Week 7
1. After reading “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” discuss the threats we face at the Southwest Border and the influence of transnational crime and terror organizations associated with the fight against narcotics, terrorism, and spillover violence.
2. Please critique in detail the fight against drug related violence and terror on the Southwest Border of the United States. In doing so, also list and discuss the three points keyed in on by Kingpins and corruption (2017), which is part of this week’s readings.
The response to each question should be a “minimum” of 500 words of content (does not count references and or restating a question) and include “at least” two properly referenced sources, in accordance with the most recent edition of the APA manual , for full credit.
A M E R I C A N E N T E R P R I S E I N S T I T U T E
TA R G E T I N G T R A N S N AT I O N A L O R G A N I Z E D
C R I M E I N T H E A M E R I C AS
Kingpins and Corruption
AEI WORKING GROUP ON TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE AMERICAS
J U N E 2 0 1 7
A M E R I C A N E N T E R P R I S E I N S T I T U T E
TA R G E T I N G T R A N S N AT I O N A L O R G A N I Z E D
C R I M E I N T H E A M E R I C AS
Kingpins and Corruption
AEI WORKING GROUP ON TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE AMERICAS
J U N E 2 0 1 7
2017 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved.
The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit,
501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional posi-
tions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s).
iii
Contents
Executive Summary …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
I. US Policy Tools for Combating Transnational Organized Crime …………………………………………………………………….. 5
II. Colombia: Securing Genuine Peace ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 11
III. Venezuela: A State Destroyed by Crime and Corruption ……………………………………………………………………………… 18
IV. Confronting the Iran-Hezbollah Threat in the Western Hemisphere ………………………………………………………….. 26
V. The Criminalized State in Latin America …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 32
VI. Instability and Gangs in the Northern Triangle …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 37
VII. Modernizing Security Cooperation with Mexico …………………………………………………………………………………………. 42
AEI Working Group on Transnational Organized Crime in the Americas ………………………………………………………. 49
Acknowledgments ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 50
Notes ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 51
1
Executive Summary
Transnational organized crime resides at the heart of nearly every major threat confronting
the Americas today, whether it is the deadly opioid
crisis hurting US communities, the catastrophic col-
lapse of oil-rich Venezuela, or debilitating gang vio-
lence throughout Central America, which spills over
into the streets of American cities. These crises can
be traced to criminal networks that garner billions
from the production of illicit drugs, human traffick-
ing, and extortion.
These organizations relentlessly attack democratic
institutions and the rule of law, stunting economic
growth and stifling legitimate commerce and invest-
ment. Their criminal networks, largely bankrolled by con-
sumers of illicit drugs in the United States and Europe,
respect no borders and operate with virtual impunity in
countries ravaged by corruption and violence.
Disrupting those transnational operations requires
international cooperation, and for decades, US aid and
diplomacy has prioritized this partnership. Regret-
tably, political developments have undermined the
willingness or capability of key states in the Western
Hemisphere to effectively implement efforts against
transnational organized crime.
Now, more than ever, the United States must work
with regional allies to restore the hemispheric coali-
tion against transnational organized crime. US poli-
cymakers can lead the way by applying asymmetrical
tools, such as financial sanctions targeting transna-
tional organized crime kingpins and corrupt officials,
and working to enhance local enforcement capabili-
ties and promote economic development. Such pro-
active engagement signals US resolve to confront the
transnational organized crime threat and levels the
playing field for states that lack the resources to con-
front these powerful syndicates.
This report focuses on the threat posed by trans-
national organized crime in the Americas, elucidating
a series of effective policy prescriptions for Congress
and the Trump administration. The reports seven
sections present an overview of tools available to the
government and spotlight transnational organized
crime threats that demand more attention and action
from US authorities.
The US government has the means and legal
framework to counter transnational organized
crime. However, effectively implementing such
policy will require strong political will and the
proper allocation of resources.
As Colombia begins implementing its peace
accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC), dissident guerrillas and
the countrys other organized criminal groups
threaten to undermine this major undertaking.
These dissidents deep ties to demobilized FARC
leaders and the cocaine trade, their international
connections, and their historical control over a
significant portion of the FARCs financial assets
demand special attention.
Venezuelan government officials are actively
involved in international crime and using state
resources, including military assets, to support
illicit activities such as money laundering and
drug smuggling. These officials also have collab-
orated with extra-regional actors such as Iran
and Hezbollah, incorporating them into their
criminal networks.
