Country Presentation to the Board of Directors
Based on readings in Rising Powers, Global Governance, and Global Ethics and related discussions, choose 1 of the countries or regions from the book into which your company might wish to expand.
Develop a 1-to 2-page table using either Microsoft Word, PowerPoint, or Excel that accurately compares your U.S.-based companys ethics, based on classical ethical theory as well as its ethical stance on privacy, protection of intellectual property, and protection of PII to those within your country of choice. The column headings are U.S.-based Company and Country of Choice. The row headings are Classical Ethical Theory, Privacy, Protection of Intellectual Property, and Protection of PII.
Create a PowerPoint presentation containing 8 to 10 slides for your corporate Board of Directors logically depicting at least 3 ethical challenges you might anticipate along with a policy statement for each. Include research concerning the countrys stance on issues, such as privacy, protection of intellectual property, corruption index, major religions, or indigenous tribal groups in the speaker notes.
Include supportive graphics and appropriate backgrounds and styles. All references need to adhere to APA guidelines, and images should not be copied unless you obtain author permission or use copyright-free images.
Cite all references and format APA.
CYB/320: Global Cyber Ethics
Wk 4 – Apply: Country Presentation to the Board of Directors [due Day 7]
Top of Form
Bottom of Form
Assignment Content
Top of Form
Based on readings in Rising Powers, Global Governance, and Global Ethics and related discussions, choose 1 of the countries or regions from the book into which your company might wish to expand.
Develop a 1-to 2-page table using either Microsoft Word, PowerPoint, or Excel that accurately compares your U.S.-based companys ethics, based on classical ethical theory as well as its ethical stance on privacy, protection of intellectual property, and protection of PII to those within your country of choice. The column headings are U.S.-based Company and Country of Choice. The row headings are Classical Ethical Theory, Privacy, Protection of Intellectual Property, and Protection of PII.
Create a PowerPoint presentation containing 8 to 10 slides for your corporate Board of Directors logically depicting at least 3 ethical challenges you might anticipate along with a policy statement for each. Include research concerning the countrys stance on issues, such as privacy, protection of intellectual property, corruption index, major religions, or indigenous tribal groups in the speaker notes.
Include supportive graphics and appropriate backgrounds and styles. All references need to adhere to APA guidelines, and images should not be copied unless you obtain author permission or use copyright-free images.
Cite all references and format APA.
10.4324_978131573
8901-7 – Rising powers and regional organization in the Middle East.pdf
7 Rising powers and regional
organization in the Middle East
Louise Fawcett
Which powers might rise to regional leadership?
What is the state of regional organization?
Conclusion
The potential ordering properties of regional or global hegemons, of
which rising powers may be considered a category, are widely
acknowledged. So is their role in international organization. Not all
regional organizations have been driven by hegemons and not all
regional powers seek to enhance their power in this way; but in many
cases they have played a role in their start-up, consolidation, or devel-
opment. Regional organizations provide aspiring powers a platform to
demonstrate muscle and provide a gateway to global power and influence,
both normative and material.
Although the roles of regional powers have been gathering more
attentiona reflection of their enhanced status in a post-bipolar inter-
national systemthe relationship between rising powers, a relatively
new category of analysis, and regional organizations is under-researched.1
This is particularly true for the Middle East given the widely perceived
absence of influential powers and the weaknesses of regional organiza-
tions.2 The region has been loosely referred to as a site of rising powers or
leaders like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Turkey. Indeed, the CIVETS
include Egypt and Turkey, and MIST includes Turkey. However, in gen-
eral, the rising power phenomenon is mostly identified outside the region,
resting with countries like Brazil, China, India, or South Africa. Recent
evidence from the region in the light of economic developments and the
Arab Spring uprisings suggests some alternative scenarios that deserve
exploration, particularly given the instability of the region and the high
demand for leadership.
This chapter aims to explore the relationships between regional
powers, regional organizations, and order in the Middle East. First, it
discusses the rising phenomenon as it relates to the region; then it
considers Middle East regional organizations and their capabilities and
how these have developed over time; third, it links the roles of regional
powers to the activities of regional organization, offering a critical
evaluation of their potential roles in regional and global governance
and norms.
