dentify the independent, dependent, and any intervening variables. Indicate whether the relationships among them are direct or inverse
dentify the independent, dependent, and any intervening variables. Indicate whether the relationships among them are direct or inverse
Defiant Innovation: The Adoption of Medical
Marijuana Laws in the American States
A. Lee Hannah and Daniel J. Mallinson
Diffusion research often characterizes the role of the federal government in innovation adoption as a
supportive one, either increasing the likelihood of adoption or its speed. We examine the adoption of
medical marijuana laws (MMLs) from 1996 to 2014 to shed light on what motivates states to adopt
innovations that are in explicit defiance of federal law. Furthermore, we examine whether federal
signals have any influence on the likelihood of adoption. In doing so, we utilize implementation
theory to expand our understanding of how the federal governments position impacts state policy
innovation adoption. We find mixed evidence for the influence of federal signals on the adoption of
MMLs. The results suggest that medical marijuana policies are much more likely to be adopted in
states when proponents have the political or institutional capital, rather than a medical or fiscal need.
Moreover, this political capital is sufficient independent of the federal governments real or perceived
position.
KEY WORDS: medical marijuana, policy diffusion, federalism
, ,
19962014,
,
,
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Introduction
The American federal system creates opportunities for sharing and learning
among localities, states, and the federal government. Often touted as laboratories of
democracy,1 the states experiment with new policy ideas, which may spread hori-
zontally to other states, as well as exhibit vertical influence on the federal govern-
ments issue agenda. Yet, federalism also generates conflict. For example, states
compete with each other for tax resources and residents (Dye, 1990; Tiebout, 1956).
402
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They also wrestle with the federal government over the proper boundaries of state
sovereignty and the implementation of federal initiatives (Rabe, 2007; Thompson &
Gusmano, 2014). Moreover, from the early doctrine of nullification to the passage of
medical and recreational marijuana policies in the modern era, states sometimes
actively defy federal law. We explore the concept of defiant innovationa process
whereby states, through initiatives or the legislature, pass laws that not only circum-
vent, but also reimagine federal law. The study of policy diffusion brings insight into
the complex intergovernmental relationships fostered by federalism, yet it does not
address vertical conflict as much as vertical influence. We do so by examining the
adoption of medical marijuana laws. Moreover, we build bridges between theories
of policy implementation and diffusion in order to provide a framework for identify-
ing diffusion patterns that typify defiance.
We use the diffusion of medical marijuana to address the question of what moti-
vates states to adopt innovations that are in explicit defiance of federal law. This is
important for establishing whether the expected determinants of diffusion have the
same effect when states are defiantly adopting. This study also speaks to whether
defiant innovation is motivated differently than the well-studied cases of states
undermining federal mandates (Balla & Deering, 2015; Gormley, 2006; Regan &
Deering, 2009; Shelly, 2008). The two are linked, yet distinct, because in the first case
states are actively innovating in a policy area expressly prohibited by the federal
government and in the second states are refusing incentives and/or mandates to
implement federal initiatives. We seek to determine whether these two acts are moti-
vated differently.
The extent to which medical marijuana can be labeled defiant has fluctuated
over time since California first passed medical marijuana in 1996. At times, the fed-
eral government has signaled deference to the states on these issues, providing
implicit support for experimentation. At other times, the federal government has
been proactive and even aggressive in enforcing marijuana laws (OKeefe, 2013).
Such variation in credible commitments to marijuana prohibition enforcement by the
federal government provides a useful test of how those commitments impact the
willingness of states to innovate in an area of federalstate conflict. Not only does
this address an important gap in policy diffusion research, it is timely given that
eight states have already legalized recreational marijuana and several additional
states are likely to consider legalization in the next 2 years (Steinmetz, 2016). Further-
more, national polling data shows increasing support for marijuana legalization
(Jones, 2015). It is likely that the factors driving state adoption of MMLs are consis-
tent with broader trends in marijuana policy. An understanding of the mechanisms
that drive the adoption of these policies might help to anticipate future development
of recreational marijuana as the federal landscape continues to evolve.
