Business Economics Case Study 1: Auctions and Dynamic Pricing The following video describes auctions as price discovery mechanisms: The Ideal Auction -

Business Economics
Case Study 1: Auctions and Dynamic Pricing
The following video describes auctions as price discovery mechanisms:
The Ideal Auction.(YOUTUBE)
Use the video on auctions and at least three academic or high-quality business publications (see acceptable types below) to answer the following questions in 57 pages. Other articles and resources can be found at the Strayer Library.

There are many types of auctions, each with strengths and weakness at uncovering the real price or value of an item. Compare and contrast how each of the following uncovers value:
English and Dutch auctions.
Sealed-bid first-price auctions and Vickery auctions.
Compare and contrast surge pricing and congestion pricing. Give an example of each currently in use.
Auctions are widely used in finance, e-commerce, and in e-games. Identify three examples of auctions used in finance, e-commerce, and/or e-games. Explain the following in-depth:
The need for an auction to uncover value in the product or service.
How the type of auction used to uncover the value of the product or service is better at uncovering value than other types of auctions.
Auctions are also widely used to generate revenue for not-for-profit organizations. What are the advantages or disadvantages of auctions as revenue generators for not-for-profit organizations?
Suggest ways in which a for-profit company, such as the company for which you work or a company for which you aspire to work, can use auctions or dynamic pricing to better uncover value and increase revenue.
Formatting Requirements
This course requires the use of Strayer Writing Standards. For assistance and information, please refer to the Strayer Writing Standards link in the left-hand menu of your course. Check with your professor for any additional instructions.

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Business Economics Case Study 1: Auctions and Dynamic Pricing The following video describes auctions as price discovery mechanisms: The Ideal Auction

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Acceptable Types of Publications
A high-quality, professional business publication is one that is primarily directed at reporting or analyzing the workings of business. Examples are the Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, and Reuters. Avoid general news publications such as USA Today, the Washington Post, and the New York Times.

Please do not rely on Wikipedia, Investopedia, or similar websites as references at any time in this course.Case Study 1: Auctions and Dynamic Pricing
The following video describes auctions as price discovery mechanisms:

The Ideal Auction.
Use the video on auctions and at least three academic or high-quality business publications (see acceptable types below) to answer the following questions in 57 pages. Other articles and resources can be found at the Strayer Library.

Please do not rely on Wikipedia, Investopedia, or similar websites as references at any time in this course.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

20 June 1997

FOREWORD

Since Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, was first
published in 1989, it has had a significant impact both inside
and outside the Marine Corps. That manual has changed the
way Marines think about warfare. It has caused energetic de-
bate and has been translated into several foreign languages,
issued by foreign militaries, and published commercially. It
has strongly influenced the development of doctrine by our
sister Services. Our current naval doctrine is based on the ten-
ets of maneuver warfare as described in that publication.
Current and emerging concepts such as operational maneuver
from the sea derive their doctrinal foundation from the phi-
losophy contained in Warfighting. Our philosophy of war-
fighting, as described in the manual, is in consonance with
joint doctrine, contributing to our ability to operate harmoni-
ously with the other Services.

That said, I believe WarfIghting can and should be im-
proved. Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, espe-
cially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare. Doctrine
must continue to evolve based on growing experience, ad-
vancements in theory, and the changing face of war itself. It

is in this spirit that Warfighting has been revised, and this
publication, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, super-
sedes Fleet Marine Force Manual I. I have several goals for
this revision. One goal is to enhance the description of the na-
ture of warfor example, to emphasize war’s complexity and
unpredictability and to widen the definition of war to account
for modern conflict’s expanding forms. Another goal is to
clarify the descriptions of styles of warfare. A third goal is to
clarify and refine important maneuver warfare concepts such
as commander’s intent, main effort, and critical vulnerability.
It is my intent to do this while retaining the spirit, style, and
essential message of the original.

Very simply, this publication describes the philosophy
which distinguishes the U.S. Marine Corps. The thoughts
contained here are not merely guidance for action in combat
but a way of thinking. This publication provides the authorita-
tive basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight. This
book contains no specific techniques or procedures for con-
duct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of con-
cepts and values. It requires judgment in application.

