3820 assignment 1 – 3 total
3 assignments total that belong to chapter 1-2
PAD3820 Module 1 read chapters 1-2 book attached the following 3 assignments are based on this due 8/25
professor will place in Turnitin therefore do not place just make sure no plagiarism. All articles can only be used 1 time
Assignment 1-Module One Discussion Part 1
1. Locate and summarize an article related to concepts of this modules submission box assignment(s) and POST ON THE DISCUSSION BOARD. Discuss your article in relation to the reading (in 100 words) and cite the source of your article using APA format. (This article is NOT required to be a scholarly article however you must provide the articles citation.)
2. Respond to the student below article summarizations with your opinion of their articles in 50 words for each summarization. Responses such as, I agree or Good idea are not acceptable and will receive no credit. The response must add to the scholarly dialogue presenting the reasons for your opinion and supporting documentation cited.
Student#1- The national response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been heavily criticized. The United States of America has approximately four percent of the worlds population. However, the United States accounts for twenty percent of the worlds COVID-19 cases.
Millions of United States citizens are out of work due to COVID-19 and the governments response to COVID-19. The pandemic has been unnecessarily politicized by both parties due to the upcoming election. The government executed a mandatory shutdown of all non-essential business, with the hope of a quick economic recovery after the lockdown was finished. This did not turn out to be the case. A science-based national response plan would have been ideal, rather than the political nightmare that dealt with the pandemic.
References
Canton, L. G. (2020). Emergency Management: Concepts and strategies for effective programs (2nd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
Cohen, S. (2020, August 17). Toward a National Response to the COVID Catastrophe. Retrieved August 24, 2020, from https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2020/08/17/toward-national-response-covid-catastrophe/
Assignment #2 Module 1 essay
PLACE ALL ANSWERS IN THIS ASSIGNMENT ON ONE WORD DOCUMENT ONLY, IDENTIFYING EACH ACCORDINGLY.
After reading Chapter One prepare a 200 word response to the below.
List and then discuss each of the historical perspectives that have lead to the development of emergency management.
After reading Chapter Two prepare a 200 word response the below.
List and then discuss each of the historical perspectives that have lead toward a national response strategy.
Assignment #3 Module One Research Assignment
Research Assignment: Using this school library https://www.fsw.edu/library/ locate one scholarly article that identifies the primary responsibilities for coordination of public safety agencies in response to cross jurisdictional emergencies. For this article prepare a summary paper as follows:
Page One Article Title: List the article publication information using APA style for reference list citations, e.g. Smith, N (2005). Information technology in the public sector. Technology and Public Administration Journal, 12(3), 125-136.
Page Two Summary (100 words): List the articles thesis (or hypotheses), methodology and evidence, its logic or argument, and summarizes its conclusions.
Page Three Evaluation (100 words): Using the article you summarized for Week One, critique the article’s thesis (or hypotheses), methodology, evidence, logic, and conclusions from your perspective on the problem. Be constructively critical, suggesting how the research could be better or more useful. Be sure to cite other scholarly articles, by way of comparison and contrast, in support of your critique EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
Concepts andStrategies
forEffective Programs
Second edition
LUCIEN G. CANTON, CEM
This edition first published 2020
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Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data
Names: Canton, Lucien G., author.
Title: Emergency management : concepts and strategies foreffective programs /
Lucien G. Canton, CEM.
Description: Second edition. | Hoboken, NJ : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2020. |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2018061423 (print) | LCCN 2019003431 (ebook) | ISBN
9781119560456 (Adobe PDF) | ISBN 9781119560470 (ePub) | ISBN 9781119066859
(hardcover)
Subjects: LCSH: Emergency managementUnited StatesPlanning. | Emergency
managementUnited StatesEvaluation.
