Discussion-APA Format
It does not need an abstract but it does need to be answered APA format.
Read the article “Challenges to Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations and Takeaways Amid the COVID-19 Experience” by J. Edwin Benton. Based on the article and your opinion, has American federalism been a hindrance or help in America’s fight against the COVID-19 pandemic? Defend your position. How has the political and cultural environment impacted the creating and implementing of policies by local, state, and federal governments to address COVID-19?
https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074020941698
American Review of Public Administration
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Article
Introduction
It was inevitable that the challenges posed by the COVID-19
pandemic would thrust the American political systemmore
specifically, the countrys federal form of governmentinto
both the national and global spotlight. History has taught us
that crises are the ultimate testing ground for the sufficiency
and durability of any political system. At this still early stage
in dealing with the pandemic that has had both severe health
and economic consequences, how has the federal system of
governmentbut especially the ability of the national (fed-
eral), state, and local governments to work together for the
general welfaregraded out? The purpose of the article is
to provide some early answers to this question.
But, before addressing the fundamental question posed
above, it is important to present some fundamental contex-
tual information about the U.S. federal structure of govern-
ment and the subsequent evolution of relations between the
three levels of government.
Background
When the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1789, few, if any,
people probably knew how relations would play out between
various levels of government in this unique federal form of
government that Tocqueville (1999) referred to as the great
American experiment. It is doubtful that even the Framers
of the Constitution could have foreseen the development of
and nuances in the relations among the national, state, and
local governments. What was known in those early years of
the Republic was that the national government had been del-
egated specific powers, whereas the reserved or residual
powers of the states were less clear given the wording of the
10th Amendment. And, in spite of the fact that the Constitution
referenced some national/state concurrent or shared
powers, there was uncertainty how this grant of joint author-
ity would work. The role of local governments, however,
was the least clear as the Constitution was silent on these
governments, although anecdotal thinking seemed to suggest
that states would continue to create and use them as adminis-
trative arms or political subdivisions.
941698ARPXXX10.1177/0275074020941698The American Review of Public AdministrationBenton
research-article2020
1University of South Florida, Tampa, USA
Corresponding Author:
J. Edwin Benton, School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, University of
South Florida, Tampa, FL 33620, USA.
Email: [emailprotected]
Challenges to Federalism and
Intergovernmental Relations and
Takeaways Amid the COVID-19 Experience
J. Edwin Benton1
Abstract
The American democratic system of government is being put to its greatest test since the Great Depression of the 1920s
and 1930s, as the country endeavors to cope with the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. That is, considerable pressure
continues to build up at the fault lines of governance inherent in the countrys unique federal form of government which
explicitly and implicitly expects national, state, and local levels to work together while they also may function as separate,
autonomous entities to promote and provide for the general welfare. These fault lines exist where governance and service
provision matters necessitate the collective attention and action of two or more levels of government. Both cooperation and
conflict are possible interactive outcomes in these situations.
This article provides an early assessment of how national, state, and local governments have worked together since the onset
of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequently a report card of sorts on the functioning of intergovernmental relations in the
U.S. at the present time. More specifically, the article will examine the current condition of interstate, interlocal, state-local, and
national-state relations. While the findings and observations reported here are certainly enlightening, they should be viewed as
preliminary. Followed up research should be conducted to determine if there have been any policy learning has occurred and if
such information has been used in improve the quality of governance in keeping with citizen expectations of American federalism.
Keywords
federalism, intergovernmental relations (IGR), COVID-19 pandemic, kaleidoscopic federalism
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2 American Review of Public Administration 00(0)
More than 225 years later, we do have a better under-
standing as to how the federal system of government has
performed and how intergovernmental relations have
evolved. Based on the observations of those closest to the
functioning of the federal systemelected and appointed
officials, watchdogs of the public interest (media, good
government groups, attentive and civic-minded individ-
uals, and the scholarly community), we now have a better
sense of the relations that occur between various levels of
government (that is, federalstate, federallocal, federal
statelocal; interstate, statelocal, and interlocal). The pio-
neering scholarly work of Daniel Elazar (1962, 1984) and
Morton Grodzins (1960, 1966), but especially Deil Wright
(1978, 1988), was particularly helpful in that it chronicled
and critically analyzed the evolution of the relations between
the federal (national), state, and local governments. In fact,
it was Wright who first popularized and legitimized the term
intergovernmental relations (IGR) as a better focus for the
study of the relations between levels of government in the
U.S. federal system than the more legalistic term federal-
ism. Moreover, it was Wright (1978, 1988) who helped
scholars as well as government practitioners to refine our
thinking about and ability to analyze and explain various
patterns of IGR with his identification of what he called
seven phases of IGR.
