Business Analytics and Data Analysis
The paper must be a minimum of 5,000 words. Brand is Nissan. You can use the attache file for some information.
1 Executive Summary
2 Industry: Background and Situation Analysis
3 Company: Background and Situation Analysis
4 Brand: Background and Analysis
5 Strategic Focus: Mission, Vision, and Values
6 Research Methodology
7 Analysis of Data
8 Findings and Conclusions
9 Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility
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TB0571
Copyright 2019 Thunderbird School of Global Management, a unit of the Arizona State University Knowledge Enterprise.
This case was written by Prof. Dr. Markus Kreutzer and Valentin Pfeffer of EBS Business School, EBS Universitt fr Wirtschaft
und Recht for the sole purpose of providing material for class discussion. It is not intended to illustrate either effective or ineffective
handling of a managerial situation. Any reproduction, in any form, of the material in this case is prohibited unless permission is
obtained from the copyright holder.
Markus Kreutzer
Valentin Pfeffer
The Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Strategic Alliance:
Past Accomplishments and Future Challenges
Background and Events Preceding the Alliance Formation
On March 27, 1999, Louis Schweitzer, CEO of Renault, and Yoshikazu Hanawa, president of Nissan, signed a
strategic alliance agreement between Renault and Nissan in Tokyo, thereby bringing a 10-month negotiation,
which had started with an exchange of letters between Schweitzer and Hanawa in June 1998, to a successful end.1
Nissan was losing market share and was badly in debt; it needed a partner that could provide substantial
financial support. Initially, the companys aim was to find a partner that would invest $6 billion in order to reduce
the difficulties its debt obligations had caused. Nissan had ended 1996 and 1998 with a net loss, its total unit car
sales having decreased from 1994 to 1998. In addition, the companys long-term debt exceeded its equity on its
consolidated balance sheet from 1993 to 1998. In 1998, Moodys and Standard & Poors had given Nissan the
lowest credit ratings still considered an investment grade, making decreasing its interest-bearing debt one of the
companys main goals. Conversely, Renault, the tenth largest automotive manufacturer in the world in terms of
units manufactured in 1999 (see Exhibit 1), had a favorable financial performance, with positive net incomes
and steadily growing revenues from 1997 to 2000.2
An alliance with Nissan, the eighth largest automotive manufacturer in the world, would give Renault the
opportunity to increase its size and market power, thus supporting its growth.
Nevertheless, the two companies faced various hurdles during the negotiations preceding the alliance
formation. First, each of the companies had to accommodate the needs of its multiple stakeholders: Renault those
of the French state, and Nissan those of the Fuyo keiretsu. (A keiretsu is a group of Japanese firms that trades
and conducts business together.) Furthermore, Nissan stipulated that the Nissan brand should be maintained,
that jobs be preserved, that it be given assistance to restructure, and that its CEO should come from within the
company. Negotiations were paused when Renault proved unwilling to provide the amount of financial support
that Nissan required. In an effort to win more funds, Nissan talked to DaimlerChrysler and Ford. However,
neither of these two companies was interested in investing in Nissan. Once it became clear that it could not find
an alternative alliance partner, Nissan continued its negotiations with Renault.
Although Renault had gained a bargaining advantage, it did not take advantage of this. The Renault
and Nissan negotiation approach was described as unconventional since it strongly relied on trust. Instead of
relying exclusively on a strict due-diligence procedure, the negotiating parties tried to evaluate their ability to
collaborate. After the two firms top management met several times, small teams of managers and engineers
assessed the firms potential for synergies. These teams were given no formal goals but were advised to show
respect and try to understand each others viewpoint. The Renault and Nissan management agreed that the firms
had complementary resources and that an alliance would generate adequate synergies.3 Once the negotiations
had been concluded, Louis Schweitzer, the Renault CEO, agreed to form an alliance with Nissan and to provide
$5 billion in exchange for 36.8% of Nissan.
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On conclusion of the alliance with Renault, Hanawa asked Renault for managers with experience of cost
reduction, marketing, and finance. Schweitzer sent Carlos Ghosn, who would be responsible for reducing Nissans
costs.4 Ghosn, whom the media nicknamed le cost killer, had previously been involved in restructuring Renault
to reduce costs. Born in Brazil and having studied in Lebanon, Ghosn had a background of two emerging economy
countries. Before moving to Renault, the trained engineer had started his career at Michelin, where he proved a
talented manager as the COO of Michelins South American division and later CEO of Michelin North America.5
The decade preceding the announcement of the Renault-Nissan alliance was filled with mergers and
acquisitions in the automotive industry, such as the merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler in 1998. Mergers
were considered the normal procedure for combining the strengths of two firms in the automotive industry.
