Microbial Foren
Read Jonathan Tucker’s position paper on microbial forensics and choose one of the four faces for further analysis. Tucker’s advice for the establishment of the “Microbial Forensics Advisory Board” was taken. In 2009, the National Science and Technology Council released a “National Research and Development Strategy for Microbial Forensics”, which outlined the key parameters that needed to be addressed. A recent news article in Nature Medicine (attached) discusses how analysis of the data lags behind the sequencing – in other words, we have the scientific tools to gather a lot of data but don’t know yet how to use this data to unambiguously reach conclusions regarding association.
Read the hyperlinked articles and reports above. Choose one aspect of Tucker’s article to focus on (your choice, it could be database development, intelligence cooperation, or anything), and analyze the response of the NSTC and any other source to determine whether we are implementing a feasible strategy. Write three paragraphs, and include any outside sources that you find. (This is a “choose your own adventure” assignment, so find what interests you and proceed).
APA format, in-text citation, references include, 1 1/2 page
The Four Faces of Microbial Forensics
Jonathan B. Tucker and Gregory D. Koblentz
The emerging field of microbial forensics played a major role in the investigation of the 2001 anthrax mailings and has
been closely associated with the process of attribution, or identifying the perpetrator of a biological attack for purposes of
criminal prosecution or military retaliation. Nevertheless, microbial forensics has other potential applications in intel-
ligence, nonproliferation, and verification. This article describes the relevance of microbial forensics for a variety of law
enforcement and national security missions, examines the obstacles to its broader use, and concludes with some policy
recommendations.
Microbial forensics involves the use of advancedgenetic, chemical, and physical techniques to char-
acterize a pathogen or toxin used in a biological attack.
Bioforensics is a more inclusive term that covers, in addi-
tion to microbial forensics, a variety of other biological
forensic techniques, such as human DNA fingerprinting
and standard serological analyses (eg, ABO blood typing).
Because of the key role that microbial forensics played in
the investigation of the 2001 anthrax mailings, this
emerging discipline has been linked primarily to the process
of attribution, or identifying the country, group, or in-
dividual responsible for the use of a biological weapon in
order to pursue legal prosecution or military retaliation.
Nevertheless, microbial forensics has potential applications
in other areas of national security, including the investi-
gation of alleged biological weapons use by nation-states
or terrorist organizations; the assessment of biological
weapons capabilities possessed by adversaries; the moni-
toring of nonproliferation agreements, such as the United
Nations (UN) Security Council resolution mandating the
elimination of Iraqs biological weapons program after
the 1991 Persian Gulf War; and the verification of the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which currently
has no formal compliance measures.
The 4 communities with an interest in microbial
forensicslaw enforcement, intelligence, nonproliferation,
and verificationeach have specialized needs dictated by
the conditions under which they operate and the demands
of their respective missions. As a result, although the ap-
plications of microbial forensics involve the same basic tools
and techniques and generally meet the same standards of
scientific validity, the ways the tools are used differ in
several important respects.
First, whether the operating environment is cooperative
(as is generally true of law enforcement) or noncooperative
(as is usually the case with intelligence collection) will in-
fluence the sampling strategy employed.
Second, microbial forensics for law enforcement is
almost always based on an actual event (a biocrime or
bioterrorism incident), whereas intelligence agencies may
use forensic evidence to support predictive threat assess-
ments with varying levels of confidence.
Third, the law enforcement, intelligence, nonprolifera-
tion, and verification communities have different criteria
and thresholds for judging the probative value of forensic
evidence and employing it in the decision-making process.
For example, the forensic analyses used in law enforcement
must meet certain scientific standards to be admitted as
Jonathan B. Tucker, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Washington, DC. Gregory D.
Koblentz, PhD, is an Assistant Professor and Deputy Director of the Biodefense Program, Department of Public and International
Affairs, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia.
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science
Volume 7, Number 4, 2009 Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.
DOI: 10.1089=bsp.2009.0043
389
evidence in a court of law and are then subject to a rigorous
process of cross-examination. In contrast, the microbial
forensic evidence used to support intelligence assessments
(although it may be of equivalent scientific quality) does
not receive the same degree of external review.
Finally, the extent to which the analytical results can be
made public or shared with other countries depends on the
source of the forensic evidence and the purpose for which it
is being used. Whereas many forensic techniques used in
law enforcement are published to enhance their credibility
with judges and juries, certain techniques used by the intel-
ligence community are classified to protect sensitive col-
lection methods.
