Industrial and Hazardous Waste Management
The Unit VII Lesson presents strategies for solving industrial waste problems, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and proactive strategies in industrial waste.
For this assignment, locate a case study (do not use one that has been previously discussed in the course) that addresses solving industrial waste problems. Ensure you address the following issues:
strategies for solving industrial waste-related problems,
role of corporate social responsibility in waste strategies, and
proactive strategies for industrial waste management.
Your case studymust be at leastthree pages in length, not counting the title page and reference page (title and reference pages do not count toward the minimum page requirement). Locate a peer-reviewed article that centers on industrial waste strategies that is no more than five years old from the CSU Online Library. In addition, you must use the required unit resources article, Determinants of Monetary Penalties for Environmental Violations, for a total of two sources for your case study.
Ensure you follow APA Style guidelines for this assignment, and adhere to guidelines when creating citations and references since outside sources are used for this assignment.
Journal of Risk Research
ISSN 1366-9877 print/ISSN 1466-4461 online
2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2011.571783
http://www.informaworld.com
Risks, alternative knowledge strategies and democratic legitimacy:
the conflict over co-incineration of hazardous industrial
waste in Portugal
Helena Mateus Jernimoa* and Jos Lus Garciab
aSchool of Economics and Management, Technical University of Lisbon (ISEG-UTL) and
SOCIUS (Research Centre in Economic and Organizational Sociology), Lisbon, Portugal;
bInstitute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon (ICS-UL), Lisbon, Portugal
Taylor and FrancisRJRR_A_571783.sgm
(Received 8 November 2010; final version received 4 March 2011)
10.1080/13669877.2011.571783Journal of Risk Research1366-9877 (print)/1466-4461 (online)Article2011Taylor & Francis0000000002011Dr Natividade [emailprotected]
The decision to incinerate hazardous industrial waste in cement plants (the so-
called co-incineration process) gave rise to one of the most heated environmental
conflicts ever to take place in Portugal. The bitterest period was between 1997 and
2002, after the government had made a decision. Strong protests by residents,
environmental organizations, opposition parties, and some members of the
scientific community forced the government to backtrack and to seek scientific
legitimacy for the process through scientific expertise. The experts ratified the
governments decision, stating that the risks involved were socially acceptable.
The conflict persisted over a decade and ended up clearing the way for a more
sustainable method over which there was broad social consensus a multi-
functional method which makes it possible to treat, recover and regenerate most
wastes. Focusing the analysis on this conflict, this paper has three aims: (1) to
discuss the implications of the fact that expertise was confiscated after the
government had committed itself to the decision to implement co-incineration and
by way of a reaction to the atmosphere of tension and protest; (2) to analyse the
uses of the notions of risk and uncertainty in scientific reports from both
experts and counter-experts committees, and their different assumptions about
controllability and criteria for considering certain practices to be sufficiently safe
for the public; and (3) to show how the existence of different technical scientific
and political attitudes (one more closely tied to government and the corporate
interests of the cement plants, the other closer to the environmental values of re-
use and recycling and respect for the risk perception of residents who challenged
the facilities) is closely bound up with problems of democratic legitimacy. This
conflict showed how adopting more sustainable and lower-risk policies implies a
broader view of democratic legitimacy, one which involves both civic movements
and citizens themselves.
Keywords: risks; knowledge strategies; hazardous waste
Introduction
Among environmental issues involving risk decisions, few have been more contentious
than the building of infrastructure for treating or disposing of waste, especially hazard-
ous waste.1 The literature published on episodes in this area and in different contexts
gives us a typical anatomy of the phenomenon (Kasperson [2000] 2005). Aspects of
*Corresponding author. Email: [emailprotected]
Vol. 14, No. 8, September 2011, 951967
2 H.M. Jernimo and J.L. Garcia
this anatomy include the adoption of a top-down decide-announce-defend strategy,
the devaluing of local residents participation and risk perceptions, the lack of trust in
the organizations responsible for managing and monitoring the infrastructure,
geographical inequity in the distribution of risks and benefits, the potential for the loca-
tion to become stigmatized by the technology and failures in the procedural transpar-
ency of the process (e.g. Vari, Reagan-Cirincione, and Mumpower 1994; Petts 1994,
2004; Llurds, Sauri, and Cerdan 2003; Kasperson, Golding, and Tuler [1992] 2005;
Botetzagias and Karamichas 2009).
