essayy
variance in American kinship:
implications for cultural analysis
SY LVlA JUNK0 YANAGISAKO-Stanford University
If there is a single key or core issue that encapsulates both the substantive and
theoretical issues raised by David Schneiders (1968) cultural analysis of American
kinship, it is perhaps Schneiders conclusion that, at least at one level of analysis, all
Americans share the same kinship system. While granting a wide range of variation a t the
behavioral and normative levels of American kinship, Schneider (1968:112) claims that a t
the cultural (symbolic) level the system of distinctive features that define the person as a
relative constitutes a firm, fixed core around which variation occurs. The distinctive
features that define the cultural universe of relatives for all Americans are relationship as
natural substance (blood) and relationship as code for conduct. These features are in turn
elements from two major cultural orders: the order of nature and the order of law
(Schneider 1968:27). Out of the conjunction of these distinctive features are constructed
three salient classes of relatives: relatives in nature, relatives in law, and relatives by blood
(Schneider 1968:28).
Not surprisingly, Schneiders claim for a single system of American kinship has been
received with considerable skepticism. American anthropologists, I suspect like natives
everywhere, find it irritating-to say the least-to have someone t e l l them how they think.
Furthermore, given the current academic climate, in which it appears to be universally
accepted that words are polysemic, that symbols have multiple referents, that cognitive
diversity not only lives but may be a societal prerequisite (Wallace 1970) and that the
omniscient informant i s either a misguided fool or a foolish misconception of the
anthropologist (Gardner 1976), an analysis that dares to posit for Americans cultural
unanimity, in any domain or a t any level of abstraction, i s bound to elicit emphatic native
pro test.
The question o f variance in American kinship provides a rich basis for a
discussion o f several c r i t i c a l conceptual, theoretical, and
methodological issues embedded in the cultural analysis o f kinship or
any other cultural domain. The paper begins with an examination of
the extent to which David Schneiders cultural account of American
kinship represents and explicates the symbolic system of
secondgeneration Japanese-Americans. This leads to the major
theoretical problem: the way in which we formulate heuristic levels o f
analysis and construe their interrelationships, An explication of the
theoretical consequences o f Schneider s scheme o f the behavioral,
normative, and cultural systems and his articulation o f the pure and
conglomerate levels o f the cultural system compels us to reassess the
goals o f cultural analysis and suggests the kind o f theory of meaning
and action that will prove most instructive in such an endeavor.
special section: American kinship 15
Aside from the question of whether Schneiders cultural analysis represents the
symbolic system o f every American anthropologist, there is the question of variance
among salient social categories and groups in American society. As Wallace noted in his
review of American Kinship :
granting the worth o f describing culture as a system o f cognitive structures or symbols and the
necessity o f constructing ideal-type systems for this purpose, there remain certain issues of
sampling by class o f utterances, as well as by class o f speaker, which cannot be begged without
opening the door to a number o f alternative systems, which are equally elegant and equally
valid and which differ either because they are based on a different sampling o f types of people
and types o f statements or because a different frame was chosen, or both. Does this study of
American kinship equally well represent Wasps, Negroes, American Indians, jews, Puerto
Ricans, Poles, etc? . . . Do all American groups maintain this symbol system? And if not, which
ones? One cannot know, and no procedures are indicated in this work for finding out (Wallace
1 9 6 9 : 1 0 6 ) .
I agree with Wallace that the issue o f sampling i s a critical one and that the answer to
the question of diversity among American groups cannot be found in Schneiders book. I
disagree, however, with Wallaces statement that there are no procedures indicated in
Schneiders work for finding out. By combining the definitions, concepts, and the
(admittedly somewhat vague) methodology presented in American Kinship with the
detailed fieldwork procedures outlined in the supplemental monograph of the American
Kinship Project (Wolf n.d.), one can indeed formulate a research strategy for discovering
whether different classes of speakers share, at any level of analysis, the cultural system
described by Schneider.
In this paper, 1 examine the extent to which Schneiders cultural account of American
kinship can be said to represent and explicate the symbolic system of one particular
section of the American population. The class of speakers whose statements form the
basis of this examination are second-generation Japanese-Americans (Nisei) residing in
Seattle, Washington. By employing Schneiders strategy of differentiating the cultural
system of kinship from the social system o f kinship (the actual patterned interactions
between people), I have extracted the system of symbols and meanings embedded in
informants normative statements about kinship relationships and then compared the
natives own units of meaning, the way in which these units are defined and
differentiated, and how these units form an integrated order or classification (Schneider
1972:38) with Schneiders account of American kinship.