The 4 faces of microbial forensics are not mutually ex-
clusive, however, and information collected for one purpose
may prove useful for others. For example, microbial forensic
analyses performed to support a biological weapons threat
assessment could later be brought to bear during the
attribution investigation following a biological attack.
Indeed, the intelligence community is charged with con-
ducting both types of missions.1 Similarly, data about a
nations biological weapons program obtained for non-
proliferation or verification purposes could contribute to
threat assessment and attribution. This article describes the
4 applications of microbial forensics, discusses the need for
an integrated research strategy, and concludes with rec-
ommendations for the future development of the field.
Microbial Forensics and Attribution
Biological weapons agents are well suited for anonymous
attacks because they can be delivered covertly and have
delayed effects. They may also cause outbreaks that are
difficult to distinguish from natural events, making them
hard to attribute and hence to deter. The process of bio-
logical attribution can be divided into 3 parts: (1) identi-
fying the infectious agent and strain responsible for an
unusual outbreak of disease; (2) characterizing the outbreak
as natural or deliberate in origin; and (3) if the event is
judged intentional, determining the state, group, or indi-
vidual responsible.2 Microbial forensic analysis of the ge-
netic, chemical, and physical characteristics of the pathogen
or toxin used in an attack can help investigators to include
or exclude a suspect, although sound attribution judg-
ments can be made only in conjunction with other types of
evidence.
Even before the anthrax letters investigation, microbial
forensics had been used to attribute the source of alleged
biological attacks and suspicious outbreaks of disease. In the
early 1980s, the U.S. and other countries relied heavily on
sampling and analysis to investigate allegations that the
Soviet Union and its allies had used trichothecene myco-
toxins (yellow rain) as a weapon in Cambodia, Laos, and
Afghanistan.3 Nevertheless, significant shortcomings in
sample collection and chain of custody, as well as the ru-
dimentary state of mycotoxin analysis at the time, cast
doubt on the validity of the forensic evidence.4 Subsequent
advances in molecular epidemiologythe use of ge-
netic sequence information to track the transmission of
pathogensprovided useful tools for microbial forensic
investigation. In 1998, for example, a phylogenetic analysis
of HIV strains helped to convict a doctor of injecting his
girlfriend with a sample of the virus obtained from an in-
fected patient.5
The revolution in molecular biology, including the ca-
pability for whole-genome sequencing, led to the develop-
ment of new techniques for identifying microbial strains
and substrains on the basis of subtle variations in their
DNA sequence. For example, a powerful method of genetic
analysis called multiple locus variable-number tandem
repeat analysis ( MLVA) enabled scientists to resolve a
long-standing mystery concerning the bioterrorism activi-
ties of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult. In June 1993, cult
members grew a liquid suspension of spores of Bacillus
anthracis (the bacterium that causes anthrax) and sprayed it
as an aerosol cloud from the roof of a building in Tokyo,
yet the attack caused no known casualties. MLVA analysis
of the spores, cultured from the release site, showed that the
cult had mistakenly grown and released the harmless Sterne
strain of B. anthracis, which is widely used as a veterinary
vaccine.6 In another incident in 2002, a husband and wife
from New Mexico traveled to New York City and became
ill with a serious infection that was later diagnosed as bu-
bonic plague. MLVA analysis of the strain of plague bac-
teria (Yersinia pestis) isolated from the 2 patients made it
possible to rule out bioterrorism as a possible cause of the
outbreak by tracing the source to an endemic focus near the
couples home in northern New Mexico.7
To date, the most high-profile application of microbial
forensics to the attribution of a biological attack was the
7-year Amerithrax investigation led by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Postal Inspection Ser-
vice. Initial genetic analysis of the B. anthracis spores mailed
in autumn 2001 revealed that they belonged to the Ames
strain, but available techniques could not determine the
source of the bacteria. When the spores were cultured on
nutrient agar, a small percentage contained mutations that
caused them to form atypical colonies, called morphotypes,
that differed in shape and color from the norm. The FBI
developed genetic assays for 4 of these mutations and used
them to screen a repository of 1,070 samples of B. anthracis
Ames collected from 19 domestic and foreign labs. Only
8 samples tested positive for all 4 mutations and were traced
back to the same source: a flask labeled RMR-1029 at the
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Dis-
eases in Maryland. Further investigation with standard
police methods narrowed the pool of suspects down to
Bruce E. Ivins, a veteran anthrax researcher at the Army
laboratory. Tragically, Ivins committed suicide before he
could be put on trial, leaving unanswered questions about
the strength of the evidence against him, which has not
THE FOUR FACES OF MICROBIAL FORENSICS
390 Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science
been fully revealed or subjected to cross-examination. In
September 2008, the FBI requested that the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences review the scientific aspects of the
Amerithrax investigation to determine whether the micro-
bial forensic techniques used by the bureau were reliable
and sufficiently validated, and whether the FBI reached the
appropriate scientific conclusions from its use of these
techniques.