Classification: LCC HV551.3 (ebook) | LCC HV551.3 .C36 2020 (print) | DDC
363.340973dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018061423
Cover design: Wiley
Cover image: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Arnold Genthe Collection: Negatives and
Transparencies, LC-USZ62-128020
Set in 12/14pts TimesNewRomanMTStd by SPi Global, Chennai, India
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For
David Fowler
19442001
Newsman, colleague, mentor and friend,
But, always, a true San Franciscan
And for
Roy Kite
19282015
and
Ken Chin
19362012
Good friends and colleagues, who taught me that service to others requires integrity,
commitment, and the courage to take risks.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION XIII
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION XV
INTRODUCTION XVII
1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THEEVOLUTION OFEMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT 1
Why Study History? 2
Lessons FromHistory 5
The Advent ofDisaster Legislation 14
The Growth ofDisaster Bureaucracy 22
From Military toCivilian Leadership 23
Civil Defense andDisaster Relief Merge 27
Conclusion 32
2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: TOWARD ANATIONAL RESPONSE
STRATEGY 33
The Origins ofNational Planning 34
September 11 andTheImpact ofHomeland Security 36
The Marginalization ofEmergency Management 36
Capabilitiesbased Planning Replaces AllHazards Planning 39
The Pendulum Swings Back: Hurricane Katrina 43
A Failed Response? 43
Degraded Capabilities andConfused Planning 45
Reform and New Planning Concepts 47
Conclusion 49
CONTENTS
viii CONTENTS
3 SOCIAL SCIENCE ANDTHEBEGINNINGS OFEMERGENCY
MANAGEMENTTHEORY 51
Social Science asanEmergency Management Tool 51
Social Science Evolves Emergency Management Theory 52
Emergencies, Disasters, andCatastrophes 54
Disaster Mythology 65
Organizational Response 69
Conclusion 71
4 THE EMERGENCY MANAGER: EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING
PARADIGMS 73
Conflicting Roles 74
The Emergency Manager asProgram Manager 78
Toward Professionalization 84
Emergency Management asaField 84
Emergency Management asaDiscipline 88
Emergency Management asaProfession 89
Conclusion 90
5 ESTABLISHING THEEMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 93
Program Administration 94
Developing aGovernance Structure 94
The Administrative Plan 99
Strategic Planning 99
Formulating Vision 101
Establishing Goals andObjectives 106
Developing theStrategic Plan 108
Enabling Authorities andLegislation 109
Grant Requirements 111
Best Practices 112
Program Elements 113
Resource Management 113
Training 115
Finance 116
CONTENTS ix
Program Evaluation 118
Quantitative Assessment Tools 118
Qualitative Assessment Tools 119
Exercise Programs 120
Actual Incidents 123
Corrective Action Program 124
Conclusion 125
6 ASSESSING RISK 127
The Nature ofRisk 128
Risk Assessment Methodologies 129
Hazard Identification 133
Hazard Analysis 140
Simple Matrix Analysis 140
Indicators andNumerical Ranking 143
THIRA andContext Analysis 148
Intuition 149
Impact Analysis 150
Business Impact Analysis (BIA) 150
Adaptive Business Continuity 154
Continuity ofGovernment/Continuity ofOperations 155
Federal Guidance 155
Critical Functions andProcess Analysis 158
Conclusion 160
7 DEVELOPING STRATEGY 163
A New Look at anOld Model 164
Risk Management Strategy 166
Mitigation Strategy 168
Recovery Strategy 173
Response Strategy 180
Preparedness Strategy 185
Using Strategy toGuide Planning 187
Conclusion 189
x CONTENTS
8 PLANNING CONCEPTS 191
Plans Versus Planning 191
The Planning Continuum 197
Planning Methodologies 201
Planning Assumptions 201
ScenarioBased Planning 202
Functional Planning 205
CapabilitiesBased Planning 207
Effective Planning 208
Simplicity inPlanning 209
Operational Phases 210
AllHazards Planning 212
Decentralized Execution 212
Putting thePieces Together 214
General Planning Principles 215
Conclusion 217
9 PLANNING TECHNIQUES ANDMETHODS 219
Establish aPlanning Structure 219
Use aMeeting Facilitation Process 222
Meeting Agenda 225
Conducting theMeeting 226
The Meeting Memorandum 227
Develop anAction Plan andSet Deadlines 229
Managing Multiple Projects 230
Annual Work Plans 230
Graphic Planning Tools 231
Facilitate DecisionMaking 232
Use Common Plan Formats 234
Determining Plan Content 236
Use Graphic Tools 238
Use Exercises toTest Concepts 242
Keep it Simple 244
Conclusion 245
CONTENTS xi
10 COORDINATING RESPONSE 247
Operational Response 247
Incident Management Systems 251