It is from this platform that scholars anchor their research
agenda and have been able to obtain a better understanding
of and appreciation for how the federal system of govern-
ment functions and the extent to which officials (both elected
and appointed) at all three levels of government interact with
one another to better serve the American public. To date,
scholarly research has identified and described a variety of
ways in which these governments tend to interact. Moreover,
the way in which they interact and the resultant IGR can and
often do varies from one policy area to another. With the for-
mulation of his seven phases of IGR, Wright (1978, 1988)
was able to capture and describe the most distinguishing and
reoccurring patterns of IGR with the following descriptors
and associated metaphors: conflict (layer-cake federalism),
cooperative (marble-cake), concentrated (water taps
focused or channeled), creative (floweringproliferated and
fused), competitive (picket-fencefragmentation), calcula-
tive (faadeconfrontational), and contractive (de facto
telescopes and whiplash). Most recently, Benton (2018) has
suggested that Wrights seventh phase has given way to an
eighth phase that began sometime around the early 1990s
and continues to the present time. In this latest phase, IGR is
characterized as being kaleidoscopic and can be identified
by metaphors such as fragmented, push-back, nuanced, fend-
for-yourself, and collaborative.
From Wrights identification of seven phases of IGR and
the recent update to it, students of American federalism and
IGR have the advantage of being able to look backward to
learn that the evolution of IGR was indelibly influenced by
the political, economic, and social events of the times. As a
result, one can view and understand the development of spe-
cific patterns of IGR through the lenses of the main and
peculiar problems and issues of a given point in time, who
the primary IGR actors were and what their perceptions of
these issues and problems were, and the way in which these
IGR actors responded through the enactment and implemen-
tation of specific legislation or the issuance of court rulings.
As noted above, each of the eight phases of IGR was
marked by unprecedented issues, challenges, prevailing phil-
osophical views, and temperament of the day. Americans
looked to the public sector (i.e., government) for answers, as
it seemed that the private sector was not able to rise to the
occasion or their proposed remedies were either unaccept-
able or inadequate. This was the dilemma that Americans
found themselves in during the Great Depression. Although
the public sector was unable or unwilling to provide the req-
uisite solutions, the Republican and conservative perspective
(especially at the national level) was heavily influenced by
philosophies like laissez-faire and Social Darwinism. Strong
aversions to this way of thinking inevitably lead to the belief
that the role played by government in the lives of Americans
had to be reevaluated. Likewise, it also became apparent that
old patterns of IGR needed to be reaccessed, fine-tuned, or
even significantly restructured to meet the challenges of the
day. Is the United States facing a similar situation today in
the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic that may require a can-
did reassessment of the condition of IGR so as to insure an
acceptable governmental response that is necessary during
these uncertain and troubling times? At present, media
accounts of government responses to the COVID-19 pan-
demic coupled with ones personal experiences provide a
mixed message as to whether the national, state, and local
governments are operating at the highest levels of efficiency,
sufficiency, and effectiveness either individually or collec-
tively in what can be best described as uncharted waters
(Altschuler 2020; Inskeep 2020).
Given this backdrop, it is important to objectively and
critically assess the functioning of American federalism at
this particular moment in time as national, state, and local
governments are scrambling to respond to COVID-19. That
is, it is important to identify what aspects of our federal form
of government are working well, what is not working so
well, and what, if any, changes are warranted. Any takeaways
drawn from such an exercise are certain to be helpful to prac-
titioners and elected officials alike going forward.