Iran has gradually increased its official profile
and influence in Latin America in recent years.
Connections to Lebanese Shia expatriate com-
munities enable Iran and its proxy Hezbollah to
operate clandestinely in the region. Hezbollahs
2
KI N G PI N S AN D C O R R U PTI O N
integration into the regions existing transna-
tional criminal networks poses a severe threat to
US and regional security.
The adaptability, endurance, and ruthlessness of
gangs in Central America make them a unique
transnational criminal threat that destabilizes
the region. Gangs such as MS-13 are working
to diversify their criminal activity, integrating
themselves into drug trafficking operations and
even political activity, with mixed results.
Corrupt officials in Central America actively
participate in and support a larger network of
international illicit financing and smuggling. In
El Salvador, Farabundo Mart National Libera-
tion Front leader Jos Luis Merino acts as the
countrys primary fixer, using his influence
and international connections to finance and
launder money for drug traffickers and corrupt
Venezuelan officials.
Despite concerted government efforts, violence
and associated mortality rates have spiked in
Mexico in recent years. New approaches and
honest recognition of underlying causes by both
the United States and Mexico are required to
effectively confront the threat.
Key Findings and Recommendations
Key enforcement mechanisms and policy
options available to the US government to
counter transnational organized crime remain
underused and under-resourced. The US gov-
ernment should reevaluate the allocation of
resources involved in countering transnational
organized crime in the Americas. It should also
more aggressively use enforcement mechanisms
at its disposal (such as sanctions and criminal
prosecution) to degrade threat networks and
promote regional security and development
cooperation.
To ensure the prospects for peace in Colom-
bia, the US government should target, seize,
and repurpose illicit funds hidden abroad by
the FARC. It should ensure that these funds are
devoted to the successful implementation of the
peace agreement. At the same time, it should
support Colombias security forces seeking to
deny criminal groups the opportunity to fill the
void left by the FARCs eventual demobilization.
US policymakers should continue applying sanc-
tions against key Venezuelan officials whose
criminal activities help sustain the authoritarian
regime. Sanctioning officials such as Diosdado
Cabello would further expose the regimes ram-
pant criminality and undercut its oppression of
the Venezuelan people.
Latin American states that lack counterterror-
ism legal frameworks could benefit from US
assistance in developing a legislative agenda to
address this problem. The US government can
also expand its own legislation, including the
Hezbollah International Financing Prevention
Act of 2015, to better target terror groups oper-
ating in Latin America.
To dismantle criminalized state structures, the
US should target their key enablers, includ-
ing Salvadoran kingpin Jos Luis Merino, with
financial investigations and sanctions. It should
also support the anticorruption efforts of attor-
neys general and advocate for adopting interna-
tionally backed anticorruption bodies.
The United States can help address the roots
of the gang problem in the Northern Trian-
gle countries of Central America by helping
them overhaul their overcrowded and unse-
cure prison systems and coordinating with them
on deporting and reintegrating gang members.
It also should work with local governments to
address underlying causes of proliferating gang
membership and violence.
3
EXE C UTIVE S U M MARY
Fighting transnational organized crime in Mex-
ico is a complicated task that requires ade-
quate human and material resources, efficient
law enforcement agencies, and willing partners
to fight a threat that evolves, adapts, and oper-
ates across national borders. The US and Mex-
ico should modernize their cooperation on
countering transnational organized crime based
on a recognition of the structural corruption
in Mexico that undermines the rule of law, law
enforcement efforts, and international cooper-
ation. Also, US authorities should consider clos-
ing legal loopholes related to arms exports and
opioid prescriptions.
5
I. US Policy Tools for Combating
Transnational Organized Crime
Transnational organized crime, with its unprec-edented wealth and influence, has become the
most significant threat to security and prosperity in
the Americas. The US government considers transna-
tional criminal organizations (TCOs) a pressing threat
to national security and has implemented initiatives,
such as the 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational
Organized Crime and the 2017 Presidential Execu-
tive Order on Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to
Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing
International Trafficking, to better detect, disrupt,
and dismantle these criminal networks. The Trump
administration has the opportunity to intensify these
efforts by exercising and expanding prosecutions,
sanctions, and enforcement agencies legal authori-
ties; allocating additional investigative resources; and
demonstrating the political will to bring TCOs to jus-
tice, seize their assets, and deny them access to the
international financial system.
