MBA – Main – Case study
Based on the attached case study, please write the below answer. s
1. Use theLevel 2tasks in thefinal WBS (Work Breakdown Structures) to create one GANTT chart for the project.[Should be One page]
2. Use the initial and final WBS (Work Breakdown Structures ) to create two high-level budgets for the project. These two should be the initial and final budgets.Explain the difference. [should be 2 pages]
1976 Montreal Olympics: Case Study of Project
Management Failure
Ashish Patel1; Paul A. Bosela, F.ASCE2; and Norbert J. Delatte, F.ASCE3
Abstract: A successful engineering project must include its timely and economic completion. A project management failure can lead to delays
and cost overruns. One example of a project that greatly exceeded its projected budget is the construction of the multiple facilities for the 1976
Olympic Games in Montreal. These included the Olympic Stadium, a velodrome for bicycle events, and the Olympic Village to house the ath-
letes. This case study reviews the circumstances of the cost increases and the design decisions and other circumstances that led to them. The
difficulties were brought on by an unrealistic schedule to complete the facilities before the fixed start date of the Games, combined with an
unusually cavalier attitude toward project costs, exacerbated by political tensions. Although the original cost estimate for the facilities was
$120 million, the final cost was $1.5 billion, with $830 million for the main stadium alone. Part of the justification for the expense of the facilities
was the hope that the facilities would be useful for future athletic eventsthe record on this is mixed at best. The lessons learned can be applied
to other projects to better control costs. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CF.1943-5509.0000332. 2013 American Society of Civil Engineers.
CE Database subject headings: Project management; Construction; Precast concrete; Scheduling; Case studies; Canada.
Author keywords: Project management; Construction; Precast concrete; Project scheduling.
Introduction
On May 12, 1970, extensive lobbying and diplomacy by Montreal
Mayor Jean Drapeau paid off when Montreal was awarded the 1976
Olympic Games over strong bids from Moscow and Los Angeles.
Although both competing cities provided financial guarantees,
Drapeau stated that the Games would cost a maximum of $124
million and that the history and reputation of Montreal would stand
in place of a guarantee (Auf der Maur 1976).
For the next few years, very little was done. The original plan was
scrapped. Mayor Drapeau became enamored with architect Roger
Tailliberts Parc des Princes in Paris. Tellingly, the construction cost for
that stadium had ballooned from the original estimated $9 million to
a final cost of $25 million. Drapeau selected Taillibert without a com-
petition. Like Taillibert, Drapeau had had previous problems with cost
overruns. The Olympic bid was based in part on Montreals successful
hosting of the 1967 Expo. However, the finalcostof the Expo was $430
millionmuch more than the 1964 estimate of $160 million. A new
plan was laid out in a press conference on April 6, 1972. Almost 2 years
of preparation time had been wasted (Auf der Maur 1976).
In November 1972, Drapeau gave a figure of $310 million as the
total projected cost of the Olympic Games. Of the $250 million in
capital expenditures in the budget, $130.8 million was for the sta-
dium and $16.4 million for the velodrome. The Olympic Village was
listed under noncapital expenditures as $5 million. Howell terms this
Drapeaus kitchen-table budget that no one ever took seriously but
that also no one ever gathered the data to challenge. It was suspicious
from the start, however, because the recently concluded Munich
Games had cost the equivalent of $600 million. Shortly afterward,
in January 1973, Drapeau made his often-quoted (and often-derided)
statement that the Montreal Olympics can no more have a deficit
than a man can have a baby (Howell 2009). Howell later observed
that amazingly, every time the Mayor revised his cost estimate, we
believed that it was correct at last (Howell 2009).
Drapeau laid out a plan for $310 million in financing, the bulk of
which would come from the sale of $250 million in Olympic com-
memorative coins. The federal government of Canada reviewed the
budget and thought that $100 million in coin sales would be more
realistic.The federal government did notwanttogetstuckwiththe bill
for the construction or the Games. The city of Montreal had made the
commitment, and Canada and the Province of Quebec did not wish to
be responsible for fulfilling that commitment. Strangely, they seemed
to think that the construction cost estimates were in the ballpark. At
this point in the process, Drapeau suggested at a news conference that
the real problem would be figuring out how to spend the surplus from
the first self-financing Games in Olympic history (Howell 2009).