Warfighting is not meant as a reference manual; it is de-
signed to be read from cover to cover. Its four chapters have a
natural progression. Chapter 1 describes our understanding of
the characteristics, problems, and demands of war. Chapter 2
derives a theory about war from that understanding. This the-
ory in turn provides the foundation for how we prepare for
war and how we wage war, chapters 3 and 4, respectively.

Experience has shown that the warfighting philosophy de-
scribed on these pages applies far beyond the officer corps. I
expect all Marinesenlisted and commissionedto read this
book, understand it, and act upon it. As General A. M. Gray
stated in his foreword to the original in 1989, this publication
describes a philosophy for action that, in war, in crisis, and in
peace, dictates our approach to duty.

DISTRIBUTION: 142 000006 00

1997 United States Government as represented by the Sec-
retary of the Navy. All rights reserved.

Throughout this publication, masculine nouns and pronouns
are used for the sake of simplicity. Except where otherwise
noted, these nouns and pronouns apply to either gender.

PREFACE

Eight years ago the Marine Corps published the first edi-
tion of Warfighting. Our intent was to describe my phi-
losophy on warfighting, establish it as Marine Corps
doctrine, and present it in an easy-to-read format. In the
foreword to that manual, I charged every officer to read
and reread the text, to understand it, and to take its mes-
sage to heart. We have succeeded. Warfighting has
stimulated discussion and debate from classrooms to
wardrooms, training areas to combat zones. The philoso-
phy contained in this publication has influenced our ap-
proach to every task we have undertaken.

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 stated, “War is both time-
less and ever changing. While the basic nature of war is
constant, the means and methods we use evolve continu-
ously.” Like war itself, our approach to warfighting must
evolve. If we cease to refine, expand, and improve our
profession, we risk becoming outdated, stagnant, and de-
feated. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 refines and

expands our philosophy on warfighting, taking into ac-
count new thinking about the nature of war and the un-
derstanding gained through participation in extensive
operations over the past decade. Read it, study it, take it
to heart.

Semper Fidelis,

General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
29th Commandant of the Marine Corps

MCDP 1

Warfighting

Chapter 1. The Nature of War
War DefinedFrictionUncertainty-Fluidity
DisorderComplexityThe Human Dimension
Violence and DangerPhysical, Moral, and Mental
ForcesThe Evolution of WarThe Science, Art, and
Dynamic of WarConclusion

Chapter 2. The Theory of War
War As an Act of PolicyMeans in WarThe
Spectrum of ConflictLevels of WarInitiative
and ResponseStyles of WarfareCombat Power
Speed and FocusSurprise and BoldnessCenters of
Gravity and Critical VulnerabilitiesCreating and
Exploiting OpportunityConclusion

Chapter 3. Preparing for War
Force PlanningOrganizationDoctrine
ProfessionalismTrainingProfessional Military
EducationPersonnel ManagementEquipping
Conclusion

Warfighting MCDP 1

Chapter 4. The Conduct of War
The ChallengeManeuver WarfareOrienting on the
EnemyPhilosophy of CommandShaping the Action
DecisionmakingMission TacticsCommander’s Intent
Main EffortSurfaces and GapsCombined Arms
Conclusion

Chapter 1

The Nature of War

“Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is dffi-
cult. The dq’/Iculties accumulate and end by producing a kind
of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced
war.

Carl von Clausewitz

“In war the chief incalculable is the human will. “2

B. H. Liddell Hart

“Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed,
but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his
own mind that the position cannot be held. ”

A. A. Vandegrift

MCDP 1 The Nature of War

T o understand the Marine Corps’ philosophy of warfight-ing, we first need an appreciation for the nature of war
itselfits moral, mental, and physical characteristics and de-
mands. A common view of war among Marines is a necessary
base for the development of a cohesive doctrine because our
approach to the conduct of war derives from our understand-
ing of the nature of war.

WAR DEFINED

War is a violent clash of interests between or among orga-
nized groups characterized by the use of military force. These
groups have traditionally been established nation-states, but
they may also include any nonstate groupsuch as an inter-
national coalition or a faction within or outside of an existing
statewith its own political interests and the ability to gener-
ate organized violence on a scale sufficient to have significant
political consequences.