Illicit networks comprised of terrorists, criminals,
and proliferators have increasingly capitalized on glo-
balization to expand their nefarious agendas, exploit-
ing global supply chains across multiple platforms to
move goods, people, services, and data. And while ter-
rorists are traditionally driven by fanatical ideology,
TCOs are motivated by profits, and they meet inter-
national demand for illegal products and contraband
through illicit activities.
Recently, terrorism and crime have converged, with
these groups sharing operating areas, intelligence,
tactics, and resources to undermine nation-states.
For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) has capitalized on global demand
for cocaine and used its illicit trade to sustain its insur-
gency and terror campaign against the Colombian
government for more than 50 years. Other groups
such as the Lebanese Hezbollah leverage segments
of the Lebanese Shiite diaspora in Latin America and
elsewhere to raise charitable donations, launder the
proceeds of crime, and engage in trade-based money
laundering to finance their terrorist agenda.1 Thus, as
globalization continues to facilitate the operations of
TCOs and terror groups, the US governments poli-
cies will need to evolve accordingly.
Beyond the War on Drugs
US efforts to counter transnational organized crime
(CTOC) began during the Nixon administration. In
response to rising drug usage, Richard Nixon declared
an all-out, global war on the drug menace and cre-
ated the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).2
Since that time, the federal governments antidrug
programs have steadily expanded.
In the 1990s, an antidrug alliance began to take
shape in drug-producing states in the Andean region
of South America, when governments in Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela made
common cause with the United States to fight the
production of illicit drugs. Despite occasional set-
backs, these countries welcomed trade benefits
and US foreign assistance to bolster their anti-
drug efforts. Large-scale aid programs such as Plan
Colombiathe most prominent example of US for-
eign assistance targeted toward combating transna-
tional criminal activitygreatly improved security
Special thanks to Celina Realuyo for her contributions to
this section.
6
KI N G PI N S AN D C O R R U PTI O N
across the region by developing local enforcement
capabilities.
In the past decade, however, that consensus has
disintegrated. Venezuelas anti-US chavista govern-
ment expelled the DEA and ended counter-drug
cooperation. In Bolivia, the head of the coca-growers
union, Evo Morales, was elected president and soon
rejected US antidrug initiatives. Ecuadorian President
Rafael Correa ousted a US antidrug operations center
from the coastal town of Manta.3 Even in Colombia,
a friendly government has moved to end aerial fumi-
gation and cease the extradition of cocaine kingpins
from guerrilla ranks.
Restoring a robust coalition among these countries
to renew coercive operations against illicit drugs, at
least in the short run, would be a challenge for US
diplomacy. However, even though foreign govern-
ments might not share the US governments commit-
ment to fighting drugs, criminals in their territories
do not have the right to violate US law or launder the
proceeds of their crimes using US dollars. Although
these criminals can evade capture and prosecu-
tion, they could still be subject to other US enforce-
ment actions. To counter illicit trade conducted in
dollar-denominated transactions through the US
financial system, the executive branch can deploy
numerous asymmetrical policy tools to target sus-
pected traffickers, deny them access to the US finan-
cial system, and freeze their assets.
One such tool is the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act of 1999, or the Kingpin Act, which
denies significant foreign narcotics traffickers . . .
access to the U.S. financial system and [prohibits] all
trade and transactions between the traffickers and
U.S. companies and individuals.4 The Kingpin Act
was modeled on an earlier sanctions program that the
Department of the Treasurys Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) administered against Colombian
drug cartels in 1995. The act has been used to disman-
tle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations around
the world and will continue to be a valuable tool for
the US government as it expands its enforcement
efforts against TCOs.
2011 Presidential Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime
After a comprehensive assessment in 2010, the US
government concluded that transnational organized
crime should be regarded as a national security threat.
The assessment included several alarming conclu-
sions, including that TCOs ability to penetrate state
structures is increasing, degrading (and sometimes
co-opting entirely) government in some states; that
transnational organized crime threatens US eco-
nomic interests and international markets; that ter-
ror and insurgent groups are increasingly relying on
TCOs for funding and logistics support, with partic-
ularly dangerous implications for the potential move-
ment of weapons of mass destruction; and that TCOs
focusing on human trafficking are increasing their
incomes and penchant for violence.5
Following the review, the White House issued
the US Strategy to Combat Transnational Orga-
nized Crime in July 2011, making the smuggling of
drugs, arms, and persons; money laundering; and the
terror-crime nexus top national security concerns.