Another potential application of microbial forensics for
attribution purposes is to support international investiga-
tions of alleged biological weapons use. The International
Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) has launched an
initiative to build the capacity of law enforcement agencies
around the world to investigate bioterrorism incidents,
including some sharing of microbial forensic techniques.
In addition, during the 1980s, the UN General Assembly
adopted a series of resolutions empowering any member
state to report a suspected incident of chemical, biological,
or toxin weapons use and to request the Secretary-General
to dispatch an international group of experts to conduct an
objective field investigation. Between 1980 and 1992, the
Secretary-General launched a dozen such investigations, all
involving the alleged use of chemical or toxin weapons.8
Although the most recent UN field investigation took place
in 1992, the mechanism remains in effect and can draw on
more than 200 experts and 20 analytical laboratories
nominated by 41 member states.* The UN Office of Dis-
armament Affairs (ODA) is charged with maintaining the
lists of experts and laboratories, training and exercising the
experts, developing standard operating procedures for
sampling and analysis, and providing logistical support to
teams conducting field investigations. Samples taken as part
of an investigation would be split into 4 aliquots, with
1 portion going to the host country and the others to 3
independent laboratories for analysis (authors interview
with a UN official, August 4, 2009).
In the event of a biological attack overseas, the U.S.
intelligence community would conduct its own investiga-
tion. (The FBI would lead the effort if one or more U.S.
citizens were targeted.) Because much of the microbial fo-
rensic information would be collected with sensitive intel-
ligence methods or for possible use in a criminal trial, it
might not be releasable to other countries. Thus, an impor-
tant advantage of the UN Secretary-Generals mechanism is
that the findings would be unclassified and could be widely
shared. A UN-sponsored investigation would also have
greater international credibility, providing a stronger basis
for mobilizing multilateral political, economic, and even
military sanctions against the attacker. Nevertheless, the
microbial forensic capabilities of the Secretary-Generals
investigative mechanism remain unproven, and ODA does
not have sufficient resources to develop new or improved
assays, validate sampling and analysis protocols, or test the
proficiency of reference laboratories.
In contrast, the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international body in The
Hague that implements the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion (CWC), regularly conducts round-robin proficiency
exercises with OPCW-certified laboratories to test their
ability to identify unknown chemical warfare agents cor-
rectly. Microbial forensics requires a similar international
capability. Because sampling and analysis would play a key
role in any UN field investigation of alleged biological
weapons use, the U.S. should make some of its expertise in
this field available to the United Nations. In addition,
classified information that is important for attribution or
exclusion, such as data on genetically engineered pathogens
or weaponization techniques, might be shared with UN
investigation teams on a case-by-case basis.
Microbial Forensics and Threat
Assessment
The U.S. intelligence community has a long-standing in-
terest in the use of microbial forensics to characterize the
threat posed by foreign biological weapons programs, and it
has developed a number of techniques and processes to
collect, transport, analyze, and interpret samples that have
made important contributions to the field. For reasons of
secrecy, however, the intelligence communitys pioneering
role in microbial forensics technology has not been widely
recognized. During the Amerithrax investigation, for ex-
ample, the FBI turned to the CIA and other intelligence
agencies for technical assistance (authors interview with
Jenifer Smith, principal, BioForensic Consulting LLC,
Washington, DC, October 29, 2009).
Microbial forensics can make a key contribution to
biological threat assessment. Because most field detectors,
diagnostic kits, and medical countermeasures are agent-
specific, it is important to know if an adversary is devel-
oping exotic, antibiotic-resistant, or genetically engineered
pathogens. Analyzing the physical characteristics and che-
mical composition of a biological warfare agent obtained
from a foreign source may also reveal how and where it was
produced and the extent to which it has been weapo-
nized, including the use of specialized processing tech-
niques and chemical additives to enhance its effectiveness.