The purpose of this presentation, however, is not limited to answering the question
do Japanese-Americans share the cultural system of kinship outlined by Schneider?;
rather, the point i s to use the question of variance in American kinship as a starting point
for examining several critical conceptual, theoretical, and methodological issues
embedded in this substantive question. As I will show, the question of variance leads us to
a major theoretical problem; namely, the construction of heuristic levels of analysis and
the manner in which we construe their interrelationships. Specifically, we are led to
scrutinize Schneiders scheme of the behavioral, normative, and cultural systems and his
articulation of the pure and conglomerate levels of the cultural system. This in turn
compels us to reassess the goals of cultural analysis and guides us toward the kind of
theory of meaning and action that will prove most instructive in such an endeavor.
the cultural system of Japanese-American kinship
In my research, I discovered several topics in which the statements made by
second-generation (Nisei) Japanese-Americans did not fit well with Schneiders analysis.
16 american ethnologist
For the purpose of this discussion, however, I will focus on only one area of contrast that
initially appeared congruent with Schneiders model, but which, on closer scrutiny,
demonstrated significant structural variation as well as complexity. This subject, which
lies a t the core of Schneiders analysis of the cultural system of American kinship,
includes the cultural domain of relatives and the distinctive features that define the
person as a relative.
Following the field procedures outlined in the American Kinship Project monograph
(Wolf n.d.), I asked each informant to list for me all the people you consider to be
related to you. 1 then proceeded to elicit from informants their reasons for including or
excluding kin types and specific individuals, and I explored generally the cultural domain
of relatives. The data appeared initially to mirror perfectly Schneiders account of the
domain of relatives. That is, the rule according to which a person is included in the
category of relative i s : a person i s a relative if he i s related by blood or marriage and
provided he i s closely enough related (or i s not too distant) (Schneider 1968:62).
Distance here refers to either (or both) the degree to which two persons share biogenetic
substance and the magnitude of the claim on diffuse, enduring solidarity (Schneider
1968:65).
Everything my Nisei informants said indicated complete agreement with Schneiders
(1968:69) statement that the decision as to who i s a relative i s made by and about a
person. In other words, there are no rules that set formal degrees of genealogical dis-
tance for inclusion in the category of relatives. Instead, ego decides to include an in-
dividual in this category depending on her assessment of the closeness of the relationship
existing between herself and alter. Thus, ego may include a specific individual from a kin
category but a t the same time exclude other individuals from the same category. Finally,
as Schneider sagaciously notes, the elements of substance and code for conduct are not of
equal value, and
their different values alone and in combination, along with distance, account for much of the
variance i n the system at the level o f the person, both as decisions about concrete individuals
and as normative constructs. Substance has the highest value, code for conduct less value, but
the two together (that is, the blood relative) have the highest value o f all (Schneider
1968:63).
The Nisei appeared to differ from Schneiders informants only with regard to their
treatment of a category o f affinal kin that Schneider elsewhere (Cottrell and Schneider
1963) has claimed his middle-class Chicago informants do not generally think of as
relatives. This i s the category of egos consanguines affines consanguines, which
Cottrell and Schneider refer to as C.A.C. kin. According to the authors, informants do
not generally think of C.A.C. kin as relatives or as being related to them in some special
sense of this idea (Cottrell and Schneider 1963:3). Thus, among Schneiders informants,
C.A.C. kin (and more distanct affines such as C.A.C.A. kin and its reciprocal, A.C.A.C.
kin) appear only erratically within the meaning of the word relative.
