
ing Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms conceivably oversees
anything from financial markets to environmental regulation. At the same
time, however, Xi has not appropriated portfolios that were not his for the
taking. As Table 1 summarises, seven of Xis titles have precedents, insofar
as they were previously held by Hu Jintao, and by Jiang Zemin before him.
The remaining five offices were conjured up during Xis first term in office,
and there is nothing in formal or informal party guidelines that discourages
such action. For instance, the National Security Commission gives Xi indirect
control over both foreign and domestic security, without expressly taking
over those portfolios. Similarly, Xis most recent title, Commander-in-Chief
of PLA Joint Operations, lays claim to new political territory, as there were
no formal joint operations under previous administrations.
In other words, rather than overtly breaking down fences, Xi Jinping ap-
pears to be re-drawing the bounds and meaning of institutional power-shar-
ing. To be sure, the point here is not in any way to downplay Xis political
bravado, but rather to highlight the nuanced signalling game Xi is playing.
Put differently, if Xi wanted to demonstrate his dominance and the end of
collective leadership, he might simply appropriate the National Energy Com-
mission (headed by Li Keqiang) or the Central Commission for Discipline In-
spection (CCDI, now run by Zhao Leji). He has not done so, at least not yet.
Instead, Xi has circumvented collective leadership through the institution
of informal leading groups, a practice that predates his tenure and collective
leadership more broadly.
18 c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2
5. Hu Jintao, (Yi gaige chuangxin jingshen
quanmian tuijin dang de jianshe xin de weida gongcheng, Promoting comprehensive Party building
in the spirit of reform and innovation), 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress, 15 October 2007,
cpc.people.com.cn/GB/104019/104098/6379184.html (accessed on 15 November 2017).
6. Wang Qishan, (Kaiqi xin shidai ta shang xin zhengcheng, Opening a
new era, stepping out on a new path), Peoples Daily, 7 November 2017, paper.people.com.cn/
rmrb/html/2017-11/07/nw.D110000renmrb_20171107_1-02.htm (accessed on 15 November
2017).
7. For instance, see: Javier Hernandez, Chinas Chairman of Everything: Behind Xi Jinpings Many
Titles, The New York Times, 25 October 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/world/asia/china-
xi-jinping-titles-chairman.html (accessed on 15 November 2017).
8. In 1966, Mao Zedong installed loyalists to the Central Leading Small Group on the Cultural Rev-
olution to oversee a mass youth uprising and a widespread purge of his rivals and CCP elite more
broadly. During his tenure, Jiang Zemin repeatedly refashioned the Taiwan Affairs Leading Group,
at times leaning on generals or diplomats, reflecting changes in his Cross-Straits strategy (Hsiao
2013).
Special feature
Table 1 Leadership Positions Held by Xi Jinping
Leadership body Title Tenure since Precedent
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Gen. Secretary 2012.11 Y
Central Military Commission of the CCP Chair 2012.11 Y
Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs Head 2012.11 Y
Presidency of the Peoples Republic of China President 2013.03 Y
Central Military Commission of the PRC Chair 2013.03 Y
Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs, National Security Head 2013.03 Y
Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Work Head 2013.03 Y
PRC National Security Committee Chair 2013.11 new
Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Chair 2013.11 new
Central Leading Group for Network Security and Information Techology Head 2014.02 new
Leading Group for Deepening Reform of National Defense and Military Head 2014.02 new
PLA Joint Operations Command Center Cmdr. in Chief 2016.04 new
Note: Based on Li (2016) and expanded upon records from China Vitae Research Library.
Even if there is still some separation of power at the very top, Xi is dra-
matically reshaping the way power is organised just below. These effects
are most vivid within the military. Though often seen as an arm of the CCP,
the PLA has traditionally enjoyed a measure of autonomy from the political
state, at times acting in violation of or even contradiction to the aims of
the leadership (Cheung 2001). Since Xi took office, however, thousands of
military personnel, including hundreds of senior officers, have been purged
and the traditional system of regional command, a vestige of the PLAs land-
based limitations, has been scrapped and replaced with five theatres under
the direct oversight of the Central Military Commission (CMC), headed by
Xi. (9) The CMC itself was downsized from 11 members to seven, (10) and in
December 2017, the CCP Central Committee (CCOM) announced that the
Peoples Armed Police Force (PAP), a force of more than 600,000 overseen
by both the State Council and the CMC since 1982, would be put under the
direct command of the CMC alone, beginning on 1 January 2018.