Making the Grade and Takeaways
During the Pandemic
In some respects, the U.S. federal structure of government
has lived up to the challenges posed by COVID-19 and per-
formed in ways in keeping with the expectations of the
Framers of the Constitution and the U.S. citizenry. However,
in some other ways, it appears that our federal form of gov-
ernment is dysfunctional, performs unsatisfactorily, or, as the
Benton 3
subtitle to Don Kettls (2020) most recent book suggests,
doesnt work in crises like COVID-19.1
Positive Takeaways
Interstate and interlocal relations: Increased collaboration.
Perhaps, the most obvious positive signs of American feder-
alism being alive and well and functioning to meet the ever-
changing challenges presented by COVID-19 have been in
the areas of interstate and interlocal relations.
In the last 3 months, there have been a number of notewor-
thy examples of states consulting and collaborating with one
another over matters pertaining to the pandemic, but espe-
cially at a time when there has been a conspicuous absence of
leadership from the White House and Congress (see Benton,
2018; Kettl, 2020). This is not surprising, as states typically
are more motivated to collaborate when there is greater fre-
quency of contact, interdependence, and mutual benefit
(Agranoff, 2012). The first such example during the COVID-
19 pandemic was the emergence of multistate collaboration
among New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania
whereby they sought to coordinate actions such as the closing
of schools, nonessential businesses, parks, beaches, and more.
Given the interconnectedness of the states in this region, they
were concerned about cross-border spillovers if their public
health actions differed and worked quickly to coordinate uni-
form policies and even leverage their partnership to oppose a
possible federal quarantine. Within a few days, Rhode Island,
Delaware, and Massachusetts joined the partnership. Similar
compacts formed at about the same time for the same pur-
poses among five West Coast states (California, Colorado,
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington) and seven Midwestern
states (Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Ohio, and Wisconsin).
It is important to note that the rise of such interstate alli-
ances was not a new feature of American federalism in 2020.
To the contrary, greater utilization of interstate collaboration
can be traced back to the 1990s. In fact, there have been a
number of policy diffusion studies (e.g., see Balla, 2001;
Berry & Baybeck, 2005; Pacheco, 2012; Shipan & Volden,
2012; Teodoro, 2009) reported on the existence of stable net-
work structures among the states that served to promote the
spread of policy innovations. Therefore, the arrival of the
COVID-19 pandemic served only to spur further interest in
and development of this aspect of IGR.
Although states have been collaborating more during
COVID-19, the same has also been the case for local gov-
ernments. In point of fact, the frequency of local govern-
ment collaboration has grown exponentially over the last
few months, as local officials realize that they will be deal-
ing with issues that know no political boundaries and are
likely to have significant spillover effects. In some
instances, cities (and sometimes school and special dis-
tricts and even townships) within the same county, as well
as the county government itself, have spent countless hours
in virtual meetings and consulting informally to coordinate
their jurisdictions activities, adopt emergency policies and
monitor compliance with stay-at-home orders, social dis-
tancing, curfews, and school and business closings for the
collective good of their community, and devise plans to
share resources and information. Such has been the case in
two large, diverse counties adjacent to one another in
Floridas Tampa Bay regionHillsborough and Pinellas.
In Hillsborough, an eight-person Emergency Policy Group
has been formed (mayors of the Cities of Tampa, Plant
City, and Temple Terrace, chair of the county commission,
two other county commissioners, county sheriff, and a
Hillsborough County school board member) to formulate
countywide emergency policies and coordinate enforce-
ment practices pertaining to many of the issues mentioned
above (Frago, 2020). Across the Bay, Pinellas County cre-
ated a similar and larger entity (the county has 24 munici-
palities) to assume comparable responsibilities including
access to public buildings, businesses, schools, beaches,
parks, and cultural facilities (Puente & Wilson, 2020).
Another example of interlocal cooperation can be seen in
coastal Georgetown County, South Carolina, and its beach
communities where they have formed an emergency task
force to deal with beach and park access and short-term
beach rental property (Howard, 2020). Members of the task
force include members of the County Council, mayors of the
two towns, and county sheriff. Fearing that inconsistent poli-
cies in the unincorporated beach areas of the county
(Litchfield Beach and Murrells Inlet) and the two incorpo-
rated beach communities (Pawleys Island and Garden City)
would lead to confusion and possible spread of COVID-19,
the task force formulated an agreement to have one consis-
tent policy to close beaches and parks and put a moratorium
on short-term rentals, as well as a uniform date for rescinding
these policies when the pandemic subsides.