Unified andArea Commands 256
Multiagency Coordination Systems 258
Emergency Operations Centers 264
Communications andInteroperability 269
Information Processing 272
Mutual Aid 273
Resource Management andLogistics 274
The Joint Information Center 276
Conclusion 278
11 LEADING INCRISIS 279
Principles ofEmergency Management 280
Program Leadership 282
Building aLeadership Team 282
Establishing Relationships 284
Making Decisions 285
Operational Leadership 286
The Effects ofCrisis 286
Barriers toDecisionMaking 287
Crisis DecisionMaking 289
Conclusion 291
12 CRISIS MANAGEMENT 293
Barriers toCrisis Management 294
Disengagement andInexperience 294
Common Leadership Problems 295
Appropriate Roles forSenior Officials 297
Crisis Management 299
Identifying theCrisis 299
Isolating theCrisis 300
xii CONTENTS
Preparing forCrisis Management 301
Hurricane Katrina: Crisis Management Failure 302
Increasing Organizational Effectiveness 304
Crisis Communications 305
Strategic Recovery Issues 307
Catastrophic Events 312
Conclusion 315
CONCLUSION 317
BIBLIOGRAPHY 321
INDEX 327
Preparedness is the ultimate confidence builder.
Vince Lombardi
Shortly after the publication of the first edition of this book, I accepted an invitation from
Dr.Wayne Blanchard at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to give a short
presentation on the book at the annual Emergency Management Higher Education Program
conference in Emmitsburg, Maryland. I was stunned to find myself on stage at a plenary
session with Dr. Claire Rubin on one side and Dr. Russell Dynes on the other. The contribu-
tions of these two individuals to the discipline of emergency management are almost legendary,
and to find that my book was considered worthy of being included in a discussion of their new
works was humbling and, frankly, a bit frightening.
Anyone who has authored a book knows that authors are very aware of the shortcomings of
their books. There are things you wish you had included, things you wish you had said differ-
ently, and things you just got plain wrong. I am no different, and I still cringe when I read parts
of the first edition. Consequently, when the opportunity arose to revise my book for a second
edition, I jumped at the chance.
Maybe, I should have tested the water before jumping in.
Emergency management is based on the concept of continuous improvement. This makes it
a very dynamic field that is constantly evolving. Each disaster, and there have been many since
my book was first published in 2007, presents us with new challenges and new solutions. We
learn from our experiences and revise our strategies. This dynamic change is reflected in evolv-
ing national strategies, strategies that I am gratified to see incorporate some of the concepts I
espoused in the first edition of this book.
There have been significant changes in the academic world as well, as emergency management
has come into its own as an academic discipline. With the increase in higher education pro-
grams and the number of doctoral candidates, we have seen the emergence of academic jour-
nals devoted to emergency management and an increase in the volume of research on emergency
management issues. Much of this work is being done by a new generation of researchers who
are dedicated to this new discipline of emergency management.
Perhaps one of the most significant advances has been the emergence of an accepted defini-
tion of emergency management and of the Principles or Emergency Management. One of the
major problems in emergency management has been a lack of identity. We still have a long way
to go in defining who we are and what we do, but the Principles of Emergency Management
project is a major milestone in that journey.
What has not changed, though, is the need for emergency managers to move beyond their
traditional role as a response technician to that of a manager with responsibility for formu-
lating program strategy and serving as an advisor to senior officials. The range of threats we
face is increasing, particularly in cybersecurity. The rise of social media has drastically changed
PREFACE TOTHESECOND EDITION
xiv PREFACE TOTHESECOOD EDITIOO
how we communicate warnings. The 24hour news cycle has had a major impact on our media
relations. Oo single individual or small team can handle the diversity of problems we must con-
front. Oow, more than ever, emergency management must be an enterprisewide program, and
the emergency manager must be forward thinking and capable of seeing beyond just issues of
response.