The essence of war is a violent struggle between two hos-
tile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to
impose itself on the other. War is fundamentally an interac-
tive social process. Clausewitz called it a Zweikampf (literally
a “two-struggle”) and suggested the image of a pair of wres-
tlers locked in a hold, each exerting force and counterforce to
try to throw the other.4 War is thus a process of continuous

Warfighting MCDP 1

mutual adaptation, of give and take, move and countermove.
It is critical to keep in mind that the enemy is not an inani-
mate object to be acted upon but an independent and animate
force with its own objectives and plans. While we try to im-
pose our will on the enemy, he resists us and seeks to impose
his own will on us. Appreciating this dynamic interplay be-
tween opposing human wills is essential to understanding the
fundamental nature of war.

The object in war is to impose our will on our enemy. The
means to this end is the organized application or threat of vio-
lence by military force. The target of that violence may be
limited to hostile combatant forces, or it may extend to the
enemy population at large. War may range from intense
clashes between large military forcessometimes backed by
an official declaration of warto subtler, unconventional
hostilities that barely reach the threshold of violence.

Total war and perfect peace rarely exist in practice. In-
stead, they are extremes between which exist the relations
among most political groups. This range includes routine eco-
nomic competition, more or less permanent political or ideo-
logical tension, and occasional crises among groups. The
decision to resort to the use of military force of some kind
may arise at any point within these extremes, even during pe-
riods of relative peace. On one end of the spectrum, military
force may be used simply to maintain or restore order in civil
disturbances or disaster relief operations. At the other ex-
treme, force may be used to completely overturn the existing

MCDP 1 The Nature of War

order within a society or between two or more societies.
Some cultures consider it a moral imperative to go to war
only as a last resort when all peaceful means to settle disa-
greements have failed. Others have no such hesitancy to re-
sort to militaryforce to achieve their aims.

F1UcTI0N

Portrayed as a clash between two opposing wills, war appears
a simple enterprise. In practice, the conduct of war becomes
extremely difficult because of the countless factors that im-
pinge on it. These factors collectively have been called fric-
tion, which Clausewitz described as “the force that makes the
apparently easy so difficult.”5 Friction is the force that resists
all action and saps energy. It makes the simple difficult and
the difficult seemingly impossible.

The very essence of war as a clash between opposed wills
creates friction. In this dynamic environment of interacting
forces, friction abounds.

Friction may be mental, as in indecision over a course of
action. It may be physical, as in effective enemy fire or a ter-
rain obstacle that must be overcome. Friction may be exter-
nal, imposed by enemy action, the terrain, weather, or mere
chance. Friction may be self-induced, caused by such factors

Warfighting MCDP 1

as lack of a clearly defined goal, lack of coordination, unclear
or complicated plans, complex task organizations or com-
mand relationships, or complicated technologies. Whatever
form it takes, because war is a human enterprise, friction will
always have a psychological as well as a physical impact.

While we should attempt to minimize self-induced friction,
the greater requirement is to fight effectively despite the exis-
tence of friction. One essential means to overcome friction is
the will; we prevail over friction through persistent strength
of mind and spirit. While striving ourselves to overcome the
effects of friction, we must attempt at the same time to raise
our enemy’s friction to a level that weakens his ability to
fight.

We can readily identify countless examples of friction, but
until we have experienced it ourselves, we cannot hope to ap-
preciate it fully. Only through experience can we come to ap-
preciate the force of will necessary to overcome friction and
to develop a realistic appreciation for what is possible in war
and what is not. While training should attempt to approximate
the conditions of war, we must realize it can never fully du-
plicate the level of friction of real combat.

MCDP 1 The Nature of War

UNCERTAINTY

Another attribute of war is uncertainty. We might argue that
uncertainty is just one of many sources of friction, but be-
cause it is such a pervasive trait of war, we will treat it singly.
All actions in war take place in an atmosphere of uncertainty,
or the “fog of war.” Uncertainty pervades battle in the form of
unknowns about the enemy, about the environment, and even
about the friendly situation. While we try to reduce these un-
knowns by gathering information, we must realize that we
cannot eliminate themor even come close. The very nature
of war makes certainty impossible; all actions in war will be
based on incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory infor-
mation.