In other instances, two or more counties or multiple cities
in the same region of their states have collaborated to pro-
mote social distancing, limit travel in and out of a region,
and conserve resources or preserve (potable water, food,
medical supplies, etc.). A case in point would be the three
coastal counties in South Carolina (Charleston, Georgetown,
and Horry), where tourism is a major driver of the local
economy (K. Wilson, 2020a). Like what was explained
above about Georgetown County, all three counties under-
stand that the massive influx of tourists to their beach resort
areas (not to mention local residents) would greatly increase
the chance of spreading the virus. Therefore, these three
counties quickly formed an alliance to curb access to the
resort locations and short-term housing used by vacationers.
It is noteworthy that collaborating local governmental enti-
ties, like the ones mentioned here, have lobbied their state
governments for more flexibility in performing their duties
and greater authority to employ thinking-out-of-the-box
ideas that best fit the needs and unique location or character
of their communities.
4 American Review of Public Administration 00(0)
Although local governments have a long tradition of for-
mal and informal mutual aid pacts and other cooperative
agreements, they have used the experience of COVID-19 to
expand this kind of collaboration to many more scenarios
that were never even envisioned before the onset of the
pandemic.
Statelocal relations: Getting better but could be improved.
Although so many more services and even regulatory actions
of governments have become increasingly intergovernmen-
talized since the middle of the 20th century (see Reeves,
1981), it has been refreshing to see that state governments
(and, to a less extent, the federal government) have been
more willing to defer (within reason) to local governments in
additional matters. Such episodes of deferral by higher to
lower levels of government (but particularly whereby states
are deferring to their cities, counties, townships, and school
districts while also granting them wider latitude and discre-
tion) to make their own decisions in myriad issue areas have
been occurring more often during the pandemic. However,
this does not mean that states have relinquished ultimate
regulatory oversight or setting minimal standards in certain
areas but rather they are allowing their local governments to
fashion creative solutions that best fit the peculiar needs of
their residents and business owners. In so doing, higher lev-
els of government are implicitly and explicitly acknowledg-
ing that local officials are likely to be in a better position to
take policy approaches more in keeping with the uniqueness
of their setting and how an issue or problem particularly
impacts their community. Moreover, it is recognition that
one size does not fit all, thereby encouraging the kind of
experimentation that the Framers probably envisioned.
In recent weeks, a number of state governors, as part and
parcel of initiatives to reopen their states economy, have
acceded to requests from local officials to permit them to
determine the best and safest path to transition from a strict
stay-at-home mode to a gradual reopening of businesses
and greater mobility of the public. Examples include the
directive policy statements by governors like McMaster
(R-SC), Kemp (R-GA), Abbot (R-TX), Polis (D-CO), Inslee
(D-WA), and Brown (D-OR) that permit local governments
to enact tougher or more relaxed guidelines (Brown, 2020;
Collier & Pollack, 2020; Georgia Department of Public
Health, 2020; K. Wilson, 2020b).
However, it is important to realize that there could be
some veiled downsides to this trend. One is that states may
be hoping to avoid potential political fallout in responding to
damned if you do and damned if you dont kinds of issues.
Stated differently, states may be willing to pass the buck
and thereby let their local governments incur the wrath of
citizens if local efforts turn out to be unsuccessful. A second
possibility is that states, knowing that their own revenues are
destined to decline appreciably during the pandemic, may be
willing to grant greater decision-making authority local gov-
ernments given the likelihood of not having enough state
revenue to share with their local governments. If this is the
case, local officials will face the prospect of having to raise
additional own-source revenue to fund staple services, thus
creating a shift-and-shaft or fend-for-yourself brand of
federalism (Harkness, 2014; Shannon, 1987).