In addition to the value of this information for threat as-
sessment, it may be useful for consequence management
and the conduct of military operations against an adver-
sarys biological weapons production and storage facilities.
Applying microbial forensics to threat assessment faces
several hurdles, mainly related to the conditions under
which samples are collected. Whereas criminal investi-
gators and international inspectors can operate openly,
*Ever since the entry into force in 1997 of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), which has provisions for investi-
gating chemical or toxin weapons use, the focus of the Secretary-
Generals mechanism has shifted to biological weapons.
TUCKER AND KOBLENTZ
Volume 7, Number 4, 2009 391
intelligence operatives must collect samples covertly. They
may lack direct access to a biological weapons facility,
forcing them to rely on stand-off air sampling or the col-
lection of environmental samples; or they may have access
to the facility for only a short amount of time, precluding
the use of comprehensive sampling techniques. Such con-
straints may lead to misleading results, sometimes with
negative consequences. In 1998, for example, the U.S.
apparently misidentified the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant
in Khartoum, Sudan, as a chemical weapons production
facility based on the analysis of a single soil sample collected
by a covert operative who did not have direct access to the
facility. The Al Shifa plant was subsequently destroyed by a
U.S. cruise-missile strike.9,10
The number and quality of samples collected by covert
means may also be problematic because of the natural
presence in the environment of certain pathogens of bio-
logical weapons concern (such as B. anthracis), which may
be hard to distinguish from those associated with a local
production facility; contaminants in the sample matrix (soil
or wastewater) that interfere with analytical techniques or
cause molecular signatures to become unstable; and sub-
optimal storage and preservation of samples containing
viable organisms. During shipment from the collection site
to the analytical laboratory, samples may change hands
several times, making it difficult to establish a clear chain of
custody. Finally, the need to protect undercover operatives
and clandestine collection capabilities may preclude the
sharing of analytical results with other countries or interna-
tional organizations. The intelligence community is aware
of these technical problems and has implemented plans to
reduce or mitigate them to the extent possible.
Microbial forensics can help to corroborate or refute
biological threat information obtained from other sources.
For example, the U.S. intelligence community used micro-
bial forensic techniques to assess the former Soviet Unions
development of B. anthracis as a biological weapon. In 1998,
a group of molecular biologists conducted a retrospective
analysis of tissue samples from 11 victims who died during
the 1979 anthrax outbreak in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk
(now Ekaterinburg, Russia). Although the Soviet authori-
ties claimed at the time that the outbreak had resulted from
the consumption of contaminated meat, a later investiga-
tion uncovered extensive epidemiological and pathological
evidence indicating that the victims had died of inhalational
anthrax caused by the accidental release of aerosolized
B. anthracis spores from a nearby military microbiology
facility.11
To characterize the strain of B. anthracis involved in the
Sverdlovsk outbreak, it was necessary to develop new
methods for extracting DNA from preserved samples of the
victims lung tissue, which had been fixed with formalin
and embedded in paraffin. After obtaining the cellular
DNA, the investigators used a technique called the poly-
merase chain reaction (PCR) to identify genetic sequences
specific to B. anthracis. This analysis determined that the
entire set of bacterial genes required for virulence was
present in the victims lung tissue, including the 2 plasmids
(loops of extra-chromosomal DNA) that encode the sub-
units of the anthrax toxin and the protective capsule of
the bacterium. It was also determined that a mixture of
B. anthracis strains was present, providing clear evidence
that the Sverdlovsk outbreak had not been natural in origin.12
In the mid-1990s, U.S. scientists conducted additional
analyses of the B. anthracis preparation from Sverdlovsk to
better understand its virulence, hardiness, and whether or
not it had been genetically modified.13
Despite such successes, however, the role of microbial
forensics in biological threat assessment has not always been
given the priority it deserves. Prior to the 2003 Iraq War,
for example, the U.S. intelligence community based its
estimate of Iraqs biological weapons capabilities almost
entirely on human intelligence (HUMINT) sources such as
the Iraqi engineer code-named Curveball, who later
proved to be a fabricator.14 Had senior U.S. policymakers
demanded that the human intelligence reporting on Iraqs
alleged biological weapons capabilities be corroborated
with measurement and signature intelligence ( MASINT),
including microbial forensic data, the intelligence agencies
might not have made the serious errors in their assessments
(authors interview with Jenifer Smith, October 29, 2009).