The intention is to show that, despite some evidence to the contrary,
the hitherto limited capabilities of regional powers have impeded the
development of cooperation and the promotion of regional order in the
Middle East and, by extension, the ability of the region to contribute to
wider global order. The aspirations of such powers have been blocked
by regional rivalries, external intervention, and concerns about regime
survival, all of which trump leadership initiatives. Although regional
leadership may not be a sufficient condition for effective organization,
the two are closely correlated and the absence of leadership is detri-
mental to institutional and normative developments, and therefore
regional order.
Which powers might rise to regional leadership?
Historically there have been various contenders for regional leadership
in the Middle East and some have shared attributes with the rising
power category: states that can potentially influence and reshape the
global system and its norms.3 This observation thus qualifies the
notion that the concept of regional power is not useful for analyzing
the Middle East.4 As discussed below, there have been important
episodes where regional powers have sought to influence regional, even
global outcomes. From another perspective the very absence of regio-
nal powers is, in itself, important. It is true, however, that in terms of
durable leadership credentials, the contemporary region, despite its
relative economic weight, looks weak.
Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria (perhaps also
Israel) are all states that have aspired to regional leadership, although
their ambitions, and even their idea of what constitutes their region,
have diverged. Indeed, different conceptions of region may be part of
the problem. At least three of these statesTurkey, Iran, and Saudi
Arabiamay today be considered as aspiring regional powers. Yet it
also remains true that, in contrast to other regions, the Middle East
has demonstrated an absence of consistent leadership patterns. The
interest of states in leadership tends to be rhetorical and self-serving
rather than reflective of any deep commitment to cooperation. Institu-
tional design and policy reflect this. Under the present conditions of
134 Louise Fawcett
external interference, internal rivalry, and regime insecurity, which all
inhibit autonomy of action, this pattern is likely to continue.
Egypt, for its size, location and history, has often been regarded as
the natural leader of the Arab world, and at times displayed the char-
acteristics of a hegemon, particularly during the charismatic presidency
of Nasser (and briefly following the Arab uprisings when President
Morsi sought to promote Egypt as a new regional fulcrum). Egypt
under President Nasser (19561970), given its leading roles in regional
politics and in the global Non-Aligned Movement, was an exemplary
case of a potential rising power with the possibility to influence both
regional and global norms.5 Yet, for all its ideological attraction, under
the banner of anti-colonialism and Arab nationalism (as revealed in
the Suez crisis and the formation of the United Arab Republic), its
economic, military, and even cultural power was not robust enough,
particularly when faced with the determined opposition of external,
and some regional actors. Above all, the competitive international
environment of the Cold War proved detrimental to the projection of
rising power of the form sought by Egypt. Under President Sadat, the
country moved away from reformism and closer to the prevailing
norms of Western international society: embarking on economic liber-
alization and engaging with the ArabIsrael peace process brokered by
the United States in the late 1970s. This policy, however, resulted in a
loss of legitimacy in the wider Arab world.6
As Egypts position declined, speeded by the signature of a bilateral
treaty with Israel and comparative economic weakness, particularly in
the light of the challenge from the new rentier states, states like Iraq
and Syria made bids for regional dominance, using military and
nationalist tools to some effect in regional conflicts and debates. Tell-
ingly, despite their common Baathist ideology, both sought indepen-
dently to establish regional leadership credentials: Iraq in the context
of the IranIraq War, in which it wooed the West, but also much of the
Arab world, by demonstrating its anti-Iranian stance. In the Gulf War
of 1991 Iraq reversed course, attempting to lead an anti-Western alliance
by appealing to Arab support through its rhetoric of anti-imperialism.
In the absence of Egyptian leadership, Syria too flexed its regional
muscle, supporting radical and anti-Western policies, demonstrated in
relations with Iran, dominance in Lebanon, and in its opposition to
Israel.7 Regime change in Iraq in 2003 and closer relations with Iran,
resulting in the so-called Shii axis, also placed Syria in a stronger
regional position, at least until the start of the Syrian uprising. Neither
state, however, enjoyed widespread regional legitimacy, nor did their
power base significantly expand extra-regionally. Apart from
Rising powers in the Middle East 135
promoting the Nasserite idea of support for a broad Arab coalition
against the West, against Israel, or in the case of Iraq, against Iran
and with considerably less success than Nasser, few other leadership
qualities or regional public goods were offered such as to make either
state qualify for rising power statusan argument that may be extended
to their roles in regional institutions as discussed below. It was not just that
their foreign policies (despite some appeal to a rejectionist and radical
constituency vis–vis the West and Israel) failed to attract a wide public;
their domestic arrangements did not command legitimacy and were
unattractive as models for the region and wider world.