The DaimlerChrysler merger was aimed at allowing Chrysler to share parts and vehicle architectures with the
German automotive group Daimler in order to reduce its costs when bringing new vehicles to market. In return,
Daimler wanted to increase its market share in North America and broaden its scope of vehicle types. Daimlers
Mercedes-Benz targeted the luxury market, while Chrysler targeted the broader mass market. The DaimlerChrysler
merger was predicted to initiate large synergies and, in 1999, it was well on track to meet the planned $1.4
billion synergies. However, it eventually became clear that the two companies had serious cultural differences
and different approaches to management. While Daimler was more formal and bureaucratic and relied heavily
on documentation, Chrysler developed ideas more spontaneously and used oral presentations to communicate
plans. There were also huge pay differences, with Chrysler executives in America often earning more than twice
as much as those at Daimler in Germany. Mercedes-Benzs managers and engineers were reluctant to share their
advanced knowledge with Chrysler, which received only a few parts from Daimler. Moreover, Daimler could
not significantly increase its market share in North America. Although the merger of Daimler and Chrysler was
Exhibit 1. The 20 Largest Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles
by Units Manufactured in 1999 and 2016
Sources: OICA. (2000). World Motor Vehicle Production by Manufacturer World Ranking 1999.
Retrieved from http://www.oica.net/category/production-statistics/1999-statistics/; OICA. (2017).
World Motor Vehicle Production: OICA Correspondents Survey (for 2016). Retrieved from http://
www.oica.net/category/production-statistics/2016-statistics/.
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A08-19-0008 3
originally announced as a merger of equals, the transaction was, more accurately, an acquisition, with Daimler
aiming to gain control over Chrysler. An example of Daimlers dominance was the German executives decision
to locate DaimlerChryslers headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. When Daimler sold 80.1% of Chrysler to the
private equity investment firm Cerberus Capital Management in 2007, Dieter Zetsche, then Daimler CEO,
acknowledged that the potential for synergies had been overestimated. Analysts commented that Daimler had
been too optimistic and undertaken too little due diligence.6
Founding Principles and Objectives
The Renault-Nissan alliance charter stated the principles that would guide the partners future cooperation.
Their complementary strengths had to create mutual benefits for the alliance partners. The alliance would help
both partners achieve growth and profitability. Although the cooperation would encompass numerous areas of
operation, both brands would be maintained, and both the companies would be individual members of an equal
partnership. The partners would trust and respect the other partys identity and culture. The alliance charter
assigned the right to select the alliance chairman and CEO to Renault.7 Given that France and Japan have different
national cultures (see Exhibit 2), trust and respect were especially relevant principles.
France is, for example, known for its 35-hour working week, while Japan is known for its very long working
hours. In 2004, the strategic alliance formulated three strategic objectives. The first was to be among the top three
carmakers in terms of product and service quality in the markets in which the alliance competed. Second, the
alliance aimed at being among the top three carmakers in terms of technology. The partners would accomplish
this by combining their complementary areas of strength. Third, the alliance set the objective to be among the
top three carmakers in terms of profitability. This objective involved increasing the alliances operating profit by
increasing its sales growth and ensuring its profits stability.
Renaults main motive for the alliance was to increase its scale in order to become more competitive globally.
Reaching a critical size to compete in the global automotive industry would have been far more difficult if the
company had to rely on organic growth. An additional Renault motive was that collaborating with Nissan
would simplify and accelerate the companys expansion into international markets. At the time of the alliance
formation, Renault depended heavily on the European and French markets. However, Renault could use Nissans
experience to expand into Peru, Australia, and Taiwan (see Exhibit 3). Furthermore, Renault hoped to learn
from Nissan, which was known for its engineering,8 and to benchmark its production process against that of a
larger car manufacturer.
Exhibit 2. Geert Hofstedes Six Dimensions of National Culture
France, Germany, Japan, and United States
Source: Hofstede Insights. (2018). Geert Hofstedes Six Dimensions of National CultureCountry
Comparison. Retrieved from https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/.
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This document is authorized for use only by Yekaterina Kim in 7257 Global Intercultural Communication S20 taught by MYLES BASSELL, CUNY – Brooklyn College from Jul 2020 to Jan 2021.