We find mixed evidence for the role of federal commitments to enforcement in
the adoption of MMLs. States were less likely to adopt medical marijuana policies
when the conservative Bush administration was in office. However, while President
Obamas administration signaled a less interventionist approach from the federal
government, states were no more likely to adopt an MML. While different adminis-
trations signal implicit support or opposition to medical marijuana, we find that
Hannah/Mallinson: Defiant Innovation 403
explicit signals in the form of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) marijuana
seizures also do not affect states probability of adopting. Thus, the federal govern-
ment had less of an impact on the timing of MML adoptions than would be
expected. Instead, we find that state-level factors such as the availability of the initia-
tive and citizen liberalism increase the likelihood of medical marijuana adoption and
cultural differences, like the number of evangelical adherents, decrease the likelihood
of adoption. Further, states are more likely to adopt if they are ideologically similar
to previous adopters. Taking the results as a whole, the evidence suggests that states
moved forward in defiance with little consideration of the federal governments
position.
The Logic of State Defiance
States do not always act in accordance with the will of the federal government.
This was most clear during attempts at nullification and interposition prior to the
American Civil War and school integration during the 1950s and 1960s and finally
resolved by the Supreme Court in 1971 (Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-
cation 402 U.S. 1). The doctrines of nullification, meaning states have the right to nul-
lify, or not implement, federal laws they view as unconstitutional, and interposition,
claiming that states stand as a barrier between citizens and unconstitutional federal
acts, arose from states determining that they were protecting their citizens from the
federal government.2 While the courts have dismissed both doctrines (e.g., Cooper v.
Aaron 358 U.S. 1 [1958]), states still attempt to nullify federal mandates with which
they do not agree. The question remains as to whether acts of defiance spread among
the states in a fundamentally different manner than policies that are supported by
the federal government or those whereby the federal government takes a neutral
stance.
Policy implementation research provides a foundation for developing a cogent
theory of how states respond to federal signals and why they, at times, innovate in
defiance of federal law. Goggin, Bowman, Lester, and OToole (1990) sought to pro-
vide testable hypotheses for why states vary in their willingness to implement fed-
eral priorities and subsequent success. Fiscal Federalism, whereby the federal
government induces state implementation through financial incentives, in particular,
created the potential for principalagent problems (Chubb, 1985). Extant policy diffu-
sion research regarding state responsiveness to federal signals often focuses on
instances when the federal government incentivizes diffusion, meaning when states
respond positively to national coercion (Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Welch & Thompson,
1980). These are cases where the agent states are working for the principal. Of course,
states can also fail to implement federal priorities (i.e., shirk) or even redesign federal
policy (i.e., sabotage).3 Furthermore, the federal government does not only provide
inducements (i.e., positive signals) for state action, but also utilizes constraints (i.e.,
negative signals). For either federal inducements or constraints to be implemented
by the states, the signals sent to them must be credible, clear, consistent, repeated,
and received (Allen, Pettus, & Haider-Markel, 2004; Goggin et al., 1990).
404 Policy Studies Journal, 46:2
States vary in their receptivity to these signals, not only cross-sectionally, but
also temporally. Goggin et al. (1990) hypothesized that states with supportive legisla-
tures and advocacy coalitions will implement federal policy more quickly than those
with weaker, or less supportive, institutions. Ecological capacity (i.e., a combination
of economic, political, and situational capacities) is also important to both implemen-
tation and diffusion theory. States with greater financial and institutional capacity
are in a stronger position to implement federal policy quickly and effectively. In dif-
fusion parlance, slack resources allow states to overcome obstacles to adoption
(Walker, 1969). Conversely, ecological capacity provides the resources to resist fed-
eral signals. Moreover, implementation is temporally dynamic; as a states capacity
changes or the legitimacy of the signal sender erodes or improves over time, states
can change their implementation behavior. This temporal dynamic is vital for under-
standing the spread of defiant innovations like medical marijuana policies.
Table 1 establishes a framework for differentiating the observable expectations
of adoption patterns when the federal government and states are either in concor-
dance or discordance over a specific policy. Each can take three positions on a given
policy: pro, anti, or neutral. It is important to note that this table presents the overall
adoption pattern that is observable when a plurality of states falls into each category.
A typology of the macrolevel patterns will allow future research to address how
additional policies fit within each category. After describing these macrolevel pat-
terns, we will shift the unit of analysis to the individual states, so as to establish test-
able hypotheses for our subsequent event history analysis of medical marijuana
adoption.