In contrast, my Nisei informants commonly listed C.A.C. kin as relatives. A third o f
the informants included in their kin listings one or more C.A.C. kin, the most common
types being egos siblings spouses siblings, egos siblings spouses parents, egos childs
spouseJs parents, and egos childs spouses siblings. Several other informants who did not
l i s t C.A.C. kin as relatives referred to them as shirt-tail relatives or coat-tail
relatives and categorized them as people who are not quite relatives, but who are more
than friends, and to whom you have obligations. A few Nisei also included as relatives
people in the C.A.C.A./A.C.A.C. category (for example, siblings spouses siblings spouse)
and the A.C.A.C.A. category (for example, spouses siblings spouses siblings spouse).
special section: American kinship 17
For Schneider, however, a difference in the rate of inclusion of a particular
genealogical kin type does not necessarily reflect a difference at t h e cultural level. Indeed,
the variable inclusion of C.A.C. kin by the Nisei, along with the variable inclusion of
other kin types, only supports his thesis that the decision as to who is a relative i s made
by and about a person. The higher rate of inclusion of C.A.C. kin by the Nisei as
compared to Cottrell and Schneiders informants, therefore can be dismissed as a
statistical difference a t the behavioral level, which does not reflect any difference
between the two groups in the definition of cultural units (persons), in the rules for
inclusion of these units in the domain of relatives, and in the symbolic structure
underlying these definitions and rules.
The seemingly easy resolution of this issue was soon undermined, however, when I
moved on to examine another topic within the Nisei domain of kinship, namely, the
exchange of mortuary offerings (koden) in the Japanese-American community. The
Japanese custom o f giving koden at funerals has persisted in most Japanese-American
communities (see also Johnson 1974), although there have been some modifications in
the rules of exchange as they operated in the past in rural Japan (see Nakane 1967;
Embree 1939; Fukutake 1967). For example, in contrast to rural Japan, wherekoden was
given in the form of fixed quantities of rice, in Japanese-American communities koden
has taken the form of relatively fixed quantities of money. As in Japan, however, a l i s t of
all persons who have given koden a t the deceaseds funeral i s kept by the deceaseds
spouse or, if there i s no surviving spouse, by the deceaseds eldest son. The keeper of the
koden list is responsible for reciprocating koden on the death of any contributor or any
member of a contributors immediate family (that is, his children, spouse, parents, and
siblings) .
Since the beginning o f t h e Seattle Japanese community, koden reciprocity has
involved friends and acquaintances as well as kin. The perpetuation of reciprocal
exchange relationships established by their parents (the first-generation Issei) is viewed by
the Nisei as a manifestation of the persisting solidary strength of t h e community. Koden
reciprocity i s thus associated with both the cultural domain of the community and the
cultural domain of kinship. The relevance of koden reciprocity to both of these cultural
domains provides a useful example o f the interpenetration of cultural domains-a topic
that will be discussed in the final section of this paper.
Because koden reciprocity i s conceived of as an exchange between family units, it i s
considered inappropriate for the members of the deceaseds immediate family to give
koden upon his or her death. The immediate family of the deceased includes his or her
parents, children, siblings, and spouse. These kin are considered the receivers of the
koden, although only one of them usually receives the money, which i s then used to
defray the cost of the funeral. Disagreement exists among informants as to whether the
deceaseds grandchildren, parents siblings, first cousins, nephews, and nieces are also too
close to the deceased to give koden. Several informants said these kin are too close,
both genealogically and socially, to the deceased and that monetary contributions from
them are a form o f intrafamilial aid rather than koden. Other informants disagreed.
Regardless of the variance in the determination o f who i s a close relative and part o f
t h e deceaseds immediate family, the cultural units involved in koden reciprocity are
families rather than persons. Not only are the deceaseds spouse, parents, children,
and siblings considered too close to give koden, but so are any of their spouses and
dependent children. Thus, the determination of which relatives are too close to
participate in koden exchange is made on the basis of the genealogical and social
connections between family units rather than between persons.
18 american ethnologist
While close relatives do not give koden, distant relatives are expected to do so.
Since relatively few Nisei have genealogically distant consanguineal kin in the Seattle
area, the category o f distant relatives i s filled primarily by affinal kin. These affinal
kin are members o f family units that are connected to the deceaseds family by an affinal
t i e only (no consanguineal tie), and they contain the deceaseds C.A.C., A.C.A.C./
C.A.C.A., and A.C.A.C.A. kin-in other words, just those categories of affinal kin that the
Nisei variably included as relatives in their kin listings. Figure 1 depicts the affinally
related family units4 that participate in koden reciprocity.
F G H I
A 8 C D E
– – , –
Family to whom , O = A , Family to whom
1 ,I egos family does
egos family
gives koden —/ not give koden
*See footnote 4 for a discussion of the domestic cycle o f family units.