While the 2011 CTOC strategy refocused US
efforts to target transnational criminal networks
across agencies, the new strategy was not comple-
mented with the additional financial and human
resources required to ensure its successful imple-
mentation. An extensive Rand Corporation study
highlighted this disparity and the additional gaps in
authorities that hamper the US military and other
agencies CTOC mission. Many government offi-
cials cited a lack of funding and resources as a prin-
cipal obstacle to implementing CTOC policy, and
the report noted that Congress has not appropriated
additional funds to support this mission.6
The reports findings mirrored Admiral Kurt W.
Tidds assessment in his 2017 United States Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM) Posture Statement to Con-
gress.7 He noted that SOUTHCOM has traditionally
received minimal funding relative to other regional
combatant commands and that force requirements
have repeatedly not been met. This under-resourcing
has hindered drug interdiction efforts in the area,
with three-quarters of cocaine traffickers able to
7
U S PO LI CY TO O LS FO R C O M BATI N G TR AN S NATI O NAL O R GAN IZE D C R I M E
successfully deliver their product despite detection by
the US government.8 The US Coast Guard estimates
that it is aware of roughly 90 percent of maritime
drug trafficking.9 However, it has sufficient resources
to interdict only 1120 percent of those shipments
annually.10 The new administration should consider
reviewing funding streams essential to CTOC efforts
that could enhance US national security by allowing
government agencies to more aggressively pursue
TCOs in the hemisphere.
The Trump Administrations Actions to
Combat Transnational Organized Crime
The Trump administration has so far demonstrated
a commitment to combat transnational organized
crime by enforcing existing laws and pursuing inter-
national illicit networks abroad. The presidential
executive order (EO) on TCOs and international traf-
ficking, issued February 9, 2017, indicated the new
administrations commitment to combat transna-
tional organized crime and promote domestic and
international security.
The EO focuses on TCOs and subsidiary organi-
zations, including transnational drug cartels, which
threaten the safety of the United States and regional
stability. In practice, the EO codifies much of the
2011 CTOC strategy by encouraging partnerships
with foreign counterparts and intelligence sharing
and cooperation among US agencies. It also directs
policy through entities such as the International
Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Cen-
ter, established early in the Obama administration to
coordinate the CTOC efforts of nine US law enforce-
ment agencies.11
Sanctions Against Illicit Actors
The Trump administration has also leveraged finan-
cial tools in its arsenal to combat transnational
criminal activity. On February 13, 2017, OFAC sanc-
tioned Venezuelan Vice President Tareck Zaidan El
Aissami Maddah as a Specially Designated Narcotics
Trafficker under the Kingpin Act for playing a signif-
icant role in international narcotics trafficking.12 A
multiyear government investigation uncovered and
froze assets held by multiple El Aissamiassociated
companies, while detailing his role in narcotics traf-
ficking and concluding that the Venezuelan vice pres-
ident is a prominent Venezuelan drug trafficker.13
This action, which is explored further later in this
report, demonstrates an early commitment from the
Trump administration to pursue transnational crim-
inals and apply increased pressure on Nicols Mad-
uros regime in Venezuela, a transnational organized
crime hub in Latin America. The new administration
should expand the use of targeted sanctions to isolate
and penalize criminal threat networks.
CTOC Authorities and Resources
As the threat of transnational organized crime
expands and evolves, so too should the tools and
CTOC methods of US law enforcement. One of the
primary programs in current CTOC efforts is the
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces
(OCDETF) Program in the Department of Justice
(DOJ). The ODCETF is an umbrella for seven fed-
eral agency members: the DEA; the FBI; the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF);
the US Marshals Service; the IRS Criminal Investiga-
tion Division; the Homeland Security Investigations
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and
the US Coast Guard.14 The OCDETF has had success
recently targeting high-priority TCO targets, which it
refers to as Consolidated Priority Organization Tar-
gets (CPOTs) and Regional Priority Organization
Targets. The DOJ claims that between fiscal year (FY)
2003 and FY 2015, the OCDETF disrupted or disman-
tled 3,589 CPOT-like organizations.15
Despite these successes, the OCDETF has strug-
gled to retain manpower and meet investigations tar-
gets. The number of OCDETF positions has declined
from 3,331 earlier this decade to a proposed 2,870 for
FY 2018.16 At the same time, the OCDETF has not
reached its targets in terms of investigations initiated
for the past four fiscal years.17
8
KI N G PI N S AN D C O R R U PTI O N
The DOJ has also identified several areas where
its operations could be improved, particularly in the
financial arena. According to its FY 2017 congressio-
nal budget justification, despite continued empha-
sis on targeting money launderers and facilitators,
OCDETFs investigative agents and prosecutors still
struggle to find expertise sufficient to fully investigate
and dismantle the financial infrastructure of these
criminal organizations.18 With current efforts barely
making a dent in TCOs revenue, the government will
need to expand its financial investigative efforts to
further deprive them of resources.