Perhaps the two most obvious and well-supported categories in Table 1 are
those in which the federal government sends positive signals through financial
incentives (Welch & Thompson, 1980), issue attention (McCann, Shipan, & Volden,
2015), legislative activity (Karch, 2006), or mandates (Woods & Bowman, 2011), and
those in which the federal government is assumed to have a neutral position (e.g.,
Berry & Berry, 1990). For policies like the Civil Defense Compact, the federal govern-
ment increased state financial capacity for implementation, and thus states
Table 1. Expected Diffusion Patterns When the Federal Government Takes a Pro-, Anti-, or Neutral
Stance and States Take Pro-, Anti-, or Neutral Stances to an Innovation
Federal
Government
State
Government
Pro Neutral Anti
Pro Rapid adoption
(Civil Defense
Compact)
Characteristic-
dependent
adoption
(Lotteries)
Expanding adoption,
declining enforcement
(Medical Marijuana)
Neutral Compliance with
partisan reservations
(Common Core)
Highly regionalized
issue
(Colorado River
Compact)
Limited defiance,
varying enforcement
(Medical Marijuana)
Anti Formal opposition
(REAL ID)
Limited adoption
(Stem Cell Research)
Limited defiance,
widespread enforcement
(Medical Marijuana)
Hannah/Mallinson: Defiant Innovation 405
responded quickly in adopting the innovation (Goggin et al., 1990; Nicholson-Crotty,
2009; Savage, 1985; Welch & Thompson, 1980). When the federal government is neu-
tral toward an innovation, like a state lottery, states are prompted to adopt based on
the expected internal determinants and external influences theorized by Berry and
Berry (1990, 2013). Thus, the policys overall adoption pattern should resemble a nor-
mal s-curve (Boushey, 2010; Gray, 1973; Mallinson, 2016) with relatively wide adop-
tion over time.
It is also theoretically possible to have a plurality of states take neutral positions
on policies for which the federal government sends positive, negative, or neutral sig-
nals. Policies of highly regional significance seem most likely to fit into the neutral-
neutral category. The protection and management of rivers (e.g., the Colorado River
Compact) for example, may garner little interest from a plurality of the states and
the federal government.
In the case of a positive federal position and a neutral plurality, we would expect
neutral states to experience vocal partisan reservations to the given policy that would
initially limit adoption (e.g., Common Core). Nonetheless, federal incentives can
push states from a neutral to a generally positive stance. The rate of adoption would
increase as this shift occurs, emphasizing the point that a policy can start in one cate-
gory, with a particular expected pattern of spread, and move into another category
via changes in federal signals and/or circumstances in the states. Gay marriage pro-
vides a useful example of this principle. Congruence between state and federal pol-
icy fluctuated across time as states moved in a direction different than the federal
government, until the courts stepped in to settle the law.
There is further evidence of what happens when the federal government sends
positive signals regarding a policy that states simply do not want. For example, Con-
gress passed the REAL ID Act (2005) in response to recommendations by the 9/11
Commission (2004) that the government establish standards for personal identifica-
tion, including those issued by states (e.g., drivers licenses). Maine was the first state
to adopt a law opposing the federal REAL ID requirements and, within 18 months,
20 other states followed suit (Regan & Deering, 2009). In this case, the federal gov-
ernment is trying to induce states to produce a desired policy outcome, but states
refuse. Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act highlights how financial
inducements can erode state resistance over time (Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013). State
resistance is certainly not new. Maryland did not choose to enforce federal alcohol
prohibition in the 1920s and states like New York chose to abandon enforcing alcohol
prohibition prior to the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed
Prohibition. Even further back in American history, states like Pennsylvania refused
to enforce Fugitive Slave Laws (OKeefe, 2013).
In the case of a policy where the federal government expresses neutrality toward
state action and a plurality of states are opposed, it is likely that very few states will
take up such a cause. Take stem cell research funding, for example. In his early work
on this policy, Karch (2010) identified state stem cell funding as an example of lim-
ited diffusion. Between 1999 and 2008, seven states provided financial support for
stem cell research, three legalized the conduct of this research (without funding),
and six restricted it. In fact, state funding of stem cell research has not substantially
406 Policy Studies Journal, 46:2
expanded further since then (Gugliotta, 2015). Karch (2012) later demonstrated that
while the innovation was not widely adopted, the Bush administrations banning of
federal research funding prompted many states to consider their own support.