Among the wealthy Arab Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia is another
state with evident leadership credentials. Its independent history, rela-
tive longevity, wealth and size support this claim. Its power base
resting on a union of the Al Saud tribe and the Wahhabi religious
movementis stable, supported by claims to religious legitimacy,
extensive patronage networks, and the economic advantages conferred
by significant oil reserves. Yet, despite its regional outreach through the
provision of development aid and assistance, management of the hajj,
initiatives within the wider pan-Islamic, Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) framework, or the sub-regional Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) context, the Saudis have been historically cautious and
modest in their leadership aspirations, above all avoiding foreign policy
postures that might lose them friends at home and abroad.8 This was
evident in their positioning on the oil embargo of the early 1970s,
which, despite its immediate impact and challenge to prevailing inter-
national norms, proved ephemeral. Saudi Arabia defected from the
embargoas did other core statesfollowing pressure from Western
consumers. Despite the accolades that the Arab Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) group received from the wider
developing worldit was inspirational in the actions of the G77the
Saudis themselves suffered reputational damage, while the opportunity
further to lead the Arab oil producers, and thereby produce significant
changes to regional, even global order, was not taken. Saudi leaders
then, as now, must tread delicately within the region, given their role as
guardian of Islams most holy sites, and outside, where their power
base, indeed the very survival of the monarchy has been, and remains,
linked historically to the United States, without whose longstanding
support the kingdom would arguably have been unstable.
It is true that after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring
we have seen the rise of a more regionally assertive Saudi Arabia,9 as
further discussed below. However, its leadership capabilities are con-
tested and arguably under-utilized. Like other Gulf monarchies,
136 Louise Fawcett
survival and avoidance of sectarian fall out has been a primary
response to the Arab uprisings.10 Qualified support for international
intervention in Libya and Syria should be seen in this light rather than
as the sign of a new normative turn towards R2P, as the counter-
example of support for GCC intervention to quash uprisings in Bah-
rain showed. Declining a non-permanent seat on the UN Security
Council (in October 2013) as a sign of frustration at UN and Western
policy did not generate a wave of regional solidarity and Jordan
quickly took Saudi Arabias place. Furthermore, even its predominance
in the Arab Gulf sub-region is contested, as shown by differing stances
taken by a state like Qatara small but highly significant power in its
own rightin regard to positioning towards Iran or Egypt.11
Iran itself presents a different profile as aspiring regional leader. Iran
has long been a powerful regional state, whether under the last Shah,
Mohammed Reza Pahlaviwhen relations with the United States were
particularly close12or the Islamic Republic. Its region, however, lies
on a different axis to much of the Arab world, embracing parts of
Central and South Asia, and, through Shiism, it reaches a distinctive
Islamic constituency. It is partly this reason, and Irans unique racial
and cultural make up, that makes it neither an obvious, nor widely
accepted regional leader. Despite the strengthening of Irans position
since the early years of the revolution and conclusion of the IranIraq
Warreflected in its influence among more radical Islamic groups, its
ongoing nuclear program, or in the growth of Shii influence since
2003Iran does not command a significant regional following. It has
soft power resources, manifested in Irans Islamic and Third World
links (with Venezuela for example).13 It also provides public goods,
including assistance to victims of natural disasters and wars, as well as
educational and cultural activities in the region. Iran has also sup-
ported groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Such influence attempts may
worry Israel, the Gulf States, and their Western allies, but they have
arguably not made Iran a leader state. The more moderate Khatami
presidency with its dialogue of civilizations approach could be seen as
a partial exception (as could the current presidency of Rouhani), but
rising power would not seem to be the right category to employ here, not
least since Khatami was replaced by the conservative Ahmadinejad.
Despite attempts at regional outreach, Irans domestic structure and
politics, and frequently bellicose international posture, have not always
been easy to reconcile with a wider regional, to say nothing of a global
constituency.