The extensive construction of the Olympic facilities was justi-
fied, in part, on the idea that the facilities could be used after the
Games for other sports, specifically using the Olympic Stadium for
the Montreal Expos baseball team. However, the potential users
were not consulted during the planning process (Howell 2009). The
suitability of the facilities for use after the Games ended will be
discussed later in this paper
James Neal begins his textbook, entitled Construction Cost Es-
timating Concepts and Their Applications (Neil 1979), with an
eight-page case study of the Montreal Olympics complex. Nick Auf
der Maur, a newspaper columnist and member of the Montreal City
Council, wrote The Billion-Dollar Game: Jean Drapeau and the
1976 Olympics about all the problems (Auf der Maur 1976).
1Structural Engineer, HWH Architects Engineers Planners, Inc., 1300
East Ninth St., Suite 900, Cleveland, OH 44114; formerly, Student, Dept.
of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Cleveland State Univ., Cleveland,
OH 44115-2214. E-mail: [emailprotected]
2Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Cleveland
State Univ., Cleveland, OH 44115-2214. E-mail: [emailprotected]
3Professor and Chair, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Cleveland State Univ., Cleveland, OH 44115-2214 (corresponding author).
E-mail: [emailprotected]
Note. This manuscript was submitted on August 11, 2011; approved on
January 13, 2012; published online on January 19, 2012. Discussion period
open until November 1, 2013; separate discussions must be submitted for
individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Performance of
Constructed Facilities, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 1, 2013. ASCE, ISSN 0887-
3828/2013/3-362369/$25.00.
362 / JOURNAL OF PERFORMANCE OF CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES ASCE / MAY/JUNE 2013
http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CF.1943-5509.0000332
mailto:[emailprotected]
mailto:[emailprotected]
mailto:[emailprotected]
In late July 1976, at the final session of the World Congress on
Space Structures, a highly controversial panel discussion was held
on the project, which was later documented in ASCEs Civil En-
gineering magazine. It included some prominent consulting engi-
neers from the United States, such as Anton Tedesko and Lev Zetlin,
and some engineers and architects from Canada and elsewhere. A
sidebar to the article summarized some of the comments that had
appeared in the Montreal Star newspaper under the title, Cost-Be-
Damned Attitude Brought on Olympic Woes (Civil Engineering
1976).
This paper has been assembled from a variety of sources rather
than firsthand observations. As such, it could be subject to the biases
of the authors of the source information and may be inadvertently
slanted. Care has been taken to balance the opposing viewpoints as
much as possible.
Olympic Games, Politics, and Prestige
The quadrennial Olympic Games are so prestigious that cities and
countries commit substantial resources to bidding for the right to
hold them and then invest heavily in the facilities in which to hold
them. For the 1976 Games, Moscow and Los Angeles both bid
against Montreal, and concerns about cold war politics weighted the
scales in Montreals favor. Moscow would host the 1980 Games,
boycotted by the United States and its allies, and Los Angeles would
host the 1984 Games, boycotted by the Soviet Union and its allies,
showing that the concerns about politics were well-founded. The
Montreal Games also took place against the backdrop of the 1972
Munich Games and the hostage crisis that resulted in the death of
Israeli athletes. After 1972, there were concerns about how the
Games could go on, if they should, and how they could be kept safe.
Kidd (1992) contends that the politics of Canada, Quebec, and
Montreal played a large part in the difficulties of the 1976 Games.
Much of the tension was brought about by the resurgence of
Quebecs Francophone nationalism and the succession movement.
In addition, Montreal had long been dominated economically, po-
litically, and culturally by a small Anglophone elite that was at odds
with the Quebec nationalism movement. The federal government of
Canada supported Montreals bid reluctantly and ruled out direct
financial support for the Games. Furthermore, Mayor Drapeau and
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau did not trust each other. As
a result, it took a long time to set up the Olympic lottery and coin and
stamp program to support the Games, which cost 34 months of lead
time. The program was slowed by unpaid bills until the Province of
Quebec reluctantly agreed to accept responsibility for any deficit in
early 1973.