While, on one hand, the federal government communicated its disagreement with
the policy by banning its own source of funding, it did nothing to prevent states
from instituting their own programs. Thus, the federal government is expressing
neutrality toward state innovation. The result was a limited pattern of adoption with
a few concurring anti-innovation states adopting their own bans on research.
The final three categories, which we find exemplified in the spread of MMLs,
are those where the federal government prohibits an activity that states desire (i.e.,
the growth, distribution, and consumption of marijuana). This is distinct from cases
like REAL ID, where the states are refusing to implement a federal program.
Granted, both are principalagent problems, whereby the states as agents are not
implementing the principals desires. The distinction is that mandate resistance is a
case of agent shirking, whereas a defiant innovation, like an MML, is sabotage. In
defiant innovation, states are not only simply allowing a banned activity, but they
are actively promoting the development of a new program even when the federal gov-
ernment bans it. Marijuana is presently classified as a Schedule I drug under the
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA). Thus, the distinction from mandate refusal;
states are innovating in defiance of federal law by authorizing the distribution of
marijuana for medical purposes.4
States, of course, diverge in their willingness to engage in defiant innovation. A
shrinking, but still substantial, minority is supportive of federal law or is legitimately
dissuaded from acting against federal interests, and thus sees no reason to enact
allowances for marijuana use. Other states are sympathetic, but lack the ecological
capacity to enact defiant innovations and risk retribution (e.g., lawsuits) by the fed-
eral government or peer states (Kamin, 2015). As the plurality of states shifts from
opposed to the innovation, to neutral, to positive, the patterns of both adoption and
enforcement change. We now transition to addressing states as the unit of analysis
and drawing further on implementation and principalagent theory to derive
hypotheses specific to the predictors of defiant innovation.
Expectations for the State-Level Predictors of Defiant Innovation
Explicit Federal Government Signals
A states decision to adopt a policy innovation is typically a function of their
internal motivations, the obstacles to adoption and availability of resources for over-
coming those obstacles, the effects of other policies and availability of alternative sol-
utions, and the influence of external actors (Berry & Berry, 1990, 2013). The federal
government is one external actor that increases the resources available to states for
innovation (Eyestone, 1977; Welch & Thompson, 1980), as well as the obstacles for
adoption (Karch, 2007). The executive branch, in particular, is dependent on states to
implement a host of domestic policy initiatives. From Medicaid to the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act to the War on Drugs, the states play a major role in
Hannah/Mallinson: Defiant Innovation 407
the success or failure of these programs. Increasingly, federalism scholars have noted
the shift in legislatively driven cooperative federalism to executive-driven coopera-
tive federalism (Gais & Fossett, 2005). Meaning, the executive branch has been taking
an increased role in shaping and reshaping intergovernmental implementation in the
face of gridlock in Congress and diminished legislative control (Bulman-Pozen &
Metzger, 2016; Gais & Fossett, 2005). The use of waivers for No Child Left Behind
and the Affordable Care Act clearly demonstrates the practical effects and limitations
of executive federalism (Dinan, 2014; Saultz, McEachin, & Fusarelli, 2016; Thompson
& Gusmano, 2014).
The dependence of the federal government on the states for policy imple-
mentation provides ample opportunity for states to shirk or sabotage their role.
The federal government, of course, uses the tools at its disposal (grants, waivers,
cross-over sanctions, among others) to encourage states to faithfully implement
the law. These tools send explicit signals to the states regarding the executives
expectations regarding proper policy implementation. Federal signals must be
credible and legitimate in the eyes of state officials for implementation to pro-
ceed promptly and without modifications (Goggin et al., 1990, p. 175). While
prior diffusion research corroborates the importance of credible and legitimate
signals (Allen et al., 2004), much of the extant research focuses on instances
where the federal government is promoting an innovation. In contrast, defiant
innovation modifies dissonant federal policies.
We argue that the federal government sends two kinds of signalsexplicit
and implicitto which the states respond. Explicit commitments come in the
form of executive branch enforcement activities. In the case of No Child Left
Behind, the Obama administration sent explicit signals regarding its desire to
reform the implementation of that law through the use of waivers (Saultz et al.,
2016). In the present case of MMLs, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) have authority over the enforcement of federal drug
laws. This enforcement power includes the ability to seize marijuana. We
hypothesize that increased seizure of marijuana sends explicit signals regarding
the executive branchs support of federal marijuana prohibition. There are, of
course, stronger signals at the presidents disposal, namely the millions of dol-
lars in funds and equipment sent to local police departments for the purpose of
executing the drug war. To our knowledge, the president has yet to use this
major stick against states acting in defiance of federal law. Thus, we use the mea-
sure of seizures as the clearest signal of the executive branchs commitment to
marijuana prohibition. Given that states vary in their ecological capacity to defy
federal law, stronger signals from the executive branch should raise the obstacles
to adoption to the point that the diffusion of a defiant innovation like medical
marijuana would slow, but not stop (Rabe, 2007). Conversely, the weakening of
explicit signals should prompt increased innovation activity.