Microbial Forensics
and Nonproliferation
Microbial forensics also has utility for monitoring the
proliferation of biological weapons and supporting non-
proliferation measures, such as export and border controls.
From 1991 to 1998, the investigation of the Iraqi biological
weapons program by the UN Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM) provided the first opportunity to field-test a
number of sampling and analysis techniques. These efforts
were hindered initially by the rudimentary state of micro-
bial forensics technology at the time. Aware that inspectors
might take environmental samples, Iraqi officials sought to
eliminate the telltale signatures of biological warfare agents
by decontaminating munitions and production equipment
with bleach and potassium permanganate.15 As a result,
despite extensive sampling in the early 1990s at suspect sites
such as Salman Pak and Al Hakam, UNSCOM was unable
to obtain direct evidence of past Iraqi production of biolog-
ical warfare agents. Pointing to these negative results, Iraq
tried unsuccessfully to persuade the UN Security Council
that the biological weapons file should be closed.16,17
By the mid-1990s, however, microbial forensic tech-
niques had improved significantly. In 1996, UNSCOM
was able to obtain the first direct evidence of Iraqs past
production of biological warfare agents by using a new
sampling methodology and PCR analysis to detect traces of
DNA from B. anthracis on items of production equipment
that had earlier tested negative. In addition, sampling and
THE FOUR FACES OF MICROBIAL FORENSICS
392 Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science
analysis of Iraqi missile warheads recovered from a disposal
site at Al Nibai found traces of B. anthracis DNA on at least
7 of the warheads, 2 more than Iraq claimed had been filled
with the agent. In response to this finding, Iraq filed a
revised full, final, and complete declaration stating that it
had filled 16 warheads with B. anthracis and 5 with botu-
linum toxin, rather than the other way around. The ease
with which the Iraqi regime amended its declaration to
accommodate the new facts uncovered by UNSCOM
further damaged Baghdads credibility.18
UNSCOMs successor, the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),
conducted inspections in Iraq from November 2002 to
March 2003. This agency made use of improved sampling
and analysis protocols that resolved some long-standing
controversies surrounding the Iraqi biological weapons
program. UNMOVIC set up a molecular biology labora-
tory in Baghdad that screened samples for biological warfare
agents with a variety of analytical techniques, such as rapid
PCR; for more sophisticated analyses, the Commission
relied on a network of 6 international reference laborato-
ries.19 During its 4 months of inspections in Iraq, UN-
MOVIC conducted 354 tests on 101 biological samples
from 17 suspect sites.20 None of these analyses detected any
prohibited biological warfare agents.
In an effort to verify Iraqs claim that it had unilaterally
destroyed all of its biological munitions shortly after the
1991 Persian Gulf War, UNMOVIC tested the liquid
contents of 2 R-400 bombs that Iraq excavated in February
2003. Initial screening tests for biological warfare agents at
the UN laboratory in Baghdad were negative because the
lab did not have the capability to concentrate trace levels of
DNA or to remove the decontaminating chemicals that
Iraq had used. The samples were then sent to an interna-
tional reference lab, which determined that both R-400
bombs contained DNA from a virulent strain of B. anthracis
identical to the one that Iraq had admitted weaponizing.21
Thus, microbial forensic analysis in Iraq was capable of
extracting useful information from biological material that
had been treated with chemical decontaminants and then
buried for more than 12 years. This remarkable achieve-
ment demonstrates the power of PCR techniques to detect
and identify minute quantities of DNA from nonviable
organisms. Although most living biological warfare agents
are fragile and survive only a short time in the environment
(with the notable exception of B. anthracis spores), this case
demonstrates the durability of microbial DNA and its
utility for forensic analysis.
An important lesson of the UN weapons inspections in
Iraq was that evidence obtained by sampling and analysis
is more credible than that derived from interviews or
documents, because the forensic data are objective, scien-
tifically based, and not easily refuted. Even so, sampling
must be conducted carefully to minimize the risk of false-
negative or inconclusive findings (authors interview with
a UN official, August 4, 2009). As in the case of law
enforcement, weapons inspectors must integrate microbial
forensic evidence with information from other sources,
such as a review of production ledgers and import-export
records. Moreover, despite ongoing improvements in the
sensitivity and specificity of microbial forensic tech-
niques, future biological weapons proliferators may devise
more sophisticated means of decontamination to pre-
vent the collection of telltale evidence by sampling and
analysis.