Figure 1. Family units engaged in koden reciprocity.
In the figure, ego (13) i s a member of family C along with her spouse (14). On the
deaths of individuals 11 , 12, 20, 15, 16, and 22, family C does not give koden since it i s
connected to families B and D by a sibling tie. Thus, even at the death of egos spouses
siblings spouse (an A.C.A. kin), ego i s considered too close a relative to give koden
because she is a member o f a family connected to the deceaseds family by a sibling tie.
Neither does ego give koden on the deaths of individuals 3, 4, 5, and 6, because they are
members of families (G and H) connected to egos family by a parent-child tie.
On the deaths of individuals 9, 10, 19, 17, 18, and 23, egos family gives koden
because neither families A nor E have a consanguineal tie with egos family. They are
instead connected to egos family (C) only by an affinal tie. The same i s true of families F
and I.
Families A, E, F, and I contain members of t h e categories of affinal kin (C.A.C.,
A.C.A.C./C.A.C.A., and A.C.A.C.A.) that Cottrells and Schneiders informants did not
consider relatives, but that one-third of the Nisei informants included as relatives.
None o f the Nisei informants listed more distant affines (for example, A.C.A.C.A.C.),
that is, members o f families o f more than one degree of affinal removal (in Figure 1 the
sibling o f individual 9 would be an A.C.A.C.A.C. kin o f ego).
special section: American kinship 19
Because Nisei informants, in their discussion of koden reciprocity, agreed that
members o f affinally related families are distant relatives a t whose death one is
obligated to give koden, I was initially puzzled as to why only a third of them included
such affines as relatives in their kin listings. An examination of this seeming
inconsistency in the determination of who i s a relative revealed an important feature of
Nisei kinship ideology and behavior. It also explained why C.A.C. kin appear more than
erratically in Nisei kin listings.
The contrast between the vuriubie inclusion of C.A.C. kin (as well as
A.C.A.C./C.A.C.A., and A.C.A.C.A. kin) as relatives in Nisei kin listings and the
invariable inclusion of these kin as distant relatives to whom koden must be given can
be understood only by explicating the cultural domains to which the Nisei assign these
two separate phenomena. Koden reciprocity i s conceptualized by the Nisei as a
Japanese custom rooted in a Japanese system o f ascribed moral obligations. Within
this system of ascribed obligations, personal relationships are considered irrelevant. One
has a moral obligation to give koden because of the formal social identity relationships
one has with others, regardless of how one feels about the individuals filling these
positions.
For the Nisei, then, the relevant units in Japanese kinship relationships are
families and not persons. Consequently, they feel obliged to give koden to affinally
connected family units on the occasion o f the death of any member of that family. The
expectations people have of the relationships that should obtain between affinally
connected family units are not restricted to koden reciprocity but operate as well in areas
such as participation in kin gatherings for holidays and ritual celebrations. At wedding
ceremonies and receptions family units that are connected to either the brides or the
grooms families by an affinal t i e (for example, t h e brides sisters husbands parents and
siblings) are included as relatives (Yanagisako 1975a:236). Thus, C.A.C. kin are
relatives in the sense that they have definite rights and duties to each other as members
of affinally related families.
In contrast, the act o f constructing a list of ones relatives was interpreted by my
informants as being an American phenomenon in which the appropriate units are
persons rather than families and that entails choice rather than ascription. Only after
I had completed the interviews did it become clear that the procedure of eliciting the kin
listing encouraged this conception. Following the American kinship monograph field
procedure (Wolf n.d.), I asked each informant to list for me all the people you consider
to be related to you. According to Schneider, these instructions avoid asking for a l i s t of
persons (that is, concrete individuals) and allow the informant to l i s t family groupings,
kin categories, and households, as well as individuals. Since this mode of elicitation was
designed to avoid contamination by implying any specific action-system or context,
Schneider assumes that i t i s contextually neutral.