Consolidation within Chinas cabinet mirrors that of the military. As of
March 2017, the State Council, chaired by Premier Li Keqiang, has been re-
duced from 35 members to 27.As in the case of the military, the merger of
prominent ministries and the creation of new agencies and administrations
is being touted on grounds of modernisation and efficiency. (11) This claim is
not unwarranted. For instance, the recently proposed Banking and Insurance
Regulatory Commission, a State Immigration Administration, and an Inter-
national Development Cooperation Agency each address policy arenas that
have only really emerged over the last decade.
At the same time, and just as in the case of military restructuring, it is
hard to ignore how changes within the governing cabinet are blurring the
boundary between state and party. The Financial Stability and Development
Committee (announced in November 2017), for instance, combines eco-
nomic oversight with policymaking powers, each of which has traditionally
been housed in separate kitchens (Naughton 2017). (12) Even more dramat-
ically, a new National Supervision Commission (NSC) merges and absorbs
the functions of the Ministry of Supervision (a state institution) within that
of the CCDI (a party organ). (13) This new branch of government not only ce-
ments Xi Jinpings signature anti-corruption crusade as permanent fixture
of the party-state, its institutional rankequal to that of the State Council
and higher than the judicial organscircumvents the most paramount di-
vision of power and rule of law. (14)
Rigging the transfer of power
The transfer of power in Chinese leadership politics has been guided in re-
cent decades by three reinforcing norms, none of which are formally or
legally outlined in the CCPs or the PRCs constitution (Wang and Vangeli
2016). The first, and arguably the most important, concerns age and term
limits. The second and third are about the nomination and the grooming of
future leaders, respectively. Below, I briefly review the origins of these suc-
cession norms and the degree to which they are being followed today.
One of Deng Xiaopings pivotal reform efforts was rejuvenating the CCP
ranks by persuading revolutionary leaders into retirement (Manion 1993).
Although Deng refrained from adopting a specific age threshold for top
leaders, age restrictions for provincial and ministerial-level leadership posi-
tions, along with fixed term limits, were adopted into the constitution. These
efforts gradually culminated into norms for retirement, with lower-level
leaders facing mandatory retirement at 60 and mid-level leaders in the Cen-
tral Committee at 65 (Nathan 2003). The norm for top leaders is not in-
scribed in any rule book, but precedent suggests that incumbents may con-
tinue to serve when they are still 67, but not if they have reached 68, a
practice widely known as the seven-up, eight-down (qi shang, ba xia)
rule. (15) In practice, this norm, combined with the age demographics of
upper-most leadership cohorts, has also constrained top leaders to two
terms in office, which happens to coincide with the state positions.
Rather than violating the age-based retirement norm, Xi is taking full ad-
vantage of it. Although many expected 69-year-old Wang Qishan, a key Xi
ally and principal agent of Xis anti-corruption campaign, to stay in the
PBSC, he officially retired from his party portfolio during the 19th Party
Congress. (16) This, of course, did not prevent Wang from taking over the vice-
presidency, a position that carries no age restriction. Furthermore, all 16
members from the 18th PBSC who had passed the age threshold were re-
tired, freeing up slots for Xi loyalists, including the elevation of 67-year-old
Li Zhanshu to the PBSC.
Another, more ambiguous, set of norms concerns the selection and
grooming of successors, a perennial source of friction and uncertainty in
non-democratically constituted regimes. The CCP is thought to have made
in-roads into this problem by extending the succession process across over-
lapping generations, whereby leaders-in-waiting take on key roles within
the PBSC in advance of their expected promotion (Ma 2016). This staggered
approach has two important implications. First, it means that future leaders
are well-socialised into the leadership structure before taking formal posi-
tions. Second, it implies that although incumbents are constrained from di-
rectly naming their own successors they have considerable influence in
nominating contenders to succeed one generation later.