As I said in the preface to the first edition, no book is the sole product of the author, and I
have leaned heavily on the work of many others. To my many friends in the academic community,
thank you for your enthusiastic reception of my book and your many thoughtful suggestions
for improving it. Without your work, this book would not exist. Thank you also to my col-
leagues and friends in the emergency management community; many of the ideas and concepts
in this book came from you and your willingness to share your wisdom. One of the privileges I
have enjoyed since the publication of the first edition was the numerous invitations to teach at
universities in the United States and in Ireland. To all those students who let me try out new
ideas and concepts on them and challenged me to learn more about my profession, thank you.
The future is yours and you are up to the challenge.
Very special thanks go to the staff at John Wiley and Sons. This book took much longer than
it should have, and throughout it, all my editors were encouraging and understanding. Their
patience with this project was greatly appreciated.
And, as always, I am grateful for the love and support of my wife, Doreen. I am constantly
amazed at her patience and willingness to put up with crazy ideas.
An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come.
Victor Hugo
This is not the book I planned to write. When I first started this project in 2004, my original
plan was to base the book on material I had developed for a course on emergency planning and
management that I had taught for the University of California at Long Beach and to incorpo-
rate new information I had gained by teaching seminars on the Oational Preparedness Standard
for Oew York Universitys IOTERCEP program. It was to have been a very conventional book,
focused on the tactical issues so dear to us old dinosaurs in emergency management.
Hurricane Katrina changed all that. As my colleagues and I wrestled with the issues of cat-
astrophic response, I began to question a lot of our traditional approaches to disaster response.
An article by Dr. E.L. Quarantelli on the qualitative differences between catastrophe and
disaster added fuel to the flames and sent me back to the social science literature. A comment
during a presentation at the 2005 International Association of Emergency Managers conference
provided the catalyst that made all the disparate elements come together.
This book approaches emergency management from a different perspective than the tradi-
tional four phases of emergency management. It does not have the equally traditional listing of
hazards and impacts. It does not even give a lot of detail about response. There are plenty of
excellent books already available that deal with these topics. Instead, I have focused on the
development of emergency management programs and attempted to position these programs
within local government in a way that contributes to community goals by helping to manage
community risk. The idea of emergency management as an enterprisewide program forms, I
believe, the core of the Oational Preparedness Standard, OFPA 1600, and its derivative, the
Emergency Management Accreditation Program Standard. This concept also demands a
change in the role of the emergency manager from that of a technical expert who is responsible
for everything vaguely related to disasters to that of a program manager who coordinates the
communitys management of risk.
This is a very different perspective from the way we have traditionally viewed emergency
managers. However, the best emergency managers have either already adapted to this concept
or are on their way to doing so. More importantly, an entirely new generation of future
emergency managers is emerging from our educational institutions, potential leaders who are
trained in this new paradigm. The real issue for our profession will be gaining the acceptance
of elected officials and the public for this new role and overcoming the roadblocks created by
the wellmeaning but outoftouch Department of Homeland Security.
The ideas in this book are likely to be controversial and, I hope, spark discussion among my
colleagues. There is no single best way to respond to disastersby virtue of the need for inno-
vation and creative problemsolving during response, there really cannot be. However, we can
define a common set of criteria that positions us for success. It is this belief that has caused
PREFACE TOTHEFIRST EDITION
xvi PREFACE TOTHEFIRST EDITIOO
a number of my colleagues to expend considerable efforts to develop OFPA 1600 and the
EMAP Standard. Therefore, although some of my ideas may be controversial, they are
grounded in this common set of criteria and in a considerable body of social science research.