The Turkish case has recently received more attention, as indicated
by its presence in the two rising power groups above. For a long time it
Rising powers in the Middle East 137
was seen as a relative regional outlier with a more pro-European than
Middle Eastern orientation. Its distinctive modern history, including
being a founder member of the Baghdad Pact and membership of
NATO, discredited it in the eyes of many Arabs. Yet, Turkey emerged
from the regional shadows in the 1980s, as an impressive economic
power and potential mediator in regional conflicts. It sought new for-
eign policy alignments, reaching out to Middle Eastern regimes and
publics as peace-broker, and later advocate of democratization and
moderate Islamism after the victory of the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) in 2002. It has been spoken of as a bridge, or anchor
state.14 As such, it has sought more important roles in regional and
international organizations, not only through existing links to the
North Atlantic and Western Europe, but also in Central Asia, the
Middle East, and Islamic world, as shown by its closer involvement
with the OIC.
An opportunity to test its regional stature was provided by the Arab
uprisings, where Turkey sought to portray itself as an exemplary
regional state and model of good governance.15 Showing leadership on
the Tunisian and Egyptian question was relatively easy because less
was invested. Despite vacillation over the Libyan intervention and
removal of Gadhafi, Turkey was for a time viewed rather positively in
the region as the state that had best handled the Arab Spring.16
Things became harder after the Syrian crisis when Turkeys initial hes-
itation over how to retreat from its previous friendship with President
Assad suggested vulnerability and the limits of its normative power.17
Although it had aspirations to become an honest broker, and a power
that the West hoped might balance out the dangers of regional extre-
mism, it has not secured a deep regional following. It too remains
domestically vulnerable (as Istanbul uprisings of 2013 and subsequent
public protest over the curtailment of freedom of expression showed). By
late 2013, some claimed that Turkeys idealistic foreign policy had failed
and Turkey had lost its chance to lead.18 This may be overstated, but
there are good reasons to agree that, beyond its evident economic
weight, Turkey will remain an aspiring hegemon.
An exception and outlier to the above is Israel. In some senses, Israel
is an obvious regional great power in military and economic terms;19
yet it is one that has not aspired to leadership. Israel is regionally iso-
lated, and aligns with the United States and Europe. Israel possesses
the military capacity to influence outcomes and has frequently exer-
cised it. Its domestic arrangements, although seen as discriminatory to
Arabs, are more immediately attractive than those of many regional
states. It has twice been involved in greater regional engagement:
138 Louise Fawcett
following the Camp David accords of 1979 and the Oslo process of the
early 1990s, but in both cases the opportunity for regional leadership
was not taken.20 Israel is not a regional hegemon in the sense of pro-
viding leadership, public goods, or regional institutions. With its very
existence still contested by regional radicals and its territory contested
by UN resolutions, Israels support base is internal and extra-regional,
linked to the very external influences that other regional powers chal-
lenge. As a fierce and often hostile regional state, it can also act as
veto-player to block other aspirants to leadership.
As noted, changes to the regional balance of power since the Arab
Spring have elevated the prospects of some states while temporarily
eliminating others. These changes are ongoing and their effects hard to
measure. Clearly, the Arab Gulf monarchies, headed by Saudi Arabia
and Qatar (not always in unison), with their control of important
media outlets and evident economic weight, have assumed greater
importance, leading new regional initiatives to contain unrest and pre-
serve regional order. Turkey and Iran also display leadership creden-
tials in attempts to reposition themselves to their own advantage amid
the prevailing regional instability. But these are not coherent or durable
leadership initiatives. None of these states are immune to internal, or
indeed international, pressuresconsider Irans earlier Green Revolu-
tion and Turkeys subsequent unrest. Leadership claims are thus
reflective of the regional balance of power and attempts to manage this
in favor of individual states. There is no obvious regional leader, and
multiple and contradictory leadership claims prevent regional consensus
on core issues.
Considering the above changes, it is noteworthy how an external
power, the United States, as Jeffry Legro persuasively argues, has pro-
vided many of the elements of leadership that have been lacking
among regional powers. Notwithstanding a relative decline in United
States influence and the increased significance of China and Russia in
the region, this is surely the exemplary case where we cannot begin to
discuss leadership and regional order without reference to the role of
the United States.21 Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, consider how
every major peace initiative in the ArabIsraeli conflict has been in
large part initiated by the United States. The United States has simi-
larly been involved at some level in every Gulf War. No other region,
even Latin America, in the very shadow of the United States, has been
so constrained in its leadership options.