The potential embarrassment of missing the opening of the
Games provided a fixed construction deadline. The planning started
about 2 years too late, and scheduling fell apart because it was phy-
sically impossible to accommodate all the construction activities
on the project site. The City of Montreal was too slow in preparing
bid documents, so the work could not be competitively bid but
was instead awarded to selected contractors. Double crews, double
shifts, and overtime were used to attempt to increase productivity,
but because of congestion, the increase in productivity was slight
(Neil 1979).
Political turmoil intervened during the Montreal Games. Canada
refused to allow the Republic of China (Taiwan) to compete because
Canada had recognized the Peoples Republic of China in 1970,
despite the fact that the Republic of China was a member of the
International Olympic Committee (IOC). This caused considerable
friction with the United States. A much larger issue came about
involving New Zealands participation in the Games because the
New Zealand rugby team had just played in South Africa, and South
Africa was barred from the Olympics during the apartheid era. Just
before the Montreal Olympics started, 28 African countries walked
out of the Games, joined by Guyana and Iraq (Strenk 1978).
The issues of the politics and prestige of the Olympic Games
have continued since Montreal. Theres a myth growing, on this
Olympic mess, that it all started with the tacky, overcommercialized
Summer Games in Atlanta. Which led to all the bribes and greed of
Salt Lake City. Its a nice myth, but its wrong. The real sleaze got its
start with Jean Drapeau and the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal.
There was the blueprint for corruption. (Fotheringham 1999, p. 76).
Montreal Olympic Complex
The Montreal Olympic complex consisted of a main stadium, a ve-
lodrome (bicycle racing venue), roads, walkways, practice fields, an
Olympic Village housing facility, and other structures and land-
scaping. The complex is shown in Fig. 1.
Planning began in 1970, and preliminary estimates prepared at
that time indicated a projected cost for the entire complex of $120
million, including a projected cost for the main stadium of $40
million. The final cost in 1976 was $1.5 billion, with $836 million
for the main stadium. In addition to the cost overruns, there were
considerable time overruns, which meant that the complex was al-
most not completed in time for the Olympics, and some of the final
activities were still ongoing at the time the Olympics started. Major
components originally planned, such as the retractable roof, were
not begun until after the Olympics (Neil 1979).
The original owner was the City of Montreal, Quebec, which
contracted with architect Roger Taillibert to design the Olympic
Park, including the Olympic Stadium and velodrome (Auf der Maur
1976). Mr. Taillibert lived and conducted business in Paris, France.
Both the velodrome and Olympic Stadium were relatively unusual,
unique artistic creations.
The Mayor of Montreal, Jean Drapeau, has been criticized for an
almost worshipful attitude toward Taillibert. The mayor rejected
cuts that could have saved up to $146 million. He insisted on
building the stadium of concrete rather than steel because Taillibert
was a precast-concrete expertalthough a steel stadium might have
cost $100 million less (Civil Engineering 1976).
Taillabert, who was to be paid $1015 million for his work, did
not help public relations with his lack of modesty, saying Thats all
Fig. 1. Olympic Stadium complex during the 1976 Olympic Games
(Parc Olympic Quebec 2011; credit: Olympic Park of Montral)
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Canadians and North Americans talk aboutmoney, money,
money. It doesnt interest me at all, telling a reporter Are you
aware that the building of the stadium and velodrome constitutes
a great moment in the history of architecture and technology? (Civil
Engineering 1976).
Velodrome
Prior to bidding for the Olympic Games, the City of Montreal had
already committed to hosting the World Cycling Championships in
the Olympic velodrome for the summer of 1974. Construction of
the velodrome began in August 1973, a year in advance of the
scheduled opening of the Championships on August 14, 1974.