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Exhibit 3. Alliance Worldwide Production Sites2002 and 2019
Exhibit 3a.
Source: Renault Nissan. (2003, pp. 6-7). Renault-Nissan Alliance 2003. Retrieved from https://www.nissan-global.
com/EN/DOCUMENT/PDF/ALLIANCE/HANDBOOK/2003/arriance_hb2003.pdf.
Note: This map is from the earliest yearly alliance report and shows the production sites of Renault and Nissan in
2002.
Exhibit 3b.
Sources: Renault Nissan Mitsubishi. (2019). Alliance Website: About Us. Retrieved from https://www.
alliance-2022.com/about-us/. Renault Nissan. (2017, pp. 2-3). Alliance Facts & Figures 2017. Retrieved from
https://newsroom.nissan-global.com/releases/infographic-renault-nissan-alliance-facts-and-figures-2017.
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This document is authorized for use only by Yekaterina Kim in 7257 Global Intercultural Communication S20 taught by MYLES BASSELL, CUNY – Brooklyn College from Jul 2020 to Jan 2021.
A08-19-0008 5
Nissans main motive for the alliance was that it needed to obtain capital to survive. The troubled car
manufacturer also needed a partner to revive and facilitate its restructuring process. Nissan explicitly asked for
managerial support for the restructuring process. Similarly to Renault, Nissan hoped to expand into additional
international markets through the alliance. For example, Nissan planned to gain access to the Mercosur market (a
South American trade bloc) and start manufacturing in Spain with the help of Renault. Nissan was eager to learn
from Renaults design capabilities to improve its cars style. Nissan also wanted to learn from Renaults efficient
selection of suppliers, as the company had restructured its supply chains in the past and could source supplies
very cost effectively.9 Nissan paid relatively high prices for supplies, because it relied primarily on a group of
suppliers with which it had long-standing relationships. Some of these suppliers were in a keiretsu with Nissan.
Before the alliance, Nissan suppliers were partially integrated into the company via its equity investments in
them. These relationships led to supply prices above the market average.10
A common motive of both car manufacturers was the vision that, through their alliance, they could share
risks and R&D costs. They used a shared platform for small cars from 2002 onwards. The partners also sought to
gain economies of scale by pooling their production volumes. A critical size was required to compete with their
industry rivals. In the years preceding the alliance, size and synergies were becoming increasingly important in
the automotive industry. The Daimler-Chrysler merger, for example, showed that the major car manufacturers
were searching for ways to create synergies through mergers and acquisitions. Automotive groups were trying to
increase their scales in areas such as production volume, procurement, and engineering.11 By combining forces,
the alliance partners could neutralize smaller competitors, as size and scale could create barriers to competition.
Owing to its size, the alliance had greater bargaining power when facing its suppliers. The partners helped each
other and searched for areas that could be converged during the 2008 global liquidity crisis. The alliance also
Exhibit 3c.
Source: Own illustration based on the information from the maps in Exhibit 3a and Exhibit 3b.
Note: This map visualizes the differences between 2002 and 2019.
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allowed the partners to pool their skills and capabilities to develop new products and services; their sharing
capabilities allowed the partners to increase their speed to market.
Major Areas of Cooperation
Under the condition that he would receive the authority to make decisions relatively independently, Ghosn
accepted the task of moving from Renault to Nissan in order to supervise Nissans restructuring process. To turn
Nissan around, he introduced a program called the Nissan Revival Plan. Following this plan, Ghosn took several
actions that helped Nissan eliminate its problems and overcome its difficulties. The first step he took before
becoming COO of Nissan in June 1999 was taking two months to interview managers, employees, engineers, and
Nissan dealers in order to identify the companys most critical problems. Ghosn allowed the press to join Nissans
annual shareholder meeting for the first time; he was very transparent about the companys problems and clearly
communicated the changes that it required. For example, Ghosn informed the press that Nissan had been losing
market share for 26 years, but that he was, nonetheless, confident that the company employees had what it takes
to return the company to profitability. To show his commitment, he stated that he and the Nissan management
would resign if Nissan was not profitable by 2001. Part of the Nissan Revival Plan was changing reports and
management meetings language to English, with all employees subsequently offered language training. Ghosn
did not try to implement the planned standard ideas from before his transfer to Nissan. Instead, he installed
cross-functional teams comprising line managers from different countries and departments and gave them the
responsibility for finding solutions to the identified problems in areas such as purchasing, engineering, and R&D.