Issues such as these, which are social in nature and tied to political values and
concerns, are often left out of serious consideration in the process of evaluation. It is
as if it were possible for certain technical and probabilistic disciplines to provide an
objective definition of risks and benefits on which subsequent political decisions can
be based. However, the number of unknowns (and unknown unknowns) surrounding
the area of environmental risk is usually quite large, arising from a number of
factors: unforeseen interactions, negative synergies, possible transgenerational
effects, long latency periods and causes which are difficult to perceive. These
aspects not only involve the technical side but the whole social context in which the
technology is to be implemented, and so further invalidate the use of probabilistic
calculations. That is why a broad understanding of environmental risks requires
knowledge of aspects which are contingent, including social aspects. In addition,
expert knowledge is itself based on certain social assumptions and values (Fischer
2009). Just as there is no reason to separate environmental risk assessment and the
study of social variables, so too it is impossible to deny that values are present in the
theory and practice of technological and scientific expertise. There is accordingly no
single appropriate strategy for dealing with environmental problems, based on domi-
nant or hegemonic shared assumptions. Rather, there are several possible scientific
and technological strategies.
This paper identifies the difficulties encountered in environmental risk decision-
making in the conflict which took place in Portugal over the incineration of hazardous
industrial waste (HIW) in cement kilns (known as the co-incineration method), the
longest and most acrimonious environmental conflict in the countrys history.2 This
particular case is notable for the fact that experts were only called in after the political
decision had been made and had unleashed a wave of protest, leading to a situation
where the government used expert advice in an attempt to justify and legitimize a
decision it had already taken. This was a conflict in which government and experts
became part of the HIW problem, rather than part of the solution. Their actions
exposed the false assumption that a decontextualized technological and scientific
strategy based solely on the statistical calculation of probability can take the place of
the political order, social needs, and values.
This conflict was in many ways similar to cases in other countries. It differed from
them in that the storm over the governments decision to implement co-incineration,
involving local residents, government-appointed experts and counter-experts
supported by the protest movement, prompted the search for a more sustainable solu-
tion. In other words, the conflict cleared the way for an alternative HIW treatment
method which had not been thought of before a multi-functional method which
allowed for greater social involvement, recognized the uncertainties, and was closer
to a post-normal science. The co-incineration case in Portugal can be used to argue
that scientific strategies are closely bound up with problems of democratic legitimacy.
Bringing together an approach which favours a reorientation of science to incorporate
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Journal of Risk Research 3
other types of knowledge, open up the field to alternative strategies and strengthen
citizens political capabilities (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990; Wynne 1992; Lacey 1999,
2005) with the work of Tilly (2007) and Rosanvallon (2006; 2008) on restoring the
quality of democracy, this conflict can be said to have shown how adopting more
sustainable and lower-risk policies implies a broader view of democratic legitimacy,
one which involves both civic movements and citizens themselves.
Chronicle of a struggle foretold
The conflict over co-incineration was the most acutely contested, most widespread,
and most publicized phase in a long and fluctuating battle over the management of
HIW (for a chronology of the main events of the conflict, see Appendix 1). The
story began with the adoption of externally designed environmental policies and
directives after Portugal had joined the European Economic Community in 1985
1986. Until then there had been no adequate system for managing and eliminating
wastes. They piled up illegally in open-air dumps or were emptied into rivers and
watercourses. Political parties from left and right formed successive governments,
each sponsoring a different method for dealing with the chaotic waste situation
particularly that of industrial waste given its potentially harmful effects on health
and the environment.
The decision to implement co-incineration in cement kilns was taken by a PS
(Socialist Party, member of the European Socialist Group) government, on the basis
of two arguments: technological developments in recent years and the favourable
costbenefit analysis, both for the nations industry and for the environment (Reso-
lution of the Council of Ministers 98/97 of 25 June). According to the government,
co-incineration could be implemented quickly and cheaply. Moreover, the cement kilns
would eliminate HIW more efficiently because they operated at extremely high temper-
atures, and used fewer natural resources (fossil fuels and primary raw materials), since
the waste would replace part of the coal usually used for fuel in producing cement, up
to a maximum of 25%. These advantages of the co-incineration method meshed with
the private interests of a significant economic power centre in Portugal, the cement
plants, which saw in the method a way of saving money and obtaining revenue in an
area in which they normally incur costs.