However, it turned out that the rocky subsoil was not solid enough
to support the roofa fact that had not been found by geologic
soundings and subsurface tests. The location near the Saint Law-
rence River, however, hinted at probable subsurface difficulties. The
foundation problems, along with labor union conflicts, ensured that
the velodrome could not open in time for the Championships. A
temporary facility was quickly built at the University of Montral
football stadium. The makeshift site had an excellent view of
Mount Royal and would have served very well for the Olympic
Games, although the spectator capacity would have been less. The
incident highlighted the problems with the Olympic construction,
but by this time there were less than 2 years left to go (Howell
2009).
The contract for the velodrome construction was awarded to
prime contractor Charles Duranceau with a $12 million bid, based
on half-complete plans, in August 1973, and construction began
later that year. It was the first and last contract of the Montreal
Olympics issued through public bidding (Auf der Maur 1976).
The velodrome consisted of three arches supported by abut-
ments. It was designed to have the appearance of a cycling helmet,
as shown in Fig. 2. The structure consisted almost entirely of arches
171 m (560 ft) long and rising to 27 m (90 ft) high. The arches were
made of precast-concrete sections positioned onto falsework on site
and then posttensioned (DAppolonia 1990).
The horizontal component H of the arch thrust is given by
H qL
2
8d
1
whereq 5 uniform load along the arch, L 5 span of the arch, and d 5
height of the arch. For a given span L, as the depth decreases, the
horizontal force increases. The low aspect ratio d/L of the arch, about
1:6, produced very high horizontal thrust forces.
The arch was supported by four abutments, designated W, X, Y,
and Z in Fig. 3. Abutments X and Y were founded on good rock, but
the rock was of questionable quality at Abutments W and Z. Addi-
tional investigations showed that the rock was broken up to a depth
of about 6 m (20 ft) and was over a thin layer of clay shale 150600
mm (6 in. to 2 ft) thick. The thin layer represented a potential slip
surface for the abutments, and as a result, tendons had to be driven
through that layer into competent rock (DAppolonia 1990) (Fig. 4).
Abutment Z, unlike the other three abutments, takes the combined
thrust of three arches and, as a result, has to resist the highest forces.
A critical construction operation was the decentering, or re-
moval of the supporting falsework for the arches. The process
would create the greatest loads on the abutments, about 32,000 tons
on Abutment Z. A total of 36 jacks were used, each with a stroke
of 25 mm (1 in.). Only 13 mm (0.5 in.) of displacement could be
tolerated during decentering, and the operation was carefully mon-
itored (DAppolonia 1990).
The soil problem of low bearing capacity and the high loads on
the abutments had resulted in substantial time delays and cost
overruns for the foundation work. Although the foundation of the
velodrome had been estimated to cost $497,576, the final cost was
$7,171, 876 because of the extensive grouting and anchorage system
shown in Fig. 4. A large part of the construction delay was because
the contractor had to wait on Taillibert to finish the plans. Once the
final plans were received, it was necessary to develop construction
plans for the falsework. The work quickly fell behind, and it was
Fig. 2. Velodrome, now a biodome (Wikipedia Commons, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Biodome_Montreal.jpg, photograph by
PtitLutin)
Fig. 3. Plan and elevation of velodrome (1 ft 5 0:3 m) (DAppolonia
1990, ASCE)
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Biodome_Montreal.jpg
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Biodome_Montreal.jpg
obvious that the 1974 date could not be met. More workers were
hired, and extensive overtime was authorized, but the extra workers
mostlygotin each others way.By latefall 1974,$34 millionhad been
spent on the velodrome, and it was not complete. New subcontractors
were hired. Given the time constraints, most of the construction
contracts were cost plus rather than low-bid fixed-cost contracts.
There also were a number of labor problems, such as tasks taking
too long, strikes, overtime, and extra equipment, which themselves
added about $12 million to the project cost (Auf der Maur 1976).
The final cost for the 7,000-seat velodrome was approximately
$70 million, compared with a $60 million cost for a 60,000-seat
domed stadium in Seattle, Washington, at the same time. The cost
per seat was 10 times as high. There also remained the concern that
acrylic panels in the roof posed a fire hazard (Auf der Maur 1976).