Expanding financial investigations would enhance
one tool that could be particularly effective in an
increased CTOC enforcement push in Latin America
specific targeting actions administered by the
Treasury Department under both OFAC and the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
Both of these arms of the Treasury have broad author-
ity to investigate and sanction individuals, financial
institutions, and states for transnational organized
crime activity under Section 311 of the Patriot Act, the
Kingpin Act, and EO 13581, which declared a national
emergency to deal with . . . the growing threat of sig-
nificant transnational criminal organizations.19
However, effectively expanding the use of these tools
in CTOC efforts in Latin America will be difficult if
their associated budgets continue stagnating.
The Treasury Departments FY 2018 budget
request leaves the budgets for FinCEN and the
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (which
houses OFAC) unchanged from FY 2017s continuing
Owned or controlled by
Owned or
controlled by
Frontman
Blocked U.S. entities linked to LOPEZ BELLO
Designated foreign entities linked to LOPEZ BELLO
U.S. Department of the Treasury
Office of Foreign Assets Control
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act
1425 BRICKELL AVENUE UNIT 46B, LLC 200G PSA HOLDINGS LLC
Tareck Zaidan EL AISSAMI MADDAH Samark Jose LOPEZ BELLO
a.k.a. Samark LOPEZ DELGADO
DOB 27 Jul 1974
POB Venezuela
Citizen Venezuela
Identification Number 11.208.888 (Venezuela)
a.k.a. Tarek EL AISSAMI
DOB 12 Nov 1974
POB El Vigia, Merida, Venezuela
Citizen Venezuela
Identification Number 12.354.211 (Venezuela)
Miami, FL
Tax ID No. 36-4802365
Miami, FL
Tax ID No. 90-1019707
Miami, FL
Tax ID No. 71-1053365
Miami, FL
Tax ID No. 80-0890696
Miami, FL
Tax ID No. 90-0865341
AGUSTA GRAND I LLC 1425 BRICKELL AVENUE 64E LLC1425 BRICKELL AVE 63-F LLC
N200VR
SERVICIOS TECNOLOGICOS INDUSTRIALES, C.A.MFAA HOLDINGS LIMITED
Registered in Miami, FL
Gulfstream 200
Manufacturer’s Serial Number 133
EL AISSAMI & LOPEZ BELLO Network
February 2017
Blocked aircraft
YAKIMA TRADING CORPORATION
Panama
RUC # 3196611412868
PROFIT CORPORATION, C.A. GRUPO SAHECT, C.A.
SMT TECNOLOGIA, C.A.
Caracas, Venezuela
RIF # J-00317392-4
YAKIMA OIL TRADING, LLP
Caracas, Venezuela
RIF # J-40068226-6
ALFA ONE, C.A.
Caracas, Venezuela
RIF # J-29620174-9
London, United Kingdom
Commercial Registry Number OC390985
Tortola, British Virgin Islands
Company Number 1793372
Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela
RIF # J-31103570-2
Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela
RIF # J-31482089-3
US Department of the Treasury graphic describing El Aissamis network
Source: US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, El Aissami & Lopez Bello Network, February 2017, https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/20170213_el_aissami_lopez_bello_network.pdf.