War is intrinsically unpredictable. At best, we can hope to
determine possibilities and probabilities. This implies a cer-
tain standard of military judgment: What is possible and what
is not? What is probable and what is not? By judging prob-
ability, we make an estimate of our enemy’s designs and act
accordingly. Having said this, we realize that it is precisely
those actions that seem improbable that often have the great-
est impact on the outcome of war.

Warfighting MCDP 1

Because we can never eliminate uncertainty, we must learn
to fight effectively despite it. We can do this by developing
simple, flexible plans; planning for likely contingencies; de-
veloping standing operating procedures; and fostering initia-
tive among subordinates.

One important source of uncertainty is a property known as
nonlinearity. Here the term does not refer to formations on
the battlefield but describes systems in which causes and ef-
fects are disproportionate. Minor incidents or actions can
have decisive effects. Outcomes of battles can hinge on the
actions of a few individuals, and as Clausewitz observed, “is-
sues can be decided by chances and incidents so minute as to
figure in histories simply as anecdotes.”6

By its nature, uncertainty invariably involves the estima-
tion and acceptance of risk. Risk is inherent in war and is in-
volved in every mission. Risk is equally common to action
and inaction. Risk may be related to gain; greater potential
gain often requires greater risk. The practice of concentrating
combat power toward the main effort necessitates the willing-
ness to accept prudent risk elsewhere. However, we should
clearly understand that the acceptance of risk does not equate
to the imprudent willingness to gamble the entire likelihood
of success on a single improbable event.

Part of uncertainty is the ungovernable element of chance.
Chance is a universal characteristic of war and a continuous

MCDP 1 The Nature of War

source of friction. Chance consists of turns of events that can-
not reasonably be foreseen and over which we and our enemy
have no control. The constant potential for chance to influ-
ence outcomes in war, combined with the inability to prevent
chance from impacting on plans and actions, creates psycho-
logical friction. However, we should remember that chance
favors neither belligerent exclusively. Consequently, we must
view chance not only as a threat but also as an opportunity
which we must be ever ready to exploit.

FLUIDITY

Like friction and uncertainty, fluidity is an inherent attribute
of war. Each episode in war is the temporary result of a
unique combination of circumstances, presenting a unique set
of problems and requiring an original solution. Nevertheless,
no episode can be viewed in isolation. Rather, each episode
merges with those that precede and follow itshaped by the
former and shaping the conditions of the lattercreating a
continuous, fluctuating flow of activity replete with fleeting
opportunities and unforeseen events. Since war is a fluid phe-
nomenon, its conduct requires flexibility of thought. Success
depends in large part on the ability to adaptto proactively
shape changing events to our advantage as well as to react
quickly to constantly changing conditions.

Warfighting MCDP 1

It is physically impossible to sustain a high tempo of activ-
ity indefinitely, although clearly there will be times when it is
advantageous to push men and equipment to the limit. The
tempo of war will fluctuate from periods of intense combat to
periods in which activity is limited to information gathering,
replenishment, or redeployment. Darkness and weather can
influence the tempo of war but need not halt it. A competitive
rhythm will develop between the opposing wills with each
belligerent trying to influence and exploit tempo and the con-
tinuous flow of events to suit his purposes.

Military forces will mass to concentrate combat power
against the enemy. However, this massing will also make
them vulnerable to the effects of enemy fires, and they will
find it necessary to disperse. Another competitive rhythm will
developdisperse, concentrate, disperse againas each bel-
ligerent tries to concentrate combat power temporarily while
limiting the vulnerability to enemy combat power.

DIsoluER

In an environment of friction, uncertainty, and fluidity, war
gravitates naturally toward disorder. Like the other attributes
of war, disorder is an inherent characteristic of war; we can
never eliminate it. In the heat of battle, plans will go awry,

MCDP 1 The Nature of War

instructions and information will be unclear and misinter-
preted, communications will fail, and mistakes and unfore-
seen events will be commonplace. It is precisely this natural
disorder which creates the conditions ripe for exploitation by
an opportunistic will.

Each encounter in war will usually tend to grow increas-
ingly disordered over time. As the situation changes continu-
ously, we are forced to improvise again and again until finally
our actions have little, if any, resemblance to the original
scheme.