I had hoped initially to write a book that would be applicable to both the public and private
sectors. However, I began to realize that there are, in fact, qualitative differences between the
two sectors that make such a task extremely difficult. The principles are the same, but there are
enough subtle nuances that would have made the book cumbersome. Wherever I could, I have
tried to focus on concepts and principles; therefore, it is my hope that this book may be of some
value to my colleagues in the private sector.
I have had to make similar decisions in some of the titles I selected. Over the last few years,
there have been many new players getting involved in disaster response. We are seeing a conver-
gence of disciplines that will have a profound impact on our professions in the future. Risk
managers, security managers, business continuity managers, and so many others are lending
important new skills to our programs. Therefore, although I have focused this book on public
sector emergency managers, it is my hope that there will be applicability to the other disciplines
that are involved with disaster response. Each of these disciplines has a specialized body of
knowledge that makes us experts in our field, but there is a commonality among disciplines
when we start discussing emergency preparedness and response.
It has been said that no book is the sole product of the author and how true that is! The two
most humbling things I know are teaching a course or writing a book about your profession. It
forces you to confront how little you really know and how much better others have expressed
the ideas you are groping toward. Thomas Edison once said that, If I have seen farther than
others, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of giants. Many of those giants are listed in
the bibliography.
I am an emergency management dinosaur. I came to the profession with previous experience
in private security and the military at a time when you learned your craft from your mentors
and your colleagues. It was years before I discovered that everything that I had learned the hard
way had already been written about by social scientists such as Russell Dynes and E.L.
Quarantelli. The advantage to coming to their work late in my career is that I know they are
right their work corresponds to the lessons I have learned in over 30 years of dealing with
crisis. Therefore, to all those social scientists that are building the knowledge base so critical to
our profession, at least one emergency manager has heard you and appreciates your hard work.
For the rest, there are friends and colleagues around the world who have taught me my craft
and had a part, however unknowing, in the writing of this book. I am always amazed at the
generosity of my fellow emergency managers and their willingness to help in any and all cir-
cumstances. If I have learned anything in this business, it has been because of you. You know
who you are.
A final thank you goes, as always, to my wife Doreen, who suffered through multiple reread-
ings of the initial manuscript and encouraged me to keep plugging away. For over 20 years, she
has been my moral compass and best friend.
INTRODUCTION
I cannot imagine any condition which would cause a ship to founder. I cannot conceive of any
vital disaster happening to this vessel. Modern ship building has gone beyond that.
Captain Edward John Smith, Commander, HMS Titanic
When on Friday, 24 February 2006, the White House issued a report entitled, The Federal
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, one salty emergency manager observed It
aint a lesson learned until you correct it and prove it works. Until then, its just an observa-
tion. The White House report was just one of several released around the same time, all saying
essentially the same thing: as a nation, the United States is not prepared to deal with catastrophe.
How is this possible? The United States has been in the emergency management business for
over 50 years. There are volumes of social science reports on human behavior in disaster. There
are detailed records on historical disasters that have occurred in the past 300 years and geolog-
ical records going back to prehistory. Millions have been spent on building the capacity to
respond. Since September 11 there has been an even bigger push to strengthen and enhance
emergency response capabilities. And yet, in the biggest test in US history, the system failed at
all levels of government.
Despite vows to improve things, little has changed. Hurricane Sandy in 2012 highlighted
weaknesses in key infrastructure. The multiple disasters in 2017 severely taxed the United
States ability to respond, particularly on the island of Puerto Rico. These are not, unfortu-
nately, isolated cases. Every disaster seems to generate a list of failures couched as lessons
learned, along with pledges to improve the system. Few of those pledges are ever implemented.
Yet, like Captain Smith, citizens in the United States believe that a sophisticated system of
response is in place to protect them from the unthinkable. There is an expectation that, no
matter what the event, government will be there to provide immediate and effective relief.
To a certain extent, emergency management in the United States is a victim of its own suc-
cess. Response is extremely fast compared to other countries, and there is a culture of profes-
sionalism among first responders that makes them second to none. However, this has led to the
expectation that disaster response is a government responsibility, not a collective one, and there
are increased demands for more immediate and detailed services. This is a demand that has
obvious limits, as demonstrated by Hurricane Katrina.