One other concern about statelocal relations is the occa-
sional lack of clear direction or the sending of mixed or con-
fusing messages by a few governors to local officials. This is
similar to what has been apparent in federalstate relations,
with President Trump waffling (or engaging in double-talk)
on critical matters and thereby leaving a cloud of uncertainty
for state leaders (more on this point in the next part of this
article). A case in point is the series of actions of Florida
Governor DeSantis. Within hours of issuing a statewide stay-
at-home order on April 1, he quietly signed another order that
seemed to override restrictions that had been put in place by
local governments to slow the spread of COVID-19
(Contorno, 2020). Then, on the next day, the governor issued
a statement saying that the latter order did the reverse, thus
instigating another round of confusion. Local government
officials reactions to DeSantiss conflicting orders ranged
from I cant understand for the life of me why he did that
(Hillsborough County Commissioner Chair and the countys
Emergency Policy Group chair) to DeSantis [is] playing
politics with the executive order to say he didnt shutter busi-
nesses (Pinellas County commissioner) to I mean, it makes
no sense (mayor of Tampa).
In any event, the current challenges posed by COVID-19
is likely to give rise to renewed incentives among home rule
advocates and good governments activists to lobby state
leaders to grant counties and municipalities (and even town-
ships) greater latitude in matters like form of government,
formal powers, and fiscal authority so that they will be able
to better satisfy the expectations of their diverse populations
(Benton, 2012).
Negative Takeaways
Federalstate relations: The growing disconnect. Perhaps, the
most conspicuous and troublesome feature of American fed-
eralism presently is federalstate relations. Relations
between the major players in this arena are probably at the
worst they have ever been, as the country (and world)
endeavors to adjust to the fallout from COVID-19 and
makes plans for bringing the country back to some sem-
blance of normality. One only needs to pay minimal atten-
tion to the daily news pertinent to the COVID-19 pandemic
to sense the heightened tensions and schisms that exist
between national leaders and officials at the state level. But
this is not anything new, as this growing disconnect can be
traced back to the last decade or so of the 20th century. As
some have mused, it is as though Nero (federal government)
continues to play his violin while Rome (states and their
local governments) burns. Recently, a noted scholar and
practitioner (see Glendening, 2020) sums up federalstate
Benton 5
relations in this way: . . . in many, many instances the fed-
eral partner that had been key to solving prior crises is now
Missing in Action.
Relations between state and national actors that have been
marred by intense bitterness and rancor going back to the
Clinton administration have only gotten worse since Donald
Trump became President and certainly have been magnified
during the COVID pandemic. Partisan polarization has ren-
dered the national government unwilling or unable to address
a range of pressing issues, leaving states (and sometimes
their local governments) to try to resolve them on their own.
Examples abound of policy areas (e.g., immigration, sustain-
ability, climate change, education, abortion, health care,
Interstate sales taxation, etc.) where the national government
has failed to craft realistic solutions, been too slow in acting,
or sent mixed signals. As discussed above, failed federal
leadership and subsequent gridlock (on a positive side) have
created opportunities for state leadership and collaboration
(Bowling & Pirkerill, 2013; Rose & Bowling, 2015).
As the nation battled to respond to COVID-19 in early
April 2020, President Trump tweeted that the role of the
national government was to serve as a backup to state and
local governments. This drew heavy criticism from gover-
nors across the country, even including some Republican
governors like Asa Hutchinson of Arkansas. States, locali-
ties, and the national government struggled to coordinate
with one another and frequently found themselves locked in
conflict. The situation has only gotten worse, as meaningful
leadership and direction has been sorely lacking from the
President and, to a lesser extent, by a politically polarized
Congress. But Trump has been begrudging when it comes to
providing assistance to states whether it be in the form of
money, medical supplies and equipment, personnel from fed-
eral agencies and the military, vital information, and so on.
The current posture of Trump is in stark contrast to the lead-
ership and direction that Americans have come to expect
from their president since Franklin Roosevelt. In short,
Trump appears to have no discernible, clear-cut plan for the
nation but rather responds to changing events as though he is
shooting from the hip with no clear target.