By historical standards, the modern battlefield is particu-
larly disorderly. While past battlefields could be described by
linear formations and uninterrupted linear fronts, we cannot
think of today’s battlefield in linear terms. The range and le-
thality of modem weapons have increased dispersion between
units. In spite of communications technology, this dispersion
strains the limits of positive control. The natural result of dis-
persion is unoccupied areas, gaps, and exposed flanks which
can and will be exploited, blurring the distinction between
front and rear and friendly- and enemy-controlled areas.

The occurrences of war will not unfold like clockwork. We
cannot hope to impose precise, positive control over events.
The best we can hope for is to impose a general framework of
order on the disorder, to influence the general flow of action
rather than to try to control each event.

VT an snn ..na MCDP 1

If we are to win, we must be able to operate in a disorderly
environment. In fact, we must not only be able to fight effec-
tively in the face of disorder, we should seek to generate dis-
order and use it as a weapon against our opponent.

COMPLEXITY

War is a complex phenomenon. We have described war as es-
sentially a clash between opposed wills. In reality, each bel-
ligerent is not a single, homogeneous will guided by a single
intelligence. Instead, each belligerent is a complex system
consisting of numerous individual parts. A division comprises
regiments, a regiment comprises battalions, and so on all the
way down to fire teams which are composed of individual
Marines. Each element is part of a larger whole and must co-
operate with other elements for the accomplishment of the
common goal. At the same time, each has its own mission and
must adapt to its own situation. Each must deal with friction,
uncertainty, and disorder at its own level, and each may cre-
ate friction, uncertainty, and disorder for others, friendly as
well as enemy.

As a result, war is not governed by the actions or decisions
of a single individual in any one place but emerges from the
collective behavior of all the individual parts in the system
interacting locally in response to local conditions and

MCDP 1 The Nature of War

incomplete information. A military action is not the mono-
lithic execution of a single decision by a single entity but nec-
essarily involves near-countless independent but interrelated
decisions and actions being taken simultaneously throughout
the organization. Efforts to fully centralize military opera-
tions and to exert complete control by a single decisionmaker
are inconsistent with the intrinsically complex and distributed
nature of war.

Tm HUMAN DIMENSION

Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the
human dimension is central in war. It is the human dimension
which infuses war with its intangible moral factors. War is
shaped by human nature and is subject to the complexities,
inconsistencies, and peculiarities which characterize human
behavior. Since war is an act of violence based on irreconcil-
able disagreement, it will invariably inflame and be shaped by
human emotions.

War is an extreme trial of moral and physical strength and
stamina. Any view of the nature of war would hardly be accu-
rate or complete without consideration of the effects of dan-
ger, fear, exhaustion, and privation on those who must do the
fighting.7 However, these effects vary greatly from case to
case. Individuals and peoples react differently to the stress of

Warfighting MCDP 1

war; an act that may break the will of one enemy may only
serve to stiffen the resolve of another. Human will, instilled
through leadership, is the driving force of all action in war.

No degree of technological development or scientific cal-
culation will diminish the human dimension in war. Any
doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces,
weapons, and equipment neglects the impact of the human
will on the conduct of war and is therefore inherently flawed.

VIOLENCE AND DANGER

War is among the greatest horrors known to humanity; it
should never be romanticized. The means of war is force, ap-
plied in the form of organized violence. It is through the use
of violence, or the credible threat of violence, that we compel
our enemy to do our will. Violence is an essential element of
war, and its immediate result is bloodshed, destruction, and
suffering. While the magnitude of violence may vary with the
object and means of war, the violent essence of war will
never change.8 Any study of war that neglects this basic truth
is misleading and incomplete.

Since war is a violent enterprise, danger is ever present.
Since war is a human phenomenon, fear, the human reaction
to danger, has a significant impact on the conduct of war.

MCDP 1 The Nature of War

Everybody feels fear. Fear contributes to the corrosion of
will. Leaders must foster the courage to overcome fear, both
individually and within the unit. Courage is not the absence of
fear; rather, it is the strength to overcome fear.9

Leaders must study fear, understand it, and be prepared to
cope with it. Courage and fear are often situational rather than
uniform, meaning that people experience them differently at
different times and in different situations. Like fear, courage
takes many forms, from a stoic courage born of reasoned cal-
culation to a fierce courage born of heightened emotion. Ex-
perience under fire generally increases confidence, as can
realistic training by lessening the mystique of combat. Strong
leadership which earns the respect and trust of subordinates
can limit the effects of fear. Leaders should develop unit co-
hesion and esprit and the self-confidence of individuals
within the unit. In this environment, a Marine’s unwillingness
to violate the respect and trust of peers can overcome per-
sonal fear.