The cross-functional teams, which had a maximum of ten members, were encouraged to think creatively. They
were told not to be afraid of suggesting unconventional ideas if these would help Nissan grow or save costs. It
was made clear that profitability was the primary objective.
When Nissans Revival Plan was announced, Ghosn explained that Nissan could not maintain its keiretsu
ties and that it would sell the shareholdings it had in its suppliers. The companys car design team, which was
previously part of the engineering department, was relocated and put under the supervision of the vice president
of brand identity. Furthermore, during the course of the Revival Plan, Ghosn instructed the vice president of
finance to clean the books and create transparency concerning the firms liabilities. In addition, provisions were
made for the companys pension plan, which had not been sufficiently funded. Restructuring Nissans finances
and taking liabilities properly into account led to a record loss in fiscal year 1999.12 Ghosn initiated a reassessment
of all of Nissans operation procedures. An obvious problem was that Nissans costs were too high. Forty-three
of Nissans 46 products were not profitable. Ghosn announced that Nissan would only introduce new products
in the future if there was a strong possibility of profitability. The companys headcount was reduced by 21,000
positions, while three assembly units and two powertrain units were shut down to reduce costs. However, to avoid
upsetting employees and the public, Nissan tried to implement the job reductions in a socially acceptable way by
using early retirement and part-time work.13 This increased the manufacturing resources utilization from 53%
to 82%. As a part of the turnaround, Ghosn, with the help of cross-functional teams, aimed to reduce Nissans
purchasing costs by 20%. A combined Renault-Nissan Purchasing Organization (RNPO) was established in
2001 to lower the alliances purchasing costs by creating economies of scale, with 30% of the alliances purchasing
being handled jointly shortly afterwards.
Over the years, purchasing has remained one of the alliances most important areas of cooperation. The RNPO
is responsible for purchasing and selecting suppliers and has purchased all of the alliances required commodities
since 2009. The synergies that the RNPO created increased significantly when the alliance partners started
using common vehicle platforms, powertrains, and parts. A new firm, the Avtovaz-Renault-Nissan Purchasing
Organization, was created in 2015 to combine and administrate the alliances purchasing activities in Russia.
Previously, Renault-Nissan had established a shared warehouse in Russia in 2008. After the alliances inclusion
of Mitsubishi in 2016, it hoped to save even more purchasing costs in the future.14
The alliances R&D activities included sharing platforms for cars that Renault and Nissan produced. In
2008, more than 50% of the cars that Renault and Nissan sold used common platforms. The two companies
have continuously made an effort to share parts while preserving the design characteristics that make the
brands unique. For example, the carmakers announced that they would share their cars temperature- and
audio-controlling systems. One aim of sharing parts was to decrease the purchasing costs.15 The alliance also
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This document is authorized for use only by Yekaterina Kim in 7257 Global Intercultural Communication S20 taught by MYLES BASSELL, CUNY – Brooklyn College from Jul 2020 to Jan 2021.
A08-19-0008 7
shared nonvisible parts, such as air-conditioning controls and gearboxes, to create economies of scale and to
reduce R&D and manufacturing costs. Among others, sharing R&D activities helped the alliance make use
of complementary capabilities during its development of powertrains. Furthermore, Renault had expertise in
diesel engine development and Nissan in gasoline engine development. The partners therefore exchanged their
existing engines and gearboxes, and started developing new, common engines and gearboxes that both partners
would use. For example, a diesel engine that Renault had originally designed was used for the Nissan Qashqai,
and the Renault Laguna was equipped with a Nissan gasoline engine. The alliance also collaborated on R&D
to reduce CO2 emissions, increase the environmental friendliness of the alliances cars, increase passenger safety,
and develop technology for electric vehicles.
In the area of engineering, the common module family
(CMF) is one of the most important cooperation projects. The
Nissan March, which was first sold in 2002, and the Nissan
Kubistar/Renault Kangoo, which was sold as a double-badged
vehicle in Europe in 2003, were early examples of vehicles
that used the Renault-Nissan alliances common platforms
(see Exhibit 4).
Vehicles that belonged to one of the CMFs consisted
of the five modules: engine, cockpit, front underbody, rear
underbody, and electronics. The CMF allowed the alliance
to build a wider spectrum of vehicles by using a smaller
set of parts. The alliance planned for 70% of its vehicles to
belong to a CMF by 2020. Renault-Nissan estimated that
the CMF could decrease purchasing costs by up to 30% and
engineering costs by up to 40%. These cost savings could
be used to generate greater customer value by including
additional desirable features to the cars while maintaining a
competitive price.