In short, for the different reasons described above, none of the major
regional states have succeeded in rising to durable leadership status or
translating their power to effective collective action. If power in
Rising powers in the Middle East 139
International Relations is demonstrated in the ability to influence out-
comes, or to persuade others to change their behavior, it is clear that
most Middle Eastern states have failed to acquire it.22 This regional
pattern may be extended to the wider global arena. Middle East states
have a long history of interaction with, and at times hostility towards
the West but have not hitherto seriously challenged the institutions of
international society.23 This is not to say that individual states (or
indeed non-state actors) do not have global influence in certain issue
areas; but this remains aspirational or transient, and does not confer
rising power status. The reasons, as elaborated here, include high and
continuing levels of external interference, longstanding inter-regional
tensions and rivalries, compounded by challenges to the very legitimacy
of states. Above all, the contrary and persistent effect of external pene-
tration cannot be ignored. Outside powers have repeatedly attempted to
impose their order and leadership agendas on the Middle East. France
and Britain did so before, and even after the Second World War; the
United States and USSR during the Cold War; and the United States, and
to a lesser extent both Russia and China, since. Although these efforts have
not, so far, resulted in regional stability, they have nonetheless
obstructed aspiring leaders.
Despite the lack of a dominant regional power, the Middle East has
seen attempts at hegemony: the case of Nassers Egypt, OPECs brief
successes, and the recent actions of the Gulf states are all relevant here
and illustrate the possible opportunities for rising powers. However,
their relative weakness and lack of global reach does constitute a useful
explanatory variable and link to current regional (dis)order. It also
contributes to explaining the regions failure to develop more effective
institutions, another potential source of order and global impact,
which is the subject of the next section.
What is the state of regional organization?
In this section I consider different regional organizations and their roles.
Which are the relevant institutions in the Middle East framework and
what is their sphere of activity? How do these institutions interact with
assumptions about order, power, and questions of regional leadership?
Like other regions of the world, the Middle East since 1945 has seen the
growth and functional expansion of regional institutions.24 Although
the region has not been short of regional initiatives, its record is com-
paratively weak by most measures. Regional states, individually or
collectively, have demonstrated little sustained interest in the design and
maintenance of efficient institutions.25 Is institutional failure then a way of
140 Louise Fawcett
understanding the current disorder in the Middle East, and if so to
which causes might such failure be ascribed?26 I focus on the main regional
organization, the League of Arab States (LAS), but also consider other
sub-regional and cross-regional organizations like the GCC and OIC.27
Regionalism in the Middle East, as in other parts of the world, may
be crudely but usefully divided into two waves, covering the Cold
War and post-Cold War periods. In the former period, both pan-Arab
and more modest projects aimed at union and federation were tried
alongside attempts at economic integration on the European model. In
the latter, there were further efforts at economic and political and
security cooperation. In this respect, the Middle East differs from other
regions, not in terms of institutional start up and numbers, but in terms
of the failure of institutions to evolve. Indeed, it might be argued that
Middle East regionalism reached a plateau from which it has failed to
advance and improve institutional capacity.28 Conflict has played a role
here, as has regime type and the nature of the regional economy.
Notable has been the proliferation of initiatives by external actors,
mainly Europe and the United States, to promote regional cooperation
in different contexts, even to redefine the region itself, as the Greater
Middle East and Mediterranean concepts suggest.
Any consideration of Middle East regionalism must start with the
pan-Arab question and the LAS.29 The LAS was one of the first
formal regional organizations outside the Americas and one that
played a role in discussions about the relationship between the United
Nations and regional bodies. As such it was a highly statist organization,
and this suited the agendas of many members. One could argue that
the League has mostly sought to complement rather than overturn the
prevailing norms of international society. Yet, it also embodied a more
revisionist, pan-Arab idea in which Arabs rejected aspects of the colo-
nial settlement and aspired to greater unity among the Arab territories
of the former Ottoman Empire. The discourse of pan-Arabism has
remained popular, as witnessed in regional wars and the Arab Spring.