PHYSICAL, MORAL, AND MENTAL FORCES

War is characterized by the interaction of physical, moral,
and mental forces. The physical characteristics of war are
generally easily seen, understood, and measured: equipment
capabilities, supplies, physical objectives seized, force ratios,

MCDP 1

losses of materiel or life, terrain lost or gained, prisoners or
materiel captured. The moral characteristics are less tangible.
(The term “moral” as used here is not restricted to ethics, al-
though ethics are certainly included, but pertains to those
forces of a psychological rather than tangible nature.)’ Moral
forces are difficult to grasp and impossible to quantify. We
cannot easily gauge forces like national and military resolve,
national or individual conscience, emotion, fear, courage, mo-
rale, leadership, or esprit. War also involves a significant
mental, or intellectual, component. Mental forces provide the
ability to grasp complex battlefield situations; to make effec-
tive estimates, calculations, and decisions; to devise tactics
and strategies; and to develop plans.

Although material factors are more easily quantified, the
moral and mental forces exert a greater influence on the na-
ture and outcome of war.” This is not to lessen the impor-
tance of physical forces, for the physical forces in war can
have a significant impact on the others. For example, the
greatest effect of fires is generally not the amount of physical
destruction they cause, but the effect of that physical destruc-
tion on the enemy’s moral strength.

Because it is difficult to come to grips with moral and
mental forces, it is tempting to exclude them from our study

MCDP 1 The Nature of War

of war. However, any doctrine or theory of war that neglects
these factors ignores the greater part of the nature of war.

Tm EVOLUTION OF WAR

War is both timeless and ever changing. While the basic na-
ture of war is constant, the means and methods we use evolve
continuously. Changes may be gradual in some cases and
drastic in others. Drastic changes in war are the result of de-
velopments that dramatically upset the equilibrium of war
such as the rifled bore, mass conscription, and the railroad.

One major catalyst of change is the advancement of tech-
nology. As the hardware of war improves through technolo-
gical development, so must the tactical, operational, and
strategic usage adapt to its improved capabilities both to
maximize our own capabilities and to counteract our ene-
my’s.

It is important to understand which aspects of war are
likely to change and which are not. We must stay abreast of
the process of change for the belligerent who first exploits a
development in the art and science of war gains a significant
advantage. If we are ignorant of the changing face of war, we
will find ourselves unequal to its challenges.

Warfighting MCDP 1

Tm SCIENCE, ART, AND DYNAMIC OF WAR

Various aspects of war fall principally in the realm of science,
which is the methodical application of the empirical laws of
nature. The science of war includes those activities directly
subject to the laws of ballistics, mechanics, and like disci-
plines; for example, the application of fires, the effects of
weapons, and the rates and methods of movement and resup-
ply. However, science does not describe the whole phenome-
non.

An even greater part of the conduct of war falls under the
realm of art, which is the employment of creative or intuitive
skills. Art includes the creative, situational application of sci-
entific knowledge through judgment and experience, and so
the art of war subsumes the science of war. The art of war re-
quires the intuitive ability to grasp the essence of a unique
military situation and the creative ability to devise a practical
solution. It involves conceiving strategies and tactics and de-
veloping plans of action to suit a given situation. This still
does not describe the whole phenomenon. Owing to the va-
garies of human behavior and the countless other intangible
factors which influence war, there is far more to its conduct
than can be explained by art and science. Art and science stop
short of explaining the fundamental dynamic of war.

MCDP 1 The Nature of War

As we have said, war is a social phenomenon. Its essential
dynamic is the dynamic of competitive human interaction
rather than the dynamic of art or science. Human beings in-
teract with each other in ways that are fundamentally differ-
ent from the way a scientist works with chemicals or formulas
or the way an artist works with paints or musical notes. It is
because of this dynamic of human interaction that fortitude,
perseverance, boldnes

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