Yet on closer scrutiny, the request for a l i s t o f people can be seen to encourage the
listing of specific persons as opposed to groupings of people. Moreover, the instruction to
list for me all the people you consider to be related to you contains two critical
implications. First, it implies that individuals are the units in the relationship; that is, it
asks for a l i s t of people related to you rather than to your family or household. Second, i t
implies that there is some consideration and, by implication, choice involved in the
matter. Consequently, the Nisei informants perceived the kin listing to be an American
procedure involving individuals and choice; one chooses which persons are ones
relatives. Within this procedure the greater the degree of genealogical distance, the
greater i s the significance of the personal relationship (socioemotional distance) in
determining whether alter i s a relative of ego. For A.C., C.A., and A.C.A. kin, the close
20 american ethnologist
consanguineal tie between ego and alters families tends to override the nature of the
personal relationship, and these categories of kin are generally included in the kin
listing. Members o f affinally related families, such as C.A.C. kin, however, are included
only when the informant feels that she and alter have a close personal relationship.
The contrast between the variable inclusion of C.A.C. kin as relatives and the
invariable exchange of koden with C.A.C. kin reveals that the Nisei utilize both the
person and the family as units in the determination o f who i s a relative. Which unit
they employ in any instance depends upon the perceived nature of the context. I f the
context i s perceived to be an American one (as in the case of the kin listing) the
relevant units are considered to be persons. If the context i s perceived to be a
Japanese one (as in the case of koden reciprocity) the relevant units are considered to
be families. This usage o f two different units in reckoning kinship relationships i s
neither inconsistent nor contradictory; it reflects a cultural structure that pervades all
levels of Nisei kinship ideology and behavior. This structure can be readily abstracted
from the statements the Nisei make about a wide range of subjects pertaining to the
family and relatives.
For example, the Nisei construct o f marriage and the ideal conjugal relationship can
only be fully understood within the context of their notions of Japanese versus
American marriage. To the Nisei, the ideal white-American marriage is based on
romantic love, that is, on the emotional and sexual attraction of two unique
biopsychological beings (persons). American marriage is, accordingly, viewed as having
i t s basis in feeling. In comparison, Japanese marriage i s viewed as rooted in duty
(giri), that is, in ones social and moral commitment to a contractual relationship. Within
this contractual relationship, how one feels about the person i s considered irrelevant
to the fulfillment of t h e contracted obligations. In the Nisei view, the parties to a
Japanese marriage are not persons but social identities (nonpersons). A wife i s loyal
to her husband not because she i s attracted to his unique personhood, but because he
stands in the social identity relationship of husband to her.
While the Nisei have rejected Japanese marriage as a model for their own conjugal
relationship, they have not adopted without qualification the ideal American marriage.
Instead, the ideal conjugal relationship of the Nisei i s a synthesis of these two contrastive
constructs. Love and feeling have been brought into the conjugal relationship, but
duty has not been discarded. The ideal marriage is one that includes both these
elements. Within this ideal construct the emotionality of romantic love i s balanced by
the constraint o f moral duty. Thus, one has an enduring commitment (duty) to love
(feeling) ones spouse (the social identity rather than the person).
Because the Nisei construct of conjugal love mediates between their notions of
American marriage and Japanese marriage, any particular statement by a Nisei may,
in isolation from the whole range o f statements made with respect to marriage, give
expression to only one of t h e components. Informants sometimes made statements about
marriage as if it were based solely on romantic love and natural atrraction. Other
informants a t times stressed duty and never mentioned love. This alternative
emphasis on only one o f the components did not reflect different ideals of marriage,
however, since in the course o f several interview sessions all informants eventually gave
expression to the other conponent.
The same opposition between American and Japanese constructs is made by the
Nisei in their discussions o f t h e parent-child relationship. Informants invariably contrast
their relationships with their own children with the parent-child relationship in their natal
families. The Nisei view their relationship with their parents as having been based on strict
discipline and fear and as lacking feeling, love, and companionship. They view
special section: American kinship 21
their relationships with their own children as more open, expressive, and loving.
Considerable emphasis is placed on communication within the family and Nisei parents
say they encourage their children to discuss personal problems and a wide range of topics
with them. Nisei fathers are particularly proud of their ability to discuss with their sons
controversial or sensitive topics such as sex and politics, which they could never have
brought up with their own fathers. Shared family activities are also valued as a means of
developing close emotional ties and family unity. Consistent with the emphasis on
communication i s the Nisei parents value of compliance based on reason rather than
fear. Parents should explain their decisions to children rather than rely on fear-evoking
physical force or disciplinary measures.