Explicit Federal Commitments Hypothesis: Increased federal enforcement
decreases the likelihood that states will adopt a defiant innovation and
decreased enforcement has the opposite effect.
408 Policy Studies Journal, 46:2
When campaigning for office, presidents also send implicit signals regarding
their favorability toward a host of policies under their jurisdiction. Even after the
president is able to use their powers to send explicit signals regarding state imple-
mentation, some presidents maintain an image of promarijuana or antimarijuana
that may not directly match with their enforcement of the law. For example, Presi-
dent Obama has received criticism for increasing marijuana enforcement activities
during his presidency (Tau, 2012). This sends conflicting signals, as states strategi-
cally anticipate how the federal government will receive their defiant actions.
Changes in presidential administration provide one implicit signal of agreement or
disagreement with state defiance. It is possible that an administration can have a pos-
itive or negative impact on state innovation, even if the perception of their views on
a policy deviates from more explicit signals sent to the states.
Implicit Federal Commitments Hypothesis: Changes in presidential
administrations alter the likelihood of adopting a defiant innovation.
Demand
Demand for the innovation should have a particularly strong effect, providing
an impetus for defying federal law. This demand could be for the products of the
policy itself, medical marijuana for example, or state fiscal demand if the innovation
has a substantial influence on the states fiscal health. States regularly propose alter-
native means for raising revenue in order to avoid less politically palatable increases
to income and consumption taxes (Berry & Berry, 1990; Nelson & Mason, 2007). For
example, in the case of medical marijuana, states not only levy taxes on individuals,
they also tax dispensaries and distributors (Hickey, 2014). In many states, this has
led to substantial windfalls (Oosting, 2014; Stern, 2015).
Usage Demand Hypothesis: The likelihood of a state innovating defiantly
increases as internal demand for that innovation concomitantly increases.
Fiscal Demand Hypothesis: States facing fiscal stress are more likely to
adopt a defiant innovation that can raise additional revenue.
Ecological Capacity
Ecological capacity encompasses state wealth, state institutional capabilities,
and state situational contexts (Goggin et al., 1990, p. 135). Such capacity is necessary
for rapid and effective implementation (Goggin et al., 1990) and innovation adoption
(Walker, 1969). A states ecological capacity should thus condition its ability to
respond to federal signals in defiance. The popular initiative is an important institu-
tional capability for defiance, as it provides a means for citizens that are dissatisfied
Hannah/Mallinson: Defiant Innovation 409
with federal policy to circumvent state legislators reticent to defy the federal govern-
ment. Thus, if public opinion is growing increasingly incongruent with federal policy
and usage demand is increasing, state defiance actually increases opinion-policy con-
gruence and improves citizen perceptions of state responsiveness (Ferraiolo, 2008).
Moreover, the initiative serves as a legitimizer of innovative policies and sets the
agenda for other states, including legislatures in states that do not have the initiative
(Magleby, 1988). Finally, while initiatives are sponsored by outside groups, their
inclusion on the ballot still indicates a degree of state defiance, since they must be
certified by a states executive branch. In the case of MMLs, the first five laws
(Alaska, California, Maine, Oregon, and Washington) were adopted through direct
initiative between 1996 and 1999. Hawaii became the first state, in 2000, to pass an
MML through the state legislature.5
Initiative Availability Hypothesis: States with an available initiative pro-
cess are more likely to adopt an MML.
Other institutional, political, and social factors that should impact the likelihood
of MML innovation include legislative professionalism (McCann et al., 2015), voter
liberalism (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 1998), and prohibitionist religious
culture (Frendreis & Tatalovich, 2010; Jensen, 2003). Many of these relate to a states
political culture, which shapes the policy choices made by states (Elazar, 1966) and
intergovernmental implementation (Goggin et al., 1990). These components of a
states ecological capacity influence its willingness to defy or support federal law.