Anton Tedesko was known for his efficient thin-concrete-shell
structures, epitomized by the Hershey Arena that spanned 67 m
(220 ft) with a shell only 89 mm (3.5 in.) thick (Billington and
Billington 2006). He was strongly critical of the velodrome, stating
that it should have had a greater construction depth (or height) that
would have greatly reduced the forces. As Eq. (1) shows, H is in-
versely proportional to d. It could also have been more structurally
efficient if the dome and three-dimensional action had been con-
sidered in the design. Tedesko stated that the structures do damage
to the cause of concrete. Our young people should be told that these
structures did not have to be done this way. As built, this gigantic
demonstration project is almost an argument against the use of con-
crete and for the use of structural steel or aluminum under similar
circumstances in the future (Civil Engineering 1976, pp. 5051).
The velodrome was renovated starting in 1989 and transformed
into a biodome managed by the City of Montreal in 1992. It is now
partoftheMontreal Nature Museum(Parc Olympique Quebec 2011).
Olympic Stadium
All the structures were dramatic, modern, and complex, none more
so than the main stadium. The stadium may be seen in the upper
right of Fig. 1 and in its final configuration in Fig. 5. The stadium
had a number of unusual features. It was intended to resemble an
elliptical seashell with a handle, which would have a retractable
fabric cover hanging from a tall mast over the opening. As Fig. 1
shows,themastandcoverwerenotinplaceatthetimeoftheOlympics
(Neil 1979). They were added later and may be seen in Fig. 5.
The general structural form appears to be a large elliptical dome
with an opening in the middle for the fabric roof. If it were, in fact,
a thin dome with a compression ring, it would be an efficient struc-
tural form. However, it isnt. The main structural members are com-
plex precast concrete ribs, shown in Fig. 6. The ribs cantilever out
over the stadium, and although the hollow ring inside the roof carries
lighting and other support systems, it is not designed to carry com-
pression forces. Because of the gentle slope of the roof, each pair
of ribs is a different size. The ribs were glued and posttensioned.
They proved to be very difficult to erect, so misalignments of the ribs
were as much as 150 mm (6 in.). This was a problem because the
posttensioning cables had to be threaded through tubes in the ring.
During the winter, some empty posttensioning ducts became full of
ice, and considerable time and expense were involved in removing
Fig. 4. Typical arch abutment (Abutment Z) (1 ft 5 0:3 m)
(DAppolonia 1990, ASCE)
Fig. 5. Olympic Stadium (Wikipedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/File:Le_Stade_Olympique_3.jpg)
Fig. 6. Ribs of the Olympic Stadium (Parc Olympic Quebec 2011;
credit: Olympic Park of Montral)
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Le_Stade_Olympique_3.jpg
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Le_Stade_Olympique_3.jpg
the ice (Neil 1979). It has been estimated that if all the ribs had been
the same size, $2030 million could have been saved (Civil Engi-
neering 1976).
Furthermore, the stadium design did not consider construct-
ability and did not leave room for interior scaffolding. Many cranes
were used instead, some holding ribs, and others holding workers,
tools, and materials. Fig. 7 shows the congestion of cranes in the
stadium. At one point, 80 cranes were used in the main stadium, and
it was estimated that doubling the number of cranes only increased
productivity 25% because they could not work effectively given that
they were in each others way (Neil 1979).
At one stage, there was a forest of 200 building cranes on the
stadium site, some from as far as Calgary, while gravel truck drivers
gleefully drove in, collected their fee, and then drove out the other
end, unloaded, and just went around the block again. Skilled
workers, at seven 10-hour shifts a week, pulled down $1,500 weekly
by doing only 2 hours a day of actual work (Fotheringham 1999,
p. 76).
Although epoxy-glued, posttensioned construction had been
used successfully in Europe, it was new to the North American
contractors. As with any new technology, there was a difficult
learning process (Neil 1979). With the time constraints on this
project, the use of an unfamiliar technique was not a good idea.