Importantly, therefore, adherence to the seven-up, eight down age norm
implies that all members of the 19th PBSC, including Xi, are too old to carry
on the mantle of General Party Secretary after 2022. (17) Xis predicament
aside, the key takeaway of the 19th Party Congress was thus the curious
absence of any leader-in-waiting. A surprise constitutional overhaul, con-
ducted behind the scenes of the 2018 national legislative session, helped
clear things up by removing term limits for the office of President (also held
by Xi Jinping). As with the vice-presidency, the presidency carries no age re-
N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2 c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s 19
9. Chinas Military Regrouped into Five PLA Theater Commands, Xinhua, 1 February 2016, www.xin-
huanet.com/english/2016-02/01/c_135065429.htm (accessed on 15 November 2017).
10. Charlotte Gao, Has Xi Fully Consolidated His Power Over the Military? The Diplomat, 8 January
2018, thediplomat.com/2018/01/has-xi-fully-consolidated-his-power-over-the-military/ (ac-
cessed on 15 January 2018).
11. Government Overhaul Plan, mp.weixin.qq.com/s/_mG6KoJHKvXPpE6YE3zh9w (accessed on 15
March 2018).
12. China Establishes Financial Stability and Development Committee, Xinhua, 8 November 2017,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/08/c_136737949.htm (accessed on 15 November 2017).
13. There is no question as to the CCPs predominance within the NSC. At the national level 14 out
of the 17 leadership members come with affiliations to either the Central or provincial Disciplinary
Inspection Commissions (DIC). At the provincial level more than 170 of the roughly 300 provincial
committee members have ties to provincial DICs. Authors calculations based on provincial reports.
14. See: Charlotte Gao, China Plans to Amend Its Constitution, The Diplomat, 28 December 2017,
thediplomat.com/2017/12/china-plans-to-amend-its-constitution/ (accessed on 18 January
2018).
15. Wang and Vangeli (2016) refer to this as the Li Ruihuan Clause because it was the uncomfortable
task of retiring Li Ruihuan in 1997then 68 years oldthat encouraged members of the 15th
Congress, with strong pressure from Jiang Zemin, to lower the formal retirement age of top leaders
from 70 to 68.
16. See: Wang Xiangwei, Despite Retirement, Xis Right-Hand Man Wang Qishan is Still Within Arms
Reach, South China Morning Post, 2 December 2017, www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/arti-
cle/2122250/despite-retirement-xis-right-hand-man-wang-qishan-still-within (accessed on 15
December 2017).
17. Zhao Leji, the youngest member, will be 65 in 2022 and can look forward to no longer than one
more term in the PBSC, which ought to disqualify him from the top spot.
Dimitar D. Gueorguiev Dictators Shadow: Chinese Elite Politics under Xi Jinping
striction, meaning that Xi Jinping can comfortably and legally retain his po-
sition as head of state after 2022. A future accommodation for Xi to hold
concurrent control of the Partys General Secretary position beyond 2022,
despite his advanced age, will thus be easily defendable.
Packing the balance of power
In addition to institutional divisions and succession norms, many point to
the role of factional politics as providing a de facto balance of power (Cai
and Treisman 2006). Factions revolve around CCP leaders, who play the role
of patrons, leveraging their position of power to cultivate personal networks
of clients (Nathan 1973). Importantly, CCP norms around the transfer of
power facilitate factional competition by creating room for more than one
patron at a time; namely, the incumbent leader and the predecessor. That
is, by preventing incumbents from hand-picking their own successor but al-
lowing them to appoint prospective leaders who might one day succeed
their successor, CCP norms extend the shadow of the incumbent at least
two generations ahead. In theory, this iterative process ought to ensure
some balance of personal power within the top echelon of leaders (Ma
2016). Ironically, although Hu Chunhua is highly unlikely to be promoted in
the future, his presence as one of only three PB members young enough to
be named General Secretary in 2022 is at least a symbolic nod to the idea
of staggered succession, insofar as he is widely seen as having been Hu Jin-
taos nominee from 2012.