The choice of cement plants (both in the Centre region), based on an Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) drawn up by the interested party in the case (the cement
sector), was justified by the need to improve the environment in the areas surrounding
the two cement plants and their central location in relation to waste producers. Strong
protests by local residents ensued, giving rise to a disconnect between what was
purported to be a public policy to solve the problem of HIW and the trust networks
created by civic movements, environmental associations, local government officials,
and university lecturers.
The protests were particularly strong in one of the areas, near Coimbra, the most
important city in the Centre region which is home to one of the oldest universities in
Europe. This local opposition movement came primarily from a working-class neigh-
bourhood, but a significant part of its support base was made up of professors and
researchers from the university, whose academic position enabled them to articulate
the reasons for the protest. The national government was accused of ignoring criti-
cisms which had been made in public hearings, for not knowing how much hazardous
waste was to be incinerated (because there was no accurate inventory of this type of
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4 H.M. Jernimo and J.L. Garcia
waste) and for having, in connivance with the cement plants, been socially unfair in
its choice of locations for implementation, because these areas had smaller populations
and fewer voters. Alongside these charges against the government, the residents of
those places reacted to a plan which they saw as bringing their neighbourhood into
disrepute, carrying risks for the environment and for public health. They feared atmo-
spheric emissions of dioxin, the possibility of an industrial or road traffic accident and
the dangers arising from heavy lorries carrying toxic waste as they travelled through
towns and villages.
This strong opposition led the government to react and to seek legitimacy. The
government was reluctant to reveal its political agenda of forcing co-incineration,
but the protest movement succeeded in making it redirect the debate to discussion of
alternative options for handling HIW and adopt an approach involving a degree of
proximity and interaction with its opponents. It was only as a result of this protest that
the government resorted to scientific expertise, with two committees being established
(one biochemical and the other medical) with the task of assessing the methods risks
to public health and to the environment. Both reached the conclusion, although not
unanimously, that the risks were socially acceptable, but their favourable attitude to
co-incineration and the explanations they gave were not enough to end the protests.
Despite the fact that local residents and cooperative movements took a significant
part in public hearings on the reports of the committee of experts, their specific criti-
cisms were not taken into account. The experts regarded them either as something
which was beyond the remit of their investigation, or as being tainted by local preju-
dice and/or technically unsound. Neither the government nor the experts took into
account the fact that, for residents, those arguing in favour of the method (the co-
incineration) were the same bodies which had earlier consistently acquiesced in the
contamination of their environment, and whose power of persuasion was therefore nil.
Cement plants were blamed for having caused pollution for decades, and for not
having listened to the concerns of local residents. The government was criticized for
a past situation in which public bodies had failed to ensure prevention and oversight.
There was a lack of trust in the cement plants and the government, following
decades of complaints being ignored, and an increasingly strong presence of what we
have chosen to call pollution trauma, freely adopting an idea of Jeffrey Alexander
et al. (2004).3 In this context, the counter-proposal offering environmental improve-
ment (which was unquestionably needed, given the extent to which the locations
involved had suffered environmental damage) was seen as a form of blackmail to get
local residents on board. Since the identity of the local community had been built on
the continuous experience of living next to a source of pollution, it could be regarded
as a contaminated community (Edelstein [1988] 2004). Even though pollution
trauma was always omnipresent in this community, the disposition to accept what
they saw as a feared and undesirable facility meant that the stigma of pollution could
no longer be ignored, and that a new narrative of community identity emerged in its
wake. The networks formed by doctors, scientists, members of civic and environ-
mental associations, who acted as counter-experts and had the discursive ability to
persuade the public sphere of the legitimacy of residents protests, were of funda-
mental importance in the construction of this narrative and for giving meaning to the
trauma.