To make matters worse, the White Houses ability to make
sound judgments and provide critical policy leadership (but
especially now with COVID-19 pandemic) has been signifi-
cantly undermined as a result of going against a long tradi-
tion of presidents and their senior political appointees
deferring to policy experts in the federal bureaucracy. The
most recent egregious case was when the Trump administra-
tion purposely ignored or suppressed politically neutral and
unbiased scientific data and information about the coronavi-
rus.2 It would appear as though the President and many
Republicans in Congress are less interested in leading from a
position of being armed with reliable data and objective
assessments of policy options and are more likely to exhibit
a posture of indifference or befuddlement or desire to engage
in political grandstanding, posturing for the November gen-
eral election, or making derisive statements about opposing
points of view (Mallon, 2020). In sum, one could portray the
current relations between national and state officials in terms
as being a case of estranged bedfellows.
Summary and Conclusion
Providing a comprehensive grade for the functioning of
American federalism at any point in time including the coun-
trys current preoccupation with the challenges posed by
COVID-19 is no simple undertaking and beyond the scope of
this article. Moreover, grading the functioning of American
federalism should always be tempered by the following
observation of scholar and practitioner Woodrow Wilson
(1887): It is getting to be harder to run a constitution than to
frame one (p. 200). With this caveat in mind, the tentative
analysis presented here does give us some valuable initial
insight into the extent to which the IGR implicit in our fed-
eral form of government have worked to provide a satisfac-
tory response to the current pandemic from both an
administrative and a political perspective. In so doing, this
assessment also takes into account the important political
and administrative sides of American federalism as articu-
lated by W. Wilson (1887):
Our duty is to apply the best possible life to a federal
organization, to systems within system; to make town, city,
county, state, and federal governments live with a like strength
and an equally assured healthfulness, keeping each
unquestionably its own master and yet making all interdependent
with mutual helpfulness. The task is great and important enough
to attract the best minds. (p. 221)
As this article goes to press, several IGR trends have
become obvious. First, there has been a conspicuous increase
in joint productive and encouraging endeavors among states
and among local governments (interstate and interlocal rela-
tions) as these governments work together for positive results
in dealing with common challenges caused by COVID-19.
Although the formation of formal and informal alliances
between states and between local governments is not some-
thing new (we saw this during the Great Recession), such an
activity has surged to higher levels lately. Another emerging
pattern has been in the area of statelocal relations. Here, it
can be seen that a larger number of states have been willing
to grant greater flexibility to their local governments in
implementing emergency orders and policies in recognition
of the argument that one size doesnt fit all. A third trend
has been the deteriorating relations between the national
government and the states that has been punctuated with high
levels of tension and discord, thus leaving states in many
instances to have to go it alone due to the lack of direction,
attention, and leadership from Washington. Although the
6 American Review of Public Administration 00(0)
pattern became increasingly evident in the 1990s, it has
become much more pronounced during the Trump presi-
dency. Although not discussed above, federallocal relations
continue to occur in basically the same fashion as they have
over the years with administrators at these levels of govern-
ment engaging in the usual give-and-take over the imple-
mentation of federal programs. However, to some degree, the
interactions between these IGR actors are mediated through
state officials.
In summation, a mixed picture emerges from an early
assessment of the adequacy of the American federalism amid
the challenges posed by COVID-19. On one hand, there are
some positive trends in some arenas of IGR (interstate and
interlocal relations) that bode well for the health of American
federalism and its ability to prove itself sufficient during cri-
ses such as the present. On the other hand, relations in other
arenas of IGR (federalstate relations) continue to be marred
by divisiveness and fractionalized actions and would seem to
be the antithesis of what is needed to achieve the kind of
coordination and efficiency to meet the challenges of the day
and successfully accomplish things for the collective good.
In addition, there are some encouraging signs in statelocal
relations that help insure the health of federalism. In the final
analysis, it is hoped that these takeaways will be beneficial to
scholars who focus on theory-building and practitioners who
daily must strive to harness the potential in the American
federal approach to work for the general welfare.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.
Notes
1. A similar perspective on the functioning of American federal-
ism is provided by Peterson et al. (1986), albeit from the oppo-
site angle.
2. See the most recent article (McDonald et al., 2020) that speaks
to the need for cultivating a culture that recognizes the impor-
tance of minimally respecting and giving credence to nonpar-
tisan public service leaders and administrators.
References
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public sector. Georgetown University Press.
Altschuler, G. (2020, April 5). The