Microbial Forensics and Verification
Another potential application of microbial forensics is for
verification of the Biological Weapons Convention, which
lacks formal mechanisms to monitor compliance. In Sep-
tember 1991, the Third Review Conference of the BWC
established an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts
(known as VEREX) to identify and examine potential
verification measures from a scientific and technical
standpoint. The VEREX group assessed 21 different veri-
fication techniques and concluded that some combinations
of measures would contribute to monitoring compliance
with the treaty.22
One of the measures examined by VEREX was sam-
pling and identification. The experts found that off-site
sampling (eg, from the waste stream of a biotech plant) was
of limited value because, if a biological agent was detected,
the source would be difficult to determine. In contrast, on-
site sampling could provide key information to resolve
certain ambiguities about compliance because of the pos-
sibility of identifying the nature of an agent . . . [and] of
obtaining an independent confirmation of analytical results
in the event that findings are disputed.22(p14) A negative
result, however, would not necessarily rule out a BWC
violation. The VEREX group noted further that the value
of on-site sampling could be enhanced by having a prior
indication of which biological warfare agents to look for, by
collecting multiple samples at the same site, and by em-
ploying more than one analytical technique.22 Beginning in
1995, BWC member states negotiated a legally binding
protocol designed to increase confidence in compliance by
augmenting the Convention with a number of on-site
verification measures, including sampling and analysis, but
the talks collapsed after the U.S. rejected the draft protocol
in 2001.
At least in principle, however, techniques such as PCR
and MLVA can be powerful tools for treaty monitoring and
verification. To achieve this potential, sampling and anal-
ysis methods must provide a high degree of sensitivity and
specificity, and they must also protect confidential propri-
etary information (CPI) unrelated to biological weapons.
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies are particu-
larly concerned about the risk of industrial espionage, be-
cause their competitive edge may depend on the use of
genetically engineered production microorganisms that
TUCKER AND KOBLENTZ
Volume 7, Number 4, 2009 393
could be removed surreptitiously from a plant and analyzed
to reveal valuable trade secrets.
To a large extent, the Chemical Weapons Convention
and its international implementing body, the OPCW, have
addressed the challenge of safeguarding proprietary in-
formation during sampling and analysis. The OPCW in-
spectorate, which visits chemical plants in CWC member
states throughout the world, employs a portable analytical
instrument called a gas chromatograph-mass spectrometer.
This device is equipped with blinded software that tells
the operator which treaty-controlled chemicals are present
in the sample but does not disclose the identity of other,
proprietary chemicals. Inspectors are also required to erase
the data from the instruments electronic memory before
leaving an inspected facility. Presumably, similar tech-
niques for protecting confidential proprietary information
could be developed for sampling and analysis during on-site
inspections of dual-use biological facilities. The targeted
identification of specific microbial pathogens and toxins (or
related genes) of biological weapons concern could be
achieved through the use of highly specific antibody as-
says, PCR amplification, and DNA probes. In this way,
microbial forensics could be applied for verification pur-
poses while limiting the intrusiveness of the inspection
process.
Microbial Forensics Research
and Development
To date, the attribution and threat-assessment missions
have driven the development of microbial forensic tech-
nologies; the nonproliferation and verification missions
have piggybacked somewhat on these advances but have
remained underdeveloped. One reason is that a fragmented
organizational structure in the U.S. government has ham-
pered efforts to enhance microbial forensic capabilities
across the full range of potential national security applica-
tions. Each of the agencies with an interest in the field has
tended to pursue its own parochial interests without coor-
dinating the development of technologies and protocols
that would benefit them all.
In 2004, for example, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) established the National Bioforensic Ana-
lysis Center (NBFAC) at Fort Detrick, Maryland, which
was designated the lead Federal facility to conduct and
facilitate the technical forensic analysis and interpretation
of materials following a biological attack.23 Despite its
nominal role as a national resource, however, NBFACs
primary customer is the FBI, and it is just one of many
programs competing for funds within the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate. Moreover, the CIA and other
members of the intelligence community have maintained
independent microbial forensic capabilities, ostensibly be-
cause their mission differs from that of NBFAC. While
some degree of redundancy in U.S. microbial forensic
capabilities is useful for providing surge capacity in the
event of a large-scale biological attack (or multiple smaller
attacks), there is a clear need for better interagency coor-
dination.
The U.S. government has made a prelimin