The government which had tried to implement the co-incineration method was
defeated in 2001, and this meant its chosen method was suspended. The new govern-
ment, led by the PSD (the Social Democratic Party, a member of the European
954
Journal of Risk Research 5
Peoples Party) changed its stance under popular pressure and announced a new
method which responded to the environmentalists concerns and favoured recovery,
recycling and specific treatment for each type of waste. This change of stance was also
supported by the data in a thorough inventory, commissioned from six Portuguese
universities, which concluded that the quantities of HIW produced annually in
Portugal were after all too small to justify the co-incineration option. The new method
put forward in 2003 was for multi-functional centres which, inspired by a recovery,
re-use and recycling (3Rs) policy, could apply differentiated forms of treatment to 80
90% of HIW produced annually. These multi-functional centres started operating in
2008, the whole process involving far less conflict than had been the case with co-
incineration. The mayor of a certain district which had successful prior experience of
a waste treatment site was happy for these centres to be built in a sparsely populated
part of his district. Co-incineration, which turned out to be needed for only the 10%
of waste which could not be treated at these centres, is operating in both cement plants,
although in one of them (near Coimbra) the process had to await a court ruling,
because the local council and local residents took out an injuction to stop it.
Let us now look at the factors which lay behind the long standoff in the conflict
over co-incineration in Portugal.
Expertise ex machina
When mechanisms having a strong environmental impact are being implemented, and
there is an attitude which is favourable to public participation and observance of laws
which protect it, expert opinion should be consulted before any decision is taken. The
literature, however, shows that one of the strongest reasons why politicians call on
expertise is its potential role in legitimising political decisions which have already
been taken or are already planned (Nelkin 1971; Mazur 1973; Nowotny 1982;
Collingridge and Reeve 1986; Barker and Peters 1993). Many other political purposes
may lie behind the resort to expertise: delaying or avoiding a popular protest; covering
up a reversal of a decision (without the authorities having to acknowledge their
mistake or to admit that they changed their mind); mediating in a conflict (Boehmer-
Christiansen 1995, 1978) or redefining political and social problems in purely tech-
nical terms. In some circumstances, policy makers may manipulate, distort or ignore
scientific sources and take decisions that fit their existing institutional policies and
goals (Primack and von Hippel 1974; Liberatore 1993; Alam 2005). This may happen
if the politicians in charge fail to mention the conditional nature of certain scientific
pronouncements, or select only those conclusions which suit them (Godard et al.
2002, 601). In some cases, the decision is copied entirely from expert opinions in an
attempt to evade responsibility for the consequences of conflict-laden or difficult
choices, and to depoliticize the decision-making process (Larson 1984, 634). In
others, expertise is an organized mechanism for integrating technological and
scientific innovation (Roy 2001).
In the Portuguese conflict, no expert advice was sought before the political decision
was taken to go ahead with co-incineration in certain locations. The decision was based
on an EIA drawn up by those who put forward the scheme. The committee of experts
was only summoned after the public announcement of the governments decision and
the outbreak of protest, with a view to seeking a posteriori legitimacy and justification
for a decision it had already taken. This posture is an example of what is known in the
literature as confiscation of expertise (Roqueplo 1997). In the interviews carried out
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6 H.M. Jernimo and J.L. Garcia
for this study, this point was mentioned by many interviewees, both members of the
scientific committees and opponents of the scheme.
[The government] () had to find a way out somewhere, so they found it in science. And
for a few months things were calm, quiet. But I think it was a politically artful way out,
and not a matter of scientific conviction (). (Interviewee A, see Appendix 2)
() the government used the device of a scientific committee, not because it had any
merit in itself, but as a way of trying to anaesthetize the opposition (). (Interviewee B,
see Appendix 2)
This placed the committee of experts under great public and political scrutiny and
pressure, irredeemably damaging its credibility and independence. The expert
committees focus on an analysis of co-incineration, to the detriment of an equal focus
on other treatment methods, gave further encouragement to the idea that everything
had been arranged so that the scientific report would ratify the decision which the
government had already taken.