The present PBSC features representatives from each of Chinas most
powerful factions. Premier Li Keqiang and Vice Premier Wang Yang both
hail from the Chinese Communist Youth League and are seen as having
ties to former General Secretary Hu Jintaos League faction (Tuanpai
). Han Zheng is most closely associated with former General Secre-
tary Jiang Zemins Shanghai clique, while Zhao Leji and Li Zhanshu are
both seen as part of Xis emerging New Zhijiang army. The seventh
member, Wang Hu-ning, is a low-profile academic who has connections
with each of the above groupings, having helped pen Jiangs Three Rep-
resents, Hus Scientific Development, and Xis Socialist Evolution
theories, each of which is now enshrined in the CCP constitution.
Although the PBSC appears roughly balanced, as already noted, ac-
cording to the seven up, eight down rule, practically the entire current
PBSC will have to retire in 2022. The fulcrum of balance is therefore
more likely to be found in the enlarged PB, which is heavily stacked in
Xis favour. Among the 18 current PB members who are not in the stand-
ing committee, only three could convincingly be described as members
of either Hus or Jiangs respective cliques, compared to nine who could
be labelled as part of Team Xi (see Table 2). (18) Such groupings are prob-
lematic, both conceptually and analytically. Specifically, identifying a
factional affiliation often boils down to determining a persons ex-
pressed or perceived loyalty towards a patron (Shih 2008). The problem,
of course, is deciding whether those expressing loyalty to an incumbent
leader are genuine clients, since not demonstrating such allegiance is
not much of an option.
Which individuals made it into the PB is also only half the story. The
recent career jolts to three leaders tied to Hu Jintao is a case in point.
Sun Zhengcais removal just before the 19th Congressat only 54 years
old and an obvious Hu protgalongside the unceremonious early re-
tirement of Li Yuanchao and the quiet demotion of Liu Qibao, two
prominent Tuanpai kingpins, signal with very little ambiguity that Hu
Jintaos remaining influence within the CCP leadership is token at
best. (19) In short, while the current PB reflects some semblance of bal-
ance, when we parse through the optics, it becomes quite clear that Xi
Jinping has taken full advantage of his position to tip the scales sharply
in his favour.
Dampening dissent
The relative ease with which Xi Jinping has refashioned and reconstituted
the institutional infrastructure raises questions about the internal proce-
dures underpinning collective leadership; namely that of Inner-Party Democ-
racy (Lin 2002; Hu 2010). The concept, admittedly vague, rests in the belief
that lower levels of power, despite being selected by the top leaders, exercise
some influence over top leaders and decisions through a process referred
to as reciprocal accountability (Shirk 1993). Although reciprocal account-
ability has not been directly demonstrated in China, the process by which
the CCOM ratifies PB decisions and appointments is codified in the consti-
tution. (20)
20 c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2
18. There is no clear-cut way to measure factional alignments. While some look at home town and
schooling experience, others prioritise common work experience. I treat the incumbent leader
during entry into the central committee, widely seen as the inner circle of the CCP, as a key indi-
cator for a possible factional tie. Then, I consider shared working experience and personal con-
nections as confirmation. In the absence of confirmatory links, I do not assign a factional tie.
19. Both Li and Liu were prominent members of the Chinese Communist Youth League, the organisa-
tional base for Hu Jintaos Tuanpai faction. While Li has gone into early retirement, Liu and Zhang
have been demoted from the PB positions in the 18th Congress to CCOM positions in the 19th,
without much explanation.
20. Central Committee members have exercised institutional power vis–vis PB members in other
communist systems such as the Soviet Union in 1957 and 1964, and by a no-confidence vote in
Vietnam in 2014.
Special feature
Table 2 19th Party Congress Politburo
(Standing Committe Excluded)
Member Age Jiang Hu Xi
CCOM
entry
Hu Chunhua 54 2007
Ding Xuexiang 55 2017
Chen Min’er 57 2012
Li Qiang 58 2017
Huang Kunming 61 2017
Li Hongzhong 61 2017
Li Xi 61 2017
Cai Qi 62 2017
Chen Quanguo 62 2012
Guo Shengkun 63 2012
Chen Xi 64 2012
Yang Xiaodu 64 2012
Liu He 65 2012
Wang Chen 67 2002
Xu Qiliang 67 2002
Sun Chunlan 67 2007
Yang Jiechi 67 2007
Zhang Youxia 67 2007
Note: I treat the incumbent leader during entry into the central committee as a key
indicator for a possible factional tie. Then, I consider shared working experience and
personal connections as confirmatory. In the absence of confirmatory links, I do not
assign a factional tie. Based on records from China Vitae Research Library.