CMFs were introduced in three segments. The first
segment was called CMF-A and comprised small vehicles
with low fuel consumption. CMF-A targeted customers in
expanding markets. For example, the Renault Kwid and the
Datsun redi-GO, which Nissan manufactures, were both sold
in India and both belonged to CMF-A. The second segment,
CMF-B, included medium-size cars. The third segment
was called CMF-C/D and included larger vehicles such as
SUVs and crossovers. Cars that belonged to CMF-C/D were
the Nissan X-Trail, Nissan Qashqai, Renault Espace, and
Renault Megane. The CMFs allowed the alliance to use cross
production to manufacture cars belonging to one brand in
factories for a different brand.
The Renault-Nissan alliance standardized production.
Renault learned significantly from Nissan and adopted parts
of its production system, which helped Renault increase its
productivity by 15%. The two companies developed the
Alliance Integrated Manufacturing System (AIMS) together
and shared best practices in production. By sharing its
production capacity and, thus, avoiding excess capacity, the
alliance improved its plant utilization. For example, the Nissan Rogue was manufactured in a Renault Samsung
factory in South Korea.16 Furthermore, the alliance used cross-production to manufacture Nissans in Renaults
factory in Brazil and produce Renaults in Nissan plants in South Africa, Mexico, and Spain.
Exhibit 4. Examples of Cars in the
Common Module Family (CMF)
Sources: Information on models and CMFs from
Renault Nissan. (2017). Alliance Facts & Figures 2017.
Retrieved from https://newsroom.nissan-global.com/
releases/infographic-renault-nissan-alliance-facts-and-
figures-2017. Images retrieved from:
rena
http://strongauto.net/wp-content/uploads/images/
ult-kangoo_5889.jpg
http://www.japaneserides.com/wp-content/
uploads/2011/08/Nissan-Kubistar.jpg
https://www.ibtimes.co.in/after-kwid-redi-go-cmf-
platform-based-sedan-works-report-682115
https://www.meinauto.de/nissan/neuwagen/353-
qashqai/angebote/qashqai
https://www.meinauto.de/renault/neuwagen/megane/
angebote/renault-megane-5-tuerig
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8 A08-19-0008
Renault and Nissan benefited from their
geographic complementarities and used the
alliance to expand their geographic scopes.
The partnership allowed both firms to establish
operations in all relevant geographical markets
and enabled each partner to enter markets in
which the other partner was already present.
Renault was well established in Europe, North
Africa, and South America, and Nissan in Japan,
North America, Mexico, China, and the Middle
East. For instance, when Renault entered
Mexico, it benefited from Nissans experience.17
Still, the individual partners focused on
different markets and did not compete strongly
against each other. Comparing Renaults top
six countries of 2016 unit sales to Nissans top
six countries, the two firms had no country in
common (see Exhibit 5).
This shows that even today, Renault and
Nissan still focus on different geographic areas.
The alliance is jointly working on increasing its
market share in emerging markets. For example,
Renault-Nissan has a plant in Brazil, South
Americas most important market. The alliance
has Avtovaz and Renault plants in Russia, a large
shared plant in India, and, in 2016, Renault
opened a plant in China in a joint venture with
Dongfeng Motor, which had been a Nissan
partner in China since 2013.
To increase their synergies, the alliance
members combined several functions in 2014.
By 2017, the engineering, manufacturing and
supply chain management, purchasing, and
human resources functions were managed
centrally at the alliance level. In 2015, the
alliance recorded new synergies worth 4.3
billion, anticipating 5.5 billions worth in
2018, where synergies are defined as cost
savings plus revenue increases generated by
cross-leveraging knowledge and resources. In 2019, the alliance announced that it had realized synergies of 5.7
billion in 2018 and that it aimed to increase the amount of yearly synergies to 10 billion in 2022.18 The alliance
divided synergies into product-related synergies and non-product-related synergies. Engines and gearboxes
developed in cooperation represented a product-related synergy. The alliances vehicles had gasoline, diesel, or
electric powertrains, ensuring that all major types of powertrains were available for its vehicle range. In 2017,
75% of the alliances cars used powertrains that were shared among the alliance partners. Various teams were
established to save costs in the fields of logistics, customs and trade, information systems and technology, and
cross-production to create non-product-related synergies. Logistics teams merged those tasks that customers did not
see, such as shipping, which created synergies worth 220 million in 2011. As early as 2002, the cross-company
logistics teams developed global logistics strategies for the alliance and searched for possibilities to reduce costs
in the areas of shipping, warehousing, and supply parts management. A customs and trade team later lowered
the collaborations customs duties in 2012 by setting best-practice standards within all the alliances locations.