Government officials at all levels go out of their way to reinforce these public expectations.
In a speech to the Heritage Foundation, Michael Chertoff, at the time Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, encouraged people to be prepared, saying you cannot
count on help coming in the first 24 or even 48 hours of a catastrophe people who are pre-
pared with that kind of planning do much better if they have to wait 2448 hours than people
who dont do that planning. Secretary Chertoff seemed unaware that he had just shortened
the normal recommendation of preparing for a minimum of 72 hours by 2448 hours and
further encouraged the publics expectation of immediate response.
xviii INTRODUCTION
It is unheard of for an elected official to admit the truth. Disasters, by definition, overwhelm
available local resources. You can never be fully prepared; there is not enough money or political
will to fund all the requirements for mitigation and preparedness planning that would ensure
full readiness. Preparedness is a balancing act, with most politicians betting that a disaster will
not happen on their watch and that the public will not discover the thin veneer that passes for
preparedness. Jurisdictions are unprepared, and it is extremely unlikely that they will ever reach
the level of preparedness that the public believes already exists. The bar has been set too high
to be supported by local, state, or federal government without a major shift of priorities.
However, as one reads afteraction reports and lessons learned, one begins to sense com-
monalities. It is seldom the initial lifesaving response that is criticized. Police, fire, and
emergency medical personnel usually get high marks for their efforts in a crisis. Witness the
praise deservedly heaped on the US Coast Guard for its rescue of 33 000 victims during
Hurricane Katrina (an operation so successful that Secretary Chertoff believed that only Coast
Guard admirals were qualified to serve as Principal Federal Officials). Instead, criticism seems
to fall into two areas. The first is related to traditional victim services such as sheltering or evac-
uation. Criticism of victim services usually reflects inadequacy of service or confusion in the
delivery of services brought on by poor coordination among relief agencies. Indeed, some
social scientists suggest that the biggest problem in disasters is not the impact of the event on
the victims but the lack of coordination among multiple responding agencies. This confusion
and lack of coordination can impede the delivery of services.
The second major area of criticism relates to longterm issues. This is usually characterized
by conflicts over reconstruction policies. Again, one notes concerns over confusion in the pro-
cess. There is a lack of coordination and public participation that leads to delays in the
rebuilding of a community and the restoration of its economic base. It is during this recovery
period that one generally sees the emergence of fingerpointing and an increase in underlying
social tension. There is usually a conflict between citizens who want to rebuild quickly and
return the community to the way it was and officials who push for improved structures or social
reengineering.
Again, one must ask the question Why? Why, in a system that has almost 70 years of expe-
rience in countless disasters, that has national guidelines, that has millions in government fund-
ing, and that has reams of textbooks and social science reports, why is it that the system seems
to fail more than it works, and why do those failures always seem to be in the same areas? Can
the United States do better?
The fact that these failures seem to occur in almost every disaster and in almost always the
same areas would seem to suggest that there is something wrong with the system. Social science
suggests some of the reasons. Emergency management issues do not generally engage local
officials. In many jurisdictions, the responsibility for developing emergency response capacity
rests with a single individual and is usually an additional duty. Emergency planning is viewed
as a task centered on the development of a paper plan, and there is no real linkage between
emergency management and community goals and vision. Worse, emergency plans incorporate
assumptions based on disaster myths that do not reflect the reality of human behavior in
disasters.
This book suggests that the United States can do better by changing the nature of emergency
management and traditional response. It is time for a different approach, one that is supported
by social science and by new national standards for emergency management programs. This
approach is based on the concept that emergency management is a distributed process, one that
must be collectively performed by the community. This suggests that emergency management
must be integrated with other community goals and, as such, must be perceived as adding value
to the community. This added value is achieved by helping the community manage overall risk.
The communitywide approach also holds implications for the emergency manager. Instead of
INTRODUCTION xix
being a technical expert on emergency operations, the emergency manager becomes a program
manager whose job is to facilitate