Along with this criticism of parameters went the idea that the choice of members
of the committee had been strongly influenced by the government, even though,
according to the legislation which established the committee, it was the top body of
the Portuguese universities (the Council of Vice-Chancellors) which was responsible
for those choices. According to critics, this Council had merely provided a list of
names from which the government had been free to choose. The government had not
only chosen to set up the committee, but it had also played a key role in deciding who
should be on it. The choice of experts is not a neutral process. In her detailed study of
several American advisory committees, Jasanoff observed that advisers are selected
with an eye to much more than merely technical qualifications and that the selection
criteria are tailored to fit the function an expert is expected to perform (1990, 93). The
choice of members of advisory committees, involving scientists with specific disci-
plinary and institutional affiliations, is clearly the outcome of the governments objec-
tives, which seek to confine the activities of such committees to certain scientific
procedures and thereby define the way the issues are addressed.
In the Portuguese conflict, the membership of the committee is open to criticism
for being drawn from a narrow range of disciplines. On the other hand, the presence
of a Coimbra academic who became the chairman was a sign of impartiality which the
government and the other members of the committee wished to convey to the schemes
opponents the city of Coimbra being close to the location of one of the selected
cement plants. It could be argued that to have selected an insider as chairman might
offer an additional assurance that if a local expert were not opposed to the plan, then
there would be no grounds for fear and suspicion.
In the committees hearing in Coimbra, [I was asked] could the plan affect my son and
myself? and I said: Look, I live in Coimbra. So you at least know that, lets say, Im
not suggesting something against myself (). (Interviewee A, see Appendix 2)
It is highly significant that the committees report was to be of a binding nature. It
was not confined, as is normally the case, to an advisory and scenario-building role.
The responsibility for the decision was thus transferred to the sphere of expertise,
which means that decision-making was delegated and that the backdrop to the prob-
lem was seen as being located in technology-based rationality. The fact that the
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Journal of Risk Research 7
government arranged for the committees expert opinion to be binding showed that it
believed the decision on HIW should be a technical one and that it should be left
exclusively to specialists in the fields of chemical engineering, air quality and medi-
cine. The technical nature of the solution envisaged is reinforced by the fact that the
committee contained no social scientists, no ecologists, no specialists in environmen-
tal ethics and no citizen representatives: its members worked solely in the natural and
medical sciences.4
It is understandable that politicians should seek to base decisions affecting whole
communities on technical knowledge rather than being guided merely by their politi-
cal convictions. But it should be emphasized once again that the committee of experts
was summoned as part of a broader strategy which, beyond seeking technical advice
or even the resolution of the conflict once and for all, sought to demobilize the resi-
dents and counter the arguments of the opposition. With this step, the government
made an apparent effort to withdraw its earlier commitment to the decision it had
already taken, albeit at the cost of delegating to others that which was properly its own
responsibility.
Given that the experts allowed themselves to be part of a process which had
already been largely sketched out in advance, it seems appropriate to think of them as
expertise ex machina, which is brought in to deal with a difficult situation of
tension between government and the political parties, environmental associations,
local civic organizations, councils affected by the decision and a part of the scientific
community. In other words, the proposal to set up a committee of experts after the
decision had been announced and protests had erupted has some resonance with
ancient Greek and Roman theatre, in which an outside force or unexpected event was
needed to resolve a complicated and apparently insoluble problem, or a manoeuvre
that had not been properly prepared.
Placing the problems in the context of risk or uncertainty
Because they were binding in terms of the political decision and because they complied
with what the government had already decided, the experts reports (Formosinho et al.
2000) became the main focus of study and opposition from some members of the
scientific community, who thus allied themselves with the chorus of protest from local
residents, opposition parties and civic and environmental associations.