Thus, while we expect federal signals to be weak, internal characteristics should be
prevalent predictors of adoption.
Ecological Capacity Hypothesis: Internal characteristics of the state, like
ideology, religious and political cultures, and institutional capacity (e.g.,
legislative professionalism) condition the likelihood that states will react
positively or negatively to federal signals in deciding to adopt a defiant
innovation.
Diffusion
Diffusion scholars have long found that innovations may spread outward from
an innovator state to geographically contiguous states (Berry & Berry, 1990; Walker,
1969). In short, states that share borders are more likely to follow the political hap-
penings of their neighbors than those across the country. States that share borders
are also likely to be more similar in terms of their internal characteristics than states
that are farther away. Finally, neighbors are in direct competition (Berry & Baybeck,
2005; Dye, 1990), which is relevant given the large sums of tax revenue marijuana
can yield. Thus, it is important to test whether neighbor states are in fact influencing
each other.
410 Policy Studies Journal, 46:2
Neighbor Hypothesis: A state is more likely to adopt a defiant innovation
as the proportion of its contiguous neighbors that previously adopted also
increases.
While spatial relationships are important for policy diffusion, geography does
not provide the only means of similarity through which policies can diffuse. Ideolog-
ical similarity is a potential pathway of policy learning (Grossback, Nicholson-
Crotty, & Peterson, 2004) and likely relevant for acts of defiance. If states are choos-
ing to defy federal policy, they may be doing so based on ideological differences,
meaning the set of states willing to defy are connected more through ideology than
geography. Thus, it will be ideological peers, not contiguous neighbors, which influ-
ence defiant innovation.
Relative Ideology Hypothesis: A state is more likely to adopt a defiant
innovation if the ideology of past adopters falls closer to its own.
We now turn to describing our operationalization of these concepts and analyti-
cal technique for testing the above hypotheses.
Data and Analytical Technique
Dependent Variable
Data were collected on the 50 states from 1996 through 2014. Of these states, 23
passed MMLs, either by voter initiative or statute (see Figure 1 for a map of these
states). We employ event history analysis (EHA) to test the hypotheses presented
above (Berry & Berry, 1990). The time period covered in the model starts in the year
of the first passage of medical marijuana legislation (1996) and advances to 2014. In
1996, California voters approved Ballot Proposition 215, making California the first
state to adopt and drop out of the dataset. By 2014, 27 states remain in the risk set.6
Independent Variables
Credible commitments for federal marijuana prohibition enforcement by the
executive branch have varied over time, resulting in uncertainty for states, dispensa-
ries, and other businesses that support the marijuana industry. As medical marijuana
legislation emerged in the states, the Clinton administration made the War on Drugs
a priority in order to avoid being seen as soft on crime (National Research Council,
2014). It was not until the waning days of his administration that President Clinton
argued for marijuana decriminalization (Wenner, 2000). During the George W. Bush
administration, funding was increased for global drug interdiction and the federal
government remained committed to marijuana prohibition enforcement (Gaumond,
Davis, & Hill, 2009). The commitment to enforcement wavered during the Obama
administration. In 2009, DOJ issued the Ogden (2009) memo, which suggested that
Hannah/Mallinson: Defiant Innovation 411
DOJ would not expend resources prosecuting individuals that were acting in compli-
ance with state MMLs. DOJ, however, stepped back from this assurance in 2011 by
asserting their commitment to enforcing the CSA (Cole, 2011). Finally, in 2013, DOJ
announced that it would leave primary enforcement of marijuana law to states with
strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems to control the cultivation,
distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana (Cole, 2013). It also threatened to
pursue enforcement action if state enforcement mechanisms are not robust enough.
While this paves the way for states to operate medical and recreational marijuana
programs with less threat of federal government involvement, there are no guaran-
tees that the governments wait and see approach will remain as administrations
change.
There is an arresting gap, however, between the rhetoric and practices of all
three presidents. Figure 2 displays one marker of this by plotting the total amount of
marijuana seized domestically (1,000 kilograms) by the DEA from 1986 through
2014. It also demarcates the first year in office of Clinton (1993), Bush (2001), and
Obama (2009). Strikingly, marijuana seizures declined rapidly prior to Clinton taking
office, stayed relatively steady during the Clinton ad