Taillibert did not deliver the plans and specifications for the
Olympic Stadium until the late summer of 1974. He had already
gained a reputation for late delivery of construction documents. The
contract to build the Olympic Stadium was awarded to Desourdy and
Duranceau, as cost plus $9 million profit with a $1 million bonus if
the site were ready on time. The contract was awarded without
public tenders. It was a strange choice of contractor, given that
Duranceau was already buried in difficulties with the velodrome.
The Province of Quebec forced the hiring of Lalonde, Valois,
Lamarre,Valois& Associates (known as Lalonde, Valois) as project
manager over Drapeaus resistance. The cost estimates of Lalonde,
Valois proved to be no better than any of the others (Auf der Maur
1976).
At the beginning of 1975, the Olympic Organizing Committee
(referred to as COJO from Comit de contrle des Jeux olympiques)
was very concerned about completion of the stadium and began to
look for alternatives, such as finding or building a cheaper stadium
nearby. Mayor Drapeau called an elaborate press conference to
explain the cost projections and provide assurances that the stadium
would be ready on time. He referred to a fundinggap of$200 million,
refusing to call it a deficit. The alternate-stadium concept was
scrapped (Auf der Maur 1976).
Very generous terms were given to the precasters who built the
concrete ribs, including a $230,000 rental of one plant for Olympic
construction and a $500,000 extension built onto another plant with
public funds, plus $685,000 in cash bonuses and honoraria. Pre-
casting costs rose from $16 million to $42 million (Auf der Maur
1976).
Late in the game, Taillibert insisted on adding a water cascade to
the top of the parking garages connected to the stadium, adding at
least $8 million to the cost. The parking garages, originally budgeted
for an extravagant $25 million, cost $60 million, or about $13,000
per parking space. The water cascade also would require 113 million
L (30 million gal) of water (Auf der Maur 1976).
Mayor Drapeau, with no engineering or architecture qualifica-
tions, had spent much time poring over plans and going to the
construction site to give orders, which confused the workers. Then,
on December 13, 1974, Drapeau sent a representative to a meeting to
say that the stadium construction would cost substantially more. The
project continued to be troubled by labor demonstrations and strikes.
Finally, on November 19, 1975, the Province of Quebec created the
Rgie des Installations Olympiques (RIO) to complete construction
of the Olympic Park and take over as owner. Drapeau and Taillibert
were now off the site. In assuming control from the City of Montreal,
however, Quebec also assumed the expense (Howell 2009).
Quebec advanced $200 million for the project but in return had to
delay other important construction in Montreal, such as the subway
and a sewage treatment plant. At that time, Montreal was one of the
few cities in the Western world still dumping raw, untreated sewage
into a river. Bills were paid, and construction continued, with no
better cost control than before (Auf der Maur 1976).
The final cost for the stadium was approximately $13,000 per
seat, compared with approximately $2,400 per seat for the Super-
dome in New Orleans, Louisiana, constructed at approximately
the same time (Neil 1979). The stadium was nicknamed the Big O
because of its name and shape, but it later became known as the Big
Owe (Quebecs 2006).
Tedesko and consulting engineer Lev Zetlin both criticized the
stadium. Tedesko noted that anyone familiar with match-cast post-
tensioned precast-concrete construction would have predicted the
difficulties encountered. Zetlin stated that a large-span structure
should be light, permit a large margin of error in the field, and use
construction methods that were as simple as possible, and the
Montreal Olympic Stadium violated all these principles. He further
criticized the heavy roof as a dead weight on top of the building
(Civil Engineering 1976).
After the 1976 Olympics, the Olympic Stadium saga continued.
It was found that the tower could not be completed as planned in
concrete without major structural work because it would be too
heavy and that the tower would be overstressed by the Canadian
standard (Court 1983). The tower was completed in steel and was
damaged by a fire during construction (Fire 1986). The roof and
tower were completed, but the retractable Kevlar roof was not in-
stalled until 1986 and was stored in France and then Montreal at
a cost of several million dollars. In 1989, the roof developed huge
tears because of air pressure (Experts 1989). In 1991, a 55-t chunk
of the roof fell after support beams snapped, forcing an extended
closure. Fortunately, there were no injuries. All 33 beams had to be
reinforced at a cost of several hundred thousand dollars. The failure
may have been because of the use of an improper (e.g., not corrosion-
resistant) type of steel or poor welding (55-ton 1991; Suspect
1991). Finally, RIO decided to replace the roof (Fixing 1993). The
newrooftoreagaininthewinterof1999,forcingthecancellationofan
auto show and a subsequent boat show (Stadium 1999).