In both reports, the notion of risk is a core concept, formulated on the basis of a
calculation of probabilities. The historical origins of this idea lie in the conjunction of
a modernist rejection of determinism, the definition of man as a free and rational being,
and the prestige which the laws of probability acquired over the course of the nineteenth
century. In rationalizing modernity, the West gradually devalued the idea that human
life is shaped by such arbitrary forces as luck or destiny, and opened up the space for
mans rational action and procedures to forecast and anticipate events, thereby domes-
ticating chance in all areas of individual and collective life (Gigerenzer et al. 1989;
Hacking 1990). That which the historical literature calls the emergence of statistical
and probabilistic reasoning (Hacking 1975; Porter 1986; Krger et al. 1987; Cohen
2005) expresses sciences quest to overcome the contingency inherent in human life
by means of mathematical measurement. But this effort to tame the random has not
only failed to prevent it appearing in the modern world in other forms, but has also
given rise to radical uncertainty. Early in the twentieth century, Frank Knight (1921)
and John Maynard Keynes (1921) saw that economic life is beset by wide margins of
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8 H.M. Jernimo and J.L. Garcia
uncertainty, and that these cannot be done away with by applying more information
or more science, nor can they be reduced to the mere probabilistic calculus of risk. Even
so, the concept of uncertainty was marginalized or absorbed into the generic classifi-
cation of risk which came to dominate the second half of the twentieth century (Martins
19971998). That dominant view also implied that other forms of uncertainty such as
ignorance and indeterminacy were devalued. We use ignorance here in the sense
suggested by Brian Wynne (1992), whenever we are faced with a situation of unknown
consequences and failure to acknowledge the limitations and compromises of scientific
knowledge itself. We use indeterminacy when the uncertainties deriving from the
existence of contingent social behaviour create a situation in which it is acknowledged
that scientific assessments are the outcome of a particular definition of the problem
and that this definition is influenced by social, political and scientific choices (Wynne
1992, 11419).
The conceptual distinction between risk, uncertainty, ignorance and inde-
terminacy assists in understanding the committees reports and its opponents criti-
cisms. Overall, those in favour of co-incineration stressed the benefits of the method,
and argued that the risks could be effectively monitored and controlled. They
concluded that the risks were acceptable on the basis of existing knowledge (which
states that there are no additional emissions), and the fact that the method repre-
sented an opportunity for putting an end to the illegal dumping of HIW or its inciner-
ation under uncontrolled conditions. The absence of conclusive empirical evidence
as to the harmful nature of a particular phenomenon tended to be interpreted in a
positive way, and this meant that ignorance was equated to absence of risk. This
assumption can be seen in the words of one of the members of the committee of
experts:
() based on previous experience, of several decades of operation in over 100 cement
plants in Europe using () alternative fuels [HIW], there are () no reports of accidents
related to this If that is so, then this is () proof that the risk is low. So, we dont even
need to conceptualize here, all we need to do is to check the facts, the history of what
has actually happened. (Interviewee C, see Appendix 2)
It is not unusual to find this type of conclusion. In a case study concerning the
siting of a waste incinerator facility in Portsmouth, Hampshire (southern England),
analysed by Judith Petts, one of the experts in thermal combustion, who was familiar
with the incineration process, said if there was a problem with dioxins we would
already know about it (1997, 371). Here too the methods supporters assumed that it
was safe, based on the lack of scientific evidence of any problems. This is what Beck
calls the technocratic fallacy, whereby that which has not been studied, or cannot be
studied, is assumed to be harmless ([1986] 1992, 66).
Opponents of co-incineration saw the confidence which the Portuguese expert
committees showed in the safety of the method and of the residents who lived near the
cement plants as being based on false assumptions. In contrast, they argued for the
precautionary principle and for safeguarding local residents, given the inconclusive
nature of the studies, the prevailing ignorance of the synergistic effects of pollutants,
scientific doubts, the lack of consensus on many of the effects of exposure to dioxins
and other polluting gases, the very broad margins of uncertainty deriving from long
latency periods and opacity of the risks involved, and the fact that it was impossible
to ensure absolute control. As an example of the testimony gathered in the various
interviews with scientists who were against the method, the following quote came
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Journal of Risk Research 9
from one of the doctors who rejected the committees optimism and recalled the
frequent kiln failures in the cement plants:
() if the cement plants always operated under ideal conditions, the risk would be
minimal. But everyone knows that the cement plants are always having problems with
the kilns, and when they do (), the burn rate is inadequate, and enormous amounts of
waste are pumped into the atmosphere. () the whole rationale of the expert committee
was based on ideal operating conditions. (Interviewee D, see Appendix 2)
The underlying assumptions regarding operating conditions and accident preven-
tion depended on 100% correct operation. This is unlikely, considering the history of
the environmental record of the cement plants and the states efforts at control. In
other words, they relied on the complete absence of contingencies, trouble, faults and
surprises in the process. The assumptions may be technically correct, but they are
not achievable from the social point of view. This is because, as is inherent in the
concept of indeterminacy, technological risks relate not simply to the technology
itself, but to the whole social system used to i