The alliance also used shared IT systems. The Renault-Nissan Information Systems (RNIS) firm was created to
unify and maintain the alliances information systems and data bases. RNIS created a list of common soft- and
Exhibit 5. Renault and Nissans Top 10 Markets
by Units Sold in 2016
Source: Renault Nissan Mitsubishi. (2017). Renault-Nissan Alliance
Delivers Significant Growth in 2016, Extends Electric Vehicle Sales
Record. Retrieved from https://www.alliance-2022.com/news/renault-
nissan-alliance-delivers-significant-growth-in-2016-extends-electric-
vehicle-sales-record/.
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A08-19-0008 9
hardware suppliers, established a shared data model to provide information about materials and production parts,
and installed an alliance communication broadband network called Alliance Worldwide Backbone. Combined
sales and marketing projects were another example of non-product-related synergies. The alliances combined
sales and marketing effort succeeded in having Renault-Nissan chosen to provide Danone with a fleet of more
than 15,000 vehicles. Danone chose Renault-Nissan due to its diverse range of vehicles. The alliance also secured
fleet contracts from ATOS, Merck, Orange, and Mondelez.
Alliance Governance
To lead the alliance activity and facilitate the alliances strategic planning, the firm Renault-Nissan B.V. was
founded in 2002 as a joint corporation based in the Netherlands. This governing entity functioned as the alliances
board, and Renault and Nissan each had a 50% ownership share. Renault-Nissan B.V. held 100% of the firms
RNPO and RNIS, which were responsible for the alliances combined activities in the areas of purchasing and
information services. Since Nissan needed financial support in 1999, Renault initially bought 36.8% of Nissan
Motor, 15.2% of Nissan Diesel, and fully acquired five Nissan financial entities in Europe for $5.4 billion. In
2002, Renault increased its investment and subsequently held 44.3% of Nissan, while Nissan bought 15% of
Renaults equitywithout any voting rights. The partners had equal decision rights on the alliances governance
board (see Exhibit 6). In 2016, Mitsubishi was added to the Renault-Nissan alliance when Nissan bought 34%
of Mitsubishis shares.
From 2005 until 2018, Carlos Ghosn was the president of the alliance board. After being appointed president
and CEO of Renault in May 2005, Ghosn was simultaneously CEO of both Renault and Nissan. This made
Ghosn the first executive to lead two Global 500 firms at the same time. He remained CEO of both alliance
partners for more than 11 years until he passed the CEO role of Nissan to Hiroto Saikawa in April 2017 and
became chairman of the Nissan board of directors.19 Ghosn wanted to focus on reviving Mitsubishi.20 Mitsubishi
was included in the alliance in 2016 and was striving to recover from reputational difficulties. Saikawa, who is the
same age as Ghosn, started working for Nissan in 1977 and previously held roles such as co-CEO of Nissan, chief
competitive officer (CCO) of Nissan, and executive general manager of RNPO. Saikawa also served on Renaults
board as a Nissan representative for a decade, until 2016.21 Ghosn prepared Saikawa to take a leading role at
Nissan by working with him for many years. Besides Ghosn, both Renault and Nissan had four representatives
on the alliance governance board from 2015 to 2017. The topics that the alliance board usually discussed were
mid-term plans, investments that affected the strategy, and partnerships with third firms. In addition, the board
discussed the commonalities of the alliance partners products and reviewed product plans. Usually, the alliance
board held no more than eight meetings per year.
Exhibit 6. Structure of Equity Holdings of the Alliance Partners in 2017
Source: Renault Nissan. (2017, p. 6). Alliance Facts & Figures 2017. Retrieved from
https://newsroom.nissan-global.com/releases/infographic-renault-nissan-alliance-facts-and-
figures-2017.
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10 A08-19-0008
In the past, Renault-Nissan had installed several commissions to govern the alliance. An International
Advisory Board, consisting of 10 members and chaired by Schweitzer and Hanawa, prepared proposals and
advised the alliance board on issues concerning its global strategy.22 Cross-company teams and cross-functional
teams, which Ghosn first introduced during the Nissan turnaround, were two important governance mechanisms
that the alliance used. The two types of teams had interdependent roles.