9
U S PO LI CY TO O LS FO R C O M BATI N G TR AN S NATI O NAL O R GAN IZE D C R I M E
resolutionlevels that are actually lower than
FY 2016 and include staffing reductions across mul-
tiple FinCEN programs.20 This budget crunch comes
even as increasing percentages of FinCENs federal
government partners report satisfaction with its per-
formance, including the intelligence it produces and
the positive effects its enforcement actions have on
compliance by targeted financial institutions.21
Another crucial element of the CTOC mission in
Latin America is capacity-building and development
aid for regional partners. US State Department pro-
grams such as the Central American Regional Security
Initiative and the Caribbean Basin Security Initia-
tive provide training, enhance local law enforcement
efforts, and fund aid programs that target transna-
tional organized crime drivers, such as lacking eco-
nomic opportunity and education. These programs
are integral to a well-rounded approach to CTOC in
the Western Hemisphere.
The US government will need to further develop
and evaluate how policy initiatives such as the new US
Strategy for Engagement in Central America are influ-
encing these programs and whether conditioning aid
based on local political reform has the desired effect
of improving economic and security situations. Con-
gress should also evaluate the efficacy of disparate
initiatives such as the Alliance for Prosperity, whose
mission parallels that of the US strategy but is geared
more toward the priorities of the Central American
member states.22
Continued development of aid and security pro-
grams integral to CTOC in Latin America will be con-
tingent on sufficient allocation of financial resources.
Current budget proposals would severely affect the
region, dropping funding for independent develop-
ment initiatives and agencies focused on addressing
socioeconomic factors that contribute to transna-
tional organized crime.23 If proposed budget cuts do
go into effect, the United States will need to further
engage with multilateral institutions that support key
aspects of the CTOC mission in Latin America.
The United States is a global leader in developing
strong antimoney laundering and counterterror-
ism financing (AML/CFT) regimes. The US govern-
ment should leverage this leadership in forums such
as the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America,
of which the United States is an observer, to provide
guidance and assistance to states that are working to
implement and improve their AML/CFT strategies
and laws.
The State Department also employs rewards pro-
grams, which offer large sums in return for information
US Treasury Building
Source: Wikimedia, http://bit.ly/2rnJsEM.
http://bit.ly/2rnJsEM
10
KI N G PI N S AN D C O R R U PTI O N
leading to the arrest or capture of wanted fugitives.
Since 1986, its Narcotics Reward Program has paid
out roughly $88 million in rewards.24 In 2013, the State
Department established the Transnational Organized
Crime Rewards Program, a companion to the original
narcotics program, with rewards for criminals whose
illicit activities fall outside drug trafficking. While
TCOs in Latin America continue to diversify their
illicit activities away from narcotics trafficking, the
program has seen far less engagement in terms of tar-
get designation in this region than that of the narcot-
ics program.25 Increasing engagement and the number
of TCO leaders on both lists could bolster US govern-
ment investigations and the judicial process.
Congress has also worked recently to address
gaps in US law enforcement agencies authority to
act against transnational organized crime threats
abroad, passing legislation such as the Transnational
Drug Trafficking Act of 2015. The narrowly targeted
legislation aims to help the DOJ build extradition
cases on drug kingpins from the Andean region.26
Similar legislation will almost certainly be needed as
the transnational organized crime dynamic evolves
and US government agencies are forced to adapt
accordingly.
Of the challenge in addressing the numerous
threats, US Coast Guard Captain Peter Hatch, the
deputy director of the Department of Homeland
Security Joint Task Force, observes:
The things were trying to accomplish when you
think about crime and what our desired national out-
comes are going to be for the different criminal net-
works were up againstits not going to be uniform.
Sometimes were going to arrest Pablo Escobar and
thats going to be the thing that takes down the
criminal network. Sometimes were going to build a
school in Tapachula and thats whats going to dimin-
ish or prevent the reconstitution of the criminal net-
work. Every criminal network is going to be treated
differently.27
Transnational Organized Crime in Latin
America
Transnational organized crime and the proliferation
of threat networks are global problems, and each
case poses a unique challenge for the US government
in terms of securing the homeland and its interests
abroad. While the fight against transnational threat
networks in the Middle East and other terror-addled
regions has received ample attention and resources,
it has come at the expense of other regions that pose
their own threats to US national security.
This report will focus closely on Latin America,
whose geographic proximity to the homeland makes
it of unique concern to policymakers. The 2011 CTOC
strategy identifies this region as an area where illicit
trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons [by TCOs]
fuel increased instability and are threatening the
prosperity of some Central American states. The
strategy spotlights local efforts to address threats,
such as the Mexican and Colombian governments
CTOC campaigns, indicating the importance of
capacity-building efforts by t