Whereas the 17th and 18th congresses were each preceded by an internal
election, (21) selection in the 19th Congress was conducted by face-to-face
consultation, with Xi Jinping personally meeting with 59 senior and retired
leaders to seek their suggestions. Other senior leaders also held one-on-
one sessions with 290 ministerial cadres and senior military officers. (22) To
understand what this means procedurally as well as politically, it is worth
briefly digressing for a review of internal polls and consultation.
There are two aspects to internal CCP election procedures that set them
far apart from elections typical in Western democratic contexts. First, they
are secret, so the outcome can never be independently verified. Second,
Chinese internal elections are not contests among competing candidates.
Instead, they operate as straw polls, based on a menu drafted by the PBSC,
from which voters can identify who they would not want to be promoted.
In October 2017, for instance, roughly 8 percent of proposed candidates for
the 19th CCOM were eliminated by negative selection. (23)
This approach departs from positive selection in two important ways. First,
it biases against the rise of popular candidates, a principle that is a mainstay
of collective leadership (Gueorguiev and Schuler 2016). Second, negative
voting allows voters to knock off multiple names at once, which makes it
difficult for voters to coordinate on a preferred candidate. In practice, neg-
ative selection delivers a range of least bad options, thereby empowering
the PBSC to mix and match rather than having to adopt a set meal.
Consultation is a different decision-making process but relies on roughly
the same principles and leans even more sharply in the same top-heavy di-
rection. As in negative voting, its key premise is that decision-makers set
the agenda by defining the proposed list of candidates. Similarly, consulta-
tion also makes it difficult for the input providers to coordinate on preferred
candidates because they are communicating vertically with the senior lead-
ers but not horizontally among themselves. In effect, this provides senior
leaders valuable information without the risk of bottom-up coordination.
There is a cost, however. Not only does the compartmentalisation of input
undermine the institutional basis of reciprocal accountability, face-to-face
consultation, as opposed to a ballot, is unlikely to yield much in the way of
unfiltered information. This risk increases with the personalisation of power,
as any disagreement with nominees or policy proposals could be interpreted
as disagreement with Xi Jinping himself. In other words, the move towards
consultation, in combination with personalisation, will discourage elites
from revealing preferences and speaking out. This, in turn, will compound
the regimes information problem, make it harder to anticipate opposition,
and increase the chance of policy mistakes (Stromseth et al. 2017).
The end of collective leadership?
Does an ever stronger Xi Jinping translate into a weaker CCP? If we
accept the idea that personalisation is antithetical to institutional sur-
vival, then Xi Jinpings affront on collective leadership represents a sub-
stantial liability for CCP survival. At the same time, the zero-sum
relationship between personalisation and institutionalisation is not wa-
terproof. As Slater (2003) reminds us, highly institutionalised autocracies
practice norms and procedures to constrain personal power, but they
are neither the sole nor the primary purposes of authoritarian institu-
tions. Ultimately, the raison detre of authoritarian institutions is not
to prevent one-man rule, but to supply a regime with the infrastruc-
tural power necessary to implement its command over potential [op-
ponents] (Slater 2003: 82).
Applied to the case of China, there are at least three reasons why Xis con-
solidation of power might not have come at the direct expense of the Party.
First, it is important to remember that the seeds of Xis unprecedented rise
were sown well in advance of his taking office. Specifically, in reducing the
PBSC from nine to seven members, five of whom would be too old to stay
on past the 19th Congress, CCP elites expressed a preference for centralising
and consolidating power in one leader. Furthermore, Xis ability to lead with
a strong hand had everything to do with the fact that Hu Jintao handed
over all key leadership positions in one clean transfer. As Joseph Fewsmith
(2013) put it when commenting on the 18th Congress of 2012:
Ironically the apparent concentration of power in the hands of those
with strong ties to Ji