Fig. 7. Cranes at work in the Olympic Stadium (Parc Olympic Quebec
2011; credit: Olympic Park of Montral)
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Olympic Village
The Olympic Village project began in 1970, when at the presen-
tations to win the Olympic bid in Amsterdam, Jean Drapeau an-
nounced that the Olympic Village would be a low-rise structure
that would be placed just to the east of the Olympic Stadium and
Velodrome. The mayor said that the village would be used to pro-
vide for 4,000 low-cost housing units after the Olympics were over,
serving up to 14,000 tenants. The concept would fit in well for his
self-financing Olympics because the Central Mortgage and Housing
Commission (CMHC) would provide 95% of the clearance cost and
75% of the construction cost (Auf der Maur 1976).
There was a great debate on both where to place the Olympic
Village and whether the village would be centralized or spread out.
There were many protests against placing the complex in Viau Park
because it would take away green space from a city that didnt have
much of it. However, at the end of 1972, Mayor Drapeau announced
that the Olympic Village was going to be built in the park and that the
village would be centralized, over all objections. The city also
destroyed 125 elm trees on the site after promising not to remove
any (Auf der Maur 1976).
In January 1974, a group from Montreal arrived in Baie des
Anges, on the Cte dAzur in southern France, the site of a spec-
tacular pyramid-shaped condominium complex designed by archi-
tect Andr Minangoy. The visitors, who included Montreal developer
Joseph Zappia, told the sales director of the Baie des Anges project
thattheyhad beenselectedtobuildtheOlympicVillagefor 1976.This
was odd because the deadline for tenders was not until March 1,
almost two months in the future (Auf der Maur 1976).
When the project went out to bid, 53 different groups or com-
panies had paid the $100 to pick up the preliminary specifications
and requirements. However, as the March 1 deadline came and went,
the city announced that there were no suitable proposals and that the
deadline was going to be postponed indefinitely. As time went on,
many of the bidding companies never heard anything at all from the
city regarding their respective bids. For example, a British developer
had spent in the vicinity of $400,000 to develop a private plan, which
required no excess public money. The bid was submitted in the
summer of 1973, well before the deadline. Unfortunately for the
developer, his company never received a yes or a no regarding
the subject. After never receiving a reply, the developer packed up,
left, and vowed that he would never conduct business in Quebec
again. Other strong bids were also ignored (Auf der Maur 1976).
At a meeting on June 28, 1974, Mayor Drapeau announced that
a group called Las Terrasses Zarolega would construct the Olympic
Village. It seemed to be the first indication for most that Zarolega
even existed. Although the original call for proposals specified
1,800 units (mysteriously down from 4,000), Zarolega proposed to
build only 932 units. To house 12,000 athletes, as many as 12 people
would have to sleep in the larger two-bedroom units, and many
would have to sleep in the kitchens. The design was ill suited for
Montreals cold winters because there were no indoor corridors, and
the units had to be accessed by walking up to 180 m (600 ft) along
exterior balconies open to the wind. The previously mentioned
Zappia was one of the four partners of Zarolega (Auf der Maur
1976).
Responsibility for construction of the Olympic Village had been
left vague until very late in the process. The original idea was that
either a private developer or the citys public housing commission
would develop the village and keep it separate from COJO. On
October 22, 1974, Lord Killanin, head of the IOC, phoned to say that
if the City of Montreal did not have a contract in place by the time of
the IOCs upcoming Vienna meeting (October 20, 1974), the IOC
would consider transferring the Games to another city. The Olympic
Village task became the responsibility of COJO, mostly because
Drapeau was so far behind. The original bu