The Nisei have not, however, totally accepted what they construe as the American
parent-child relationship. The Japanese way of discipline and respect for the parent i s
also valued. Again, the ideal relationship l i e s somewhere between American and
Japanese extremes. While espousing the values of open communication, informants
admitted to having reservations about too much freedom and lack of discipline. One
informant expressed the following reservations:
Kids are more relaxed these days, b u t thats whats wrong with Japanese families these
days. . . thats whats wrong with this assimilation stuff. When we were children, you could
always see a big difference i n the way Japanese children behaved and the way hakujin [ w h i t e ]
children behaved. Now you cant tell them apart. There have to be some limitations; you should
be able t o decide whos the parent and whos the child.
The fundamental contrastive pair emerging in all these areas of kinship i s the
American versus the Japanese cultural orders. That Japanese-American ideals are
syntheses of the Niseis notions of the American and Japanese orders reveals their
underlying conception o f their social identity. Within this conception, t h e
Japanese-American is a synthesis of Japanese and American traits, tendencies, values,
contexts, and behavioral patterns. Being a Japanese-American means integrating the
contrastive elements of these two cultural orders within oneself. An overemphasis of
components from either order to the detriment of the other threatens ones identity as a
Japanese-American. If too much precedence i s given to the American components one
ends up being indistinguishable from a hukujin (white). If the opposite components are
regnant, a person i s too japanesey and old-fashioned.
An individuals identity as a Japanese-American i s further affirmed by his ability to
alternate between these contrastive orders. Depending on the prevailing context, elements
from either one of the contrastive orders may be selected to construct and legitimize
normative ideals and concrete behaviors. An event, action-system, or institution may be
perceived as belonging to the American cultural domain, as in the case of the kin
listing. In these contexts, ones performance should be constructed out of, and will be
evaluated in terms of, the premises, values, and motives of the American order. On the
other hand, when one performs in contexts construed as Japanese, as in the case of
koden reciprocity, elements drawn from the Japanese order are considered appropriate.
Finally, in Japanese-American contexts a synthesis of elements from the two orders i s
constructed.
The Nisei construction and recognition of Japanese-American contexts,
action-systems, and institutions, along with their conception of Japanese-American
identity, reveals that while the Japanese and American orders are isolable and
contrastive a t the symbolic level, they are not isolated at the level of action or at the level
of normative expectations. Indeed, neither the corpus of statements made by an
aggregation of Nisei nor those made by an individual Nisei can be fully comprehended
until one views them as combinations and blendings of elements from these two symbolic
22 american ethnologist
categories. Even then the task o f identifying and categorizing these symbolic components
i s neither a simple nor mechanical one, because their selection and combination in any
particular setting does not appear to be governed by standardized formulas or procedures.
The ambiguity of meaning that prevails in most concrete situations permits individuals
creatively to manipulate the symbolic structure by advocating a definition of the context
that facilitates and legitimates idiosyncratic goals, strategies, and styles.
That Nisei kinship norms and behaviors are structured a t the cultural level of meaning
by an opposition between the American and Japanese orders can hardly surprise us.
Having matured in a domestic and community environment supervised by lssei parents
who transmitted to them Japanese conceptions, values, and interactional styles, the Nisei
must have been impressed by the contrast between this system and the European-Ameri-
can system dominating the public school and extracommunity environments. Yet the
Nisei did more than merely observe the differences between these contexts and cultural
systems. Instead they formed, consciously or unconsciously, a unitary conceptual scheme
out of the differences that they perceived to exist between these contexts and cultural
systems.
Interestingly enough, in constructing the contrastive categories o f the American
cultural order and the Japanese cultural order, the Nisei appear to have committed t h e
same analytical error of which social scientists are so often guilty; that is, in formulating
this dualistic scheme they lifted cultural elements out of context. For example, in the
cultural system of traditional Japanese kinship, both duty (giri) and feeling (ninjo)
were present as contrastive cultural elements. Yet the overt precedence placed on duty
in the Japanese normative system, when contrasted with the relatively greater emphasis
on feeling in the American normative system, appears to have.moved the Nisei to select
only one element as representative of each cultural system. Consequently, duty came
to represent t h e Japanese system and feeling the American system. This
decontextualization of elements appears to have been a necessary subprocess in t h e
formation o f a dualistic conceptual scheme. In effect, it enabled the Nisei to reduce each
of the