However, the tension between state centrism and the rhetoric of unity
remained a complicating factor in the development of the institution. As
Barnett comments: if the institution of sovereignty instructed the newly
independent Arab states to recognize each others borders and authority
over its population, the institution of pan-Arabism sanctioned just the
opposite.30
The League enjoyed some successes in conflict mediation as envi-
saged by its Charter.31 Its annex on Palestine, following the creation of
Israel in 1948, was an important document, establishing a common
position of non-recognition. The Leagues first summit in 1964
Rising powers in the Middle East 141
welcomed the PLO. Subsequent summits showed a level of regional
solidarity on core issues. Still, it remained a weak institution when mea-
sured in terms of attempts to promote economic, political, or security
cooperation.32 For example, efforts to emulate the EC model to create
an Arab Common Market produced few lasting results, although this
attempt was later revived. Such early failure, however, was unremarkable
in a Third World context where state building took priority and the
necessary demandsupply conditions for integration did not exist.
Amid multiple regional disputes, not least the protracted ArabIsrael
conflict, the regions security record was also disappointing. The
League, which expanded from a core of six to include all 22 Arab
countries, was a large and diverse institution, despite linguistic,
geographic, and religious ties, making it hard to establish common
policy frameworks. It excludes the three non-Arab powers of the region,
Iran, Turkey, and Israel, all of whom carry veto-player capabilities.
Outside the League, other attempts at inter-state cooperation and
federation were responses to the colonial legacy and the Cold War. The
Baghdad Pact, later the Central Eastern Treaty Organization
(CENTO), was an undisguised instrument of colonial influence and
United States containment. Including the pro-Western states of Turkey
and Iran, it earned the odium of most Arab states. In response there
were coalitions of Arab states like the United Arab Republic (195861)
and the Federation of Arab Republics (197173). Such unions, or the
different military alliances constructed for the purpose of fighting
regional wars, were, however, short-lived and did not survive in any
institutionalized form.
Some new dynamics came into play with the creation, in 1969, of the
OIC, reflecting an attempt to craft an Islamic version of the Arab
League, embodying another pan- (and in this case cross-)regional idea,
again with a strictly statist orientation. In addition, the formation of
the United Arab Emirates (1971) as a federation of the small Gulf
emirates and the GCC (1981), a response not to the Cold War, but to
Gulf insecurity after Britains departure and the Iranian revolution of
1979, heralded more lasting forms of regional governance. In turn, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, demonstrating its regional muscle, was
instrumental in the founding and later expansion of the Economic
Conference Organization (1985), placing its own economic and security
interests on a different axis following failed attempts to win sympathy
from, and spread revolution to, the wider Arab world.
With the exception of the GCC, none of the above formulas enjoyed
significant success from either an ideological or material perspective.
Wars, regime insecurity, external interference, and the complicating
142 Louise Fawcett
factor of oil rents, introduced new regional divides among regional haves
and have-nots, blocking further moves at integration. Peacemaking
efforts also proved highly controversial as the Arab League rejected the
Camp David accords and banished Egypt, yet subsequently proved
unable to broker any alternative ArabIsrael settlement. In some
respects, again, this lack of progress was unremarkable from a compara-
tive perspective. Outside Europe, regionalism had not taken off, giving
rise to questions about the usefulness of that model when applied to
newer and weaker states.33 Only with the end of the Cold War did this
picture change as the multiple studies of new regionalism attest.34
However, the setting free of regions and the accompanying institutional
and normative changes identified by scholars,35 did not occur in the
Middle East. The regions tensions and rivalries were not of the Cold
War type; superpower overlay was not removed, regional states did not
enjoy greater autonomy, nor did the incentive for regime changean
important push factor for regionalist effortssignificantly materialize.
In this regard, the persistence of external intervention (as in the wars of
1991 and 2003), the absence of regional leadership, and weakness of
regional organization went hand in hand.
There were some trickle-down effects of the new regionalism. The
1980s saw the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union and the Arab
Cooperation Council, although the latter soon collapsed with Iraqs
invasion of Kuwait. Yemeni unification and the Middle East Peace
Process were also products of the Cold Wars ending. However the first
post-Cold War decade ended without significant institutional progress.
More remarkable perhaps was the high level of external involvement in
efforts to remake Middle East politics, economics, and society. Even
the very boundaries of the Middle East were the subject of continuing
Western attempts at refashioning as suggested by concepts like the
Euro-Mediterranean, or the Greater Middle East, both of which crossed
over existing regional divides.36
Until the Arab Spring, the contemporary regional scene was extra-
ordinary in demonstrating the relative abs